Opportunistic wireless channel access by non-licensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. In this thesis, we first design both a deterministic heuristic auction and a randomized auction with a provable performance bound with the guarantee of truthfulness, for networked secondary users. We then turn our attention to mobility support for the secondary users. We introduce two-dimensional bids that reflect a secondary user's willingness to pay for exclusive and nonexclusive channel usage, for the single-channel and multiple-channel scenarios, under which we prove their performances under desired equilibria, respectively. We also devise core-selecting auctions in a combinatorial setting, where secondary users can submit flexible preferences on channels. These auctions can resolve VCG's vulnerability to collusion and shill bidding, and improves seller revenue.

The focus of this thesis is to better explore and understand the effects of agent interactions, information feedback, and adaptive learning in a repeated game of bidding in farmland auction markets. This thesis will develop a multi-agent model of farm-land auction markets based on data from the Saskatchewan Dark Brown Soil Zone of the Canadian Prairies. Several auction types will be modeled and data will be gathered on land transactions between farm agents to ascertain which auction type (if any) is best suited for farmland markets. Specifically, the model gathers information for 3 types of sealed-bid auctions, and 1 English auction and compares them on the basis of efficiency, price information revelation, stability, and with respect to repeated bidding and agent learning. The effects of auction choice on macro-level indicators, such as farm exits, retirement, financial stability, average productivity, farm size, and participation were unknown at the outset of this thesis because of the complex dynamic nature of the environment. I find that the chosen learning mechanism employed here affects both price and variance of prices in all auctions. I also find that the second-price-sealed-bid auction generates the most perceived surplus, most equitable share of surplus, and also decreases uncertainty in the common-value element of prices. A priori it was believed that auction choice would have an impact on pricing efficiency, price levels, and shares of surplus generated from auctions as predicted by theoretical works. Surprisingly, auction choice does not influence market structure or evolution.

The focus of this thesis is to better explore and understand the effects of agent interactions, information feedback, and adaptive learning in a repeated game of bidding in farmland auction markets. This thesis will develop a multi-agent model of farm-land auction markets based on data from the Saskatchewan Dark Brown Soil Zone of the Canadian Prairies. Several auction types will be modeled and data will be gathered on land transactions between farm agents to ascertain which auction type (if any) is best suited for farmland markets. Specifically, the model gathers information for 3 types of sealed-bid auctions, and 1 English auction and compares them on the basis of efficiency, price information revelation, stability, and with respect to repeated bidding and agent learning. The effects of auction choice on macro-level indicators, such as farm exits, retirement, financial stability, average productivity, farm size, and participation were unknown at the outset of this thesis because of the complex dynamic nature of the environment. I find that the chosen learning mechanism employed here affects both price and variance of prices in all auctions. I also find that the second-price-sealed-bid auction generates the most perceived surplus, most equitable share of surplus, and also decreases uncertainty in the common-value element of prices. A priori it was believed that auction choice would have an impact on pricing efficiency, price levels, and shares of surplus generated from auctions as predicted by theoretical works. Surprisingly, auction choice does not influence market structure or evolution.

Ratings of e-auction sellers have been an important index for e-auction buyers to form their trust. Many researches show that trust impacts the success of e-auction. Reputation or ratings have significant impacts on trust in e-auction. In order to investigate the phenomena of ratings and trust, this research adopts the diffusion of innovation model to perform an empirical data fitting analysis for the trends of seller¡¦s ratings. The results show that the rating grows slowly in the beginning, and it accelerates when the ratings are accumulated. The maximum growth rate change usually is in the range of 240 to 320 for the numbers of ratings. It implies the sellers with ratings of the amounts sell more and grow quicker. It implies they have gained more trust from the e-auction buyers. The other possibility is that those sellers become more familiar and skillful to perform e-auction.

Oil and gas auctions help transact billions of dollars in property sales in the US each year. Value is lost by participants with ineffective strategies. Federal lease auctions have been investigated from public data, but research in this narrow area peaked in the 1980s. Private property auctions did not emerge as a transaction force until nearly a decade later; however, today they dwarf federal lease sales in volume and value. This is the first study to publish research on private auctions and the first to consolidate historical lease research findings with private auction strategies. This dissertation reviews past research, interviews industry professionals, analyzes case histories, conducts game experiments, and synthesizes these views for strategic application. Findings from these efforts include the following: Reducing uncertainty increases bid values; Federal lease bid values tend to be log normal; Aggressive bidding results in a poor portfolio performance; Increasing competition increases bid values; Inexperience increases aggressive bidding; A significant group of companies do not follow consistent auction strategies; Top winning bid drivers are aggressive 3P reserves and commodity prices; Top value risks are commodity prices, capital, and operating expenses; Properties with upside value receive higher bids using sealed-bid auctions; Auction players can bid significantly less and sustain a high win probability; More money is left on the table in federal lease sales than private auctions; Poor data is primary reason auctions fail to complete the transaction; Profit taking is primary reason for selling properties though an auction; Market metrics are useful in valuation analysis; Producing properties receiver higher bids than undeveloped properties with same common knowledge including total proved reserves; Oral auctions receive higher bids than sealed-bid auctions with same common knowledge; Competition increases bid values in sealed-bid auctions; Reserve size does not increase relative value in sealed-bids with same common knowledge other than a magnitude of volume.

Following the prevailing of the internet, the vigorous development e-commerce has given great impacts on traditional tangible stores and the whole marketing environments. Information Technology has not only changed our lives, but also changed consumers¡¦ behavior and marketing channels; and the e-commerce effect has already started to permeate into every stratum of business activities, including the exploitation, marketing, and after-sales service of new products, brings the industries infinite business chances. According to the reports of Institute for Information Industry, the market of internet shopping is going into its high development period, and as the idea of internet consumption disseminates gradually, the internet business transaction market of consumers¡¦ side also becomes an important internet business area. As the portal site operators think the environment of internet shopping in Taiwan as mature, now not only the B2C market seems full of potential, the C2C trend is also not far from breaking out. This research targets at the professional internet auctioneers who have used the auction websites to sell, exploratorily analyzes their operation strategy and performances. To be more specific, the main purpose of this research is to examine the relation between the individual characteristics, entrepreneurial motives, and operation strategies of the entrepreneur internet auctioneer and their operation performances, intending to realize if these differences in different economic situations would bring different influences into their performances. Accordingly, I chose the auctioneers of the 2003 best-scale auction website-Yahoo! as research objectives, using internet questionnaires and invited auctioneers to answer them, and finally gathered 155 valid samples to identify the relation between their marketing strategy combinations and performances. Various data statistic analyses including descriptive statistics, factor analysis, reliability analysis, Pearson correlations analysis and regression analysis are completed by SPSS Version 10.1. Through this research I find that in promotion strategies, if the auctioneers strengthen their sale skill and membership management system, the re-buy rate of members and the business volume can be heightened effectively; and by effectively holding the regular consumers, auctioneers can save a large amount of operation cost searching for new customers and thus can maintain their advantages in making profits. On the other hand, in product strategies, the auctioneers emphasize a lot in the best presentation of their product information (with pictures and texts), which obviously in turn helps them a lot in stimulating buying rates. Besides, the auctioneers also stress on the cultivation of their professional abilities and their knowledge about the products, along with the preservation of virtuous interactions with their customers, their operation performances can be enhanced even more.

Tobacco plays a very significant role in Malawi’s economy by being the largest foreign exchange earner for the economy. The Integrated Production System was implemented in 2012 to promote contract production and also improve quality of tobacco which would therefore fetch higher prices for farmers. Contract farming has been believed to be potentially beneficial, but many farmers still choose not to produce under contract. This study examines factors that influence farmers’ tobacco contracting decisions. 300 farmers were interviewed for the study using a structured questionnaire. Data was analyzed with logit model using SAS software. Expected auction market price, expected fertilizer cost for contract tobacco production, and the number of years farmers have grown tobacco are negatively related to producers’ adoption of contract production. Expected contract market prices, expected non-contract fertilizer cost, loan expectations, number of years farmer has previously contracted and offarm income are positively related to contract adoption .

The thesis deals with two kinds of double auction - with the continuous auction and a sequence of call auctions. We explain their rules and we define their models. We present results of simulations of the both kinds of double auction - the aim is to look for the call auction with such parameters that the prices and the traded volume of the continuous auction are approximated best. Finally, in a theoretical part, we characterize the dis- tribution of the order book in the continuous auction and then we specify the joint distribution of the price and the traded volume in the call auction (the distribution of bid, ask and the traded volume given by the continuous auction may be immediately devised from the distribution of the order book).

This dissertation pursues to find an answer empirically to the question of the revenue ranking between the multiple price auction and the single price auction. I also attempt to get empirical clues in terms of the efficiency ranking between the two. Under the assumptions of symmetric bidders and private independent value (PIV), I derive the optimal bidding conditions for both auction formats. Following the structural model estimation approach, I estimate the underlying distribution of market clearing price using the nonparametric resampling strategy and recover the bidders’ unknown true valuations corresponding to each observed bid point. With these estimated valuations of the bidders, I calculate what the upper bound of the revenue would have been under the Vickery auction to perform the counterfactual revenue comparison with the actual revenue. I find that, ex-post, the multiple price auction yields more revenue to the Korean Treasury than the alternative. I also investigate the efficiency ranking by comparing the number of bids switched and the amount of surplus change which would occur when the bidders are assumed to report their true valuations as their bids. I find that the multiple price auction is also superior to the alternative in efficiency which supports the current theoretical prediction. Finally, I investigate the robustness of my model and empirical results by relaxing the previous assumptions. I, first, extend the model and estimation to the case of asymmetric bidders where the bidders are divided into two groups based on their size. It shows that the model and estimation framework are still valid and that the empirical findings are very similar to the symmetric case. I also test for the presence of common value (CV) component in the bidders’ valuation function. I propose the simple regression model adopting the idea of the policy experimental approach. I obtain quite an inconclusive result in general but find some evidence supporting PIV for relatively higher bid prices while supporting CV for lower bid prices.

The main purpose is to develop the auction system that enables enterprise employees to create and update information in website fast and easily. Such e–shops are one of the main components of auctions. System of auctions suggests great opportunity to sell goods or services on Internet of all over the world. There is an opportunity to obtain goods that we gained in a traditional market, staying at home or at your job place. This web system is suitable for sale companies. Either goods or facilities (services) can be sold in web market. Such type of web market is available for everyone. Both, enterprise companies or private persons can use it. There is an opportunity not only to buy, but to sell by you too. The increase of Internet users in Lithuania causes a development of such kind of systems and becomes more available. The system has user – friendly interface, good performance and ensures secure access. It can work on any operating system, which supports Apache Web server with PHP and MySQL database.