In recent years, there has been a global trend of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 2011, Canada joined this trend by implementing mandatory IFRS adoption for publicly traded firms. Proponents of IFRS adoption claim that it will benefit investors by improving comparability and transparency of firms. At the same time, research on family firms has seen increasing focus. Because of family ties to the firm, family firms can exhibit different motivations, behaviours and performance than do non-family firms. In this research, I attempt to gain insight on the effects of IFRS adoption for a unique set of firms, namely publicly traded family firms by examining the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings informativeness. Although previous literature examines the economic consequences of IFRS adoption, my study is the first to my knowledge that examines IFRS adoption effects on the unique set of family firms. I run a pooled regression to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings informativeness. I find that IFRS adoption by Canadian family firms is associated with a statistically significant higher level of earnings informativeness. The findings of this research could have implications for standard setters, minority shareholders of family firms, and academic researchers.

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Many previous studies find that family firms are prevalent among the U.S. firms. In particular, more than 35 percent of the S&P 500 firms consist of family firms in which families control about 18 percent of their firms’ shares. According to agency theory, the characteristics of a firm’s ownership, governance, and control play a critical role in the firm’s risk-taking activities and information flow to the market. Our study aims to investigate two controversies in the family business literature: whether family firms undertake fewer or more risks than non-family firms do, and whether family firms exhibit higher or lower information flow, reflected in their stock price informativeness and earnings informativeness, to the market. Using a sample of the S&P 500 companies as of 2003 for the period 2003-2007, we find that compared with non-family firms, the stock prices of family firms have more firm specific information impounded and the accounting earnings of family firms are more informative and thereby have more explanatory power for stock returns. These results are robust to different model specifications and variable proxies. In terms of risk-taking levels in corporate investment, our results indicate that family firms, on average, undertake fewer risks than non-family firms do. In particular, we find that although G-index is negatively associated with corporate risk-taking in non-family firms as previous studies (e.g. John et al., 2008) find for general firms, governance provisions do not have any influence on corporate risk-taking decisions in family firms. Numerous additional sensitivity tests using different corporate risk-taking proxies confirm the robustness of the findings.

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common “one share-one vote” configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.

This dissertation investigates the interrelationships between a client's non-GAAP earnings disclosures, financial health (profit and loss status), and the external auditor's assessment of the client's going concern status. This dissertation comprises two essays. Essay 1 examines the informativeness and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures in profit and loss firms separately. Using a large sample of non-GAAP earnings voluntarily disclosed by managers, I find that the informativeness and the quality of non-GAAP earnings vary in firms cross-classified by GAAP loss status and non-GAAP loss status. I also find that loss firms have higher quality non-GAAP exclusions relative to profit firms, although the expenses excluded by both profit and loss firms are associated with firms' future performance. Further, I posit and find that profit firms which voluntarily disclose non-GAAP losses have high-quality exclusions, while other non-GAAP reporting profit firms have low-quality exclusions. Having found that non-GAAP earnings in loss firms is opportunistic to some extent, I next study, in Essay 2, whether auditors understand the implications of low-quality non-GAAP reporting in these firms. Specifically, I examine 1) whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures are associated with the propensity of the auditor's going concern issuance to loss firms, and 2) whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures affect the accuracy of the auditor's going concern assessment. This is important because auditors often conduct audits of loss firms that disclose non-GAAP earnings, and the consequences of issuing wrong audit opinions can be severe. I find that the propensity of the auditor's going concern issuance is negatively associated with the magnitude of expense exclusions in loss firms, after controlling for determinants of going concern opinions that are derived from GAAP earnings. This finding suggests that auditors take into account information embedded in non-GAAP earnings when assessing clients' going concern status. Using bankruptcy outcome as a benchmark, I find that non-GAAP earnings disclosures could increase type II errors in auditors' going concern reporting. I further find that small size auditors and non-specialist auditors are more likely to be misled by non-GAAP reporting when making going concern decisions. In sum, my dissertation furthers our understanding of non-GAAP reporting and its implication for auditors' decision making for issuing going concern opinions.