Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Jack M. Holl / Donald J. Mrozek / As president, Dwight Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion, were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against the threat of international communism. He championed the beneficent role played by nuclear weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the simultaneous and multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war. Eisenhower's assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous. He desired to make nuclear weapons as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary military technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane. He also planned to exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also believed could contribute to national strength. However, Eisenhower did not possess a systematic view of national security in the nuclear age as some scholars have argued. Rather, Eisenhower approached the question of how to defend national security through nuclear weapons with an array of disparate ideas and programs which worked simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives that were unified only by a simple conception of national strength. In this effort, Eisenhower occasionally pursued what might seem to be conflicting initiatives, but nonetheless consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was possible, necessary, and sustainable. Because he believed nuclear technology effectively served his goal to defend national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the safety of the republic. He conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation, Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the international community of the U.S.'s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national conscience. Through his efforts, Eisenhower made nuclear weapons and nuclear technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable to U.S. national security in the twentieth century.

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This study illuminates Dwight D. Eisenhower’s efforts during his first term as President to advance new global norms that would make peace a more enduring aspect of international relations. Between 1945 and 1952, Eisenhower was an engaged supporter of America’s efforts to move the world away from the “war-system” that characterized the early twentieth century. The venture included implementing the Bretton Woods economic agreements, creating the United Nations, adopting the UN Human Rights Convention and supporting collective security organizations, such as NATO. Combined, these efforts mitigated the primary causes of war and advanced new standards of global statecraft. They also competed for influence over US foreign policy and for global support. Eisenhower’s election in 1952 represented a mandate to prevent an early failure of the undertaking. Within months of taking office, Ike implemented a comprehensive grand strategy that included the imaginative use of military and economic power, as well as the addition of moral power to guide US foreign policy. By 1956, this grand strategy had advanced America’s leadership in global affairs through the advocacy of new norms of conduct that produced mutually beneficial norms and standards. However, the Suez Crisis threatened to derail the American project. Eisenhower understood the stakes and decided to oppose the British and French efforts to secure the Suez Canal Zone by force. Throughout the crisis, America upheld the new standards of nation-state conduct agreed to in the United Nations Charter. This decision consolidated the position of the free world and served the nation’s enduring interest of advancing a peaceful world order. / History

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1965 B13 / Master of Science

Dwight D. Eisenhower has been criticized as an anti-intellectual by scholars such as Richard Hofstadter. Eisenhower’s tenure as president of Columbia University was one segment of his career he was particularly criticized for because of his non-traditional approach to education there. This paper examines Eisenhower’s time at Columbia to explain how anti-intellectualism played into his university administration. It explains how his personality and general outlook came to clash with the intellectual environment of Columbia especially in the wake of the faculty revolt against former Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler. It argues that Eisenhower utilized the Columbia institution to promote a Cold War educational agenda, which often belittled Columbia intellectuals and their scholarly pursuits. However, this paper also counter-argues that Eisenhower, despite accusations of anti-intellectualism, was an academically interested man who never engaged in true suppression of free thought despite pressure from McCarthyite influences in American government, media and business.

This academic report is the written analysis of my experience as a production intern at The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, DC. My internship specifically involved production and this report discusses production management across the performing arts disciplines, as experienced during my 480 hour internship experience. I describe the organizational history of the Kennedy Center and the internship process. I create a SWOT analysis pertaining to factors affecting the Production Department, discuss production management best practices, and make recommendations for the Center’s improvement.

This thesis analyzes how Eisenhower defined war and its utility in his New Look defense policy and the ramifications for America’s interactions with the world through its foreign policy. It argues that Eisenhower redefined the relationship between war and society as he executed his grand strategy, further removing society from the decision for war. To avoid what he believed to be the inevitable global destruction of a general war turned nuclear, Eisenhower broadened the scope of ‘war” to balance domestic opinion for containing communism while also avoiding the devastating consequences of war in American society. By authorizing coups in Iran and Guatemala, Eisenhower blurred the line between coercive diplomacy and violent political warfare. President Eisenhower’s reliance on covert action to achieve political outcomes prevented general or nuclear war but it strengthened an emerging model for society’s relationship with war. Political warfare and covert action increased the gap between society and the commitment of American power during the Cold War. In his effort to prevent war, Eisenhower expanded presidential power and set a precedent that continues today.