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Master of Arts / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / As the 1950s began, Western European defense policy posed unique challenges for the United States. At the outset of the Cold War, U.S. officials recognized that maintaining a free Western Europe was vital to the long-term survival of the United States against the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. While America could rely on its long-range nuclear bombers (and, in a few years, its intercontinental ballistic missiles) as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against the continental United States, the situation in Europe was more complicated. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), first organized in 1949, was the defense pact designed to counter the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe. The NATO alliance, however, still recovering from the destruction of the Second World War, was in no condition to oppose Soviet aggression at the end of 1950. Yet by 1955, the situation in Europe was dramatically different. The NATO allies had transformed from a loose confederation of weak nations to a strong international alliance capable of confronting the Communist forces if necessary. At the center of this transformation was Dwight D. Eisenhower. In January 1951, Eisenhower assumed the position of NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and spent nearly two years strengthening the Western European alliance. Then, after entering the White House as president in 1953, Eisenhower used his experiences as SACEUR to reinforce several aspects of his own defense policy. Ultimately, several key aspects of Eisenhower's ―New Look‖ defense policy (such as the continued emphasis of the NATO alliance) had their antecedents in Eisenhower's service as NATO Supreme Commander.

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This paper examines the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis as a diplomatic experience, conducted by the U.S. and U.S.S.R as an alternative to war. Both nations had nuclear weapon capabilities that could transform a local conflict into general war. The potential for disaster, plus other limits, made a series of diplomatic encounters the only productive option. The diplomatic course also shielded American and Russian interests indirectly related to the conflict. Each nation and its leader had pragmatic reasons for practicing restraint. These included conservation of assets, political stability, and most importantly, poor chances for sustainable gains. Limited war doctrine was influential in establishing these policies.

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The cranberry scare of 1959 was the first food scare in the United States involving food additives to have a national impact. It was also the first event to test the Delaney clause, part of a 1958 amendment to the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act prohibiting cancer-causing chemicals in food. Although lasting only a few weeks, the scare significantly affected the cranberry industry and brought the regulation of chemical residues in food to the national stage. Generated by a complex interaction of legislation, technology, media, and science, the scare had far-reaching effects in all areas of the cranberry industry, food legislation, and the perception of the public toward additives and residues in their food. The ripples caused by the scare permanently altered the cranberry industry and, after numerous subsequent scares and challenges to the law, eventually resulted in the repeal of the Delaney clause. The goal of this investigation was to demonstrate how the social, scientific, and political climates in the United States interacted and led to such an event. It shows how science, politics, and contemporary social anxiety combined, with technology as a catalyst, and how the resulting scare left significant marks on the development of both legislation and industry. It also improves our understanding of this seminal event in American social history by exploring the events surrounding the scare, as well as by comparing the perspectives and reactions of the public, the Eisenhower administration, the cranberry industry, and other industries affected by the scare and its aftermath.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 444-450).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Northern Illinois University, 1995. / Dept. of History. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [393]-409).