In recent years, judicial elections have undergone a transformation: races once characterized by low levels of competition, interest and participation are now comparable, in some states, to races for governor or senator. Elections for the bench as a whole are now more expensive, competitive and politicized than ever before. Arguably the most influential change in the last ten years has been the emergence of independent expenditures by political action committees and other groups in races for seats on state supreme courts. Despite the growth of this type of spending, our understanding of independent expenditures is rather limited, as the distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates is rarely made clear.I address this in this dissertation by examining the patterns of independent spending in states with elected supreme courts. In doing so, I develop a theoretical framework to explain the decision of individual groups to support a judicial candidate independently. I argue that this decision is shaped largely by the campaign regulations imposed on judicial candidates and their potential supporters. Expectations from this theory are tested throughout the remainder of the dissertation using an original set of data drawn directly from state disclosure records. I find that independent expenditures have been concentrated in only a few states in recent years and that campaign regulations are influential in shaping this aggregate behavior. Contribution limits, in particular, redirect money from candidates' campaigns to independent expenditures. This is particularly significant due to the unique nature of judicial elections and the role of a judge in American politics. The results of the statistical and case study analyses should give pause to participants in the normative debates regarding campaign finance and judicial reform as they suggest that regulations can have unintended, but important consequences.

No description available.

In 2010, our definition of democracy in America was drastically changed by the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC. The Court ruled that under the First Amendment, corporations have the right to free speech. The decision removed the final ban on corporations, which prohibited corporate money used for direct advocacy. The consequences of this have been tremendous. The decision has allowed for the creation and rise of Super PACs and political active nonprofits. As a result, Super PACs and nonprofits now act as “shadow campaigns”. Outside groups have the ability to engage in voter suppression tactics without politically hurting the candidate. Unlike political candidates, there are no direct ramifications for an outside organization to get caught engaging in voter suppression. They are not held accountable by anyone. The ability to take political action that is independent from the government or campaigns allows for a new form of corruption. Corruption is no longer a coordinated act between corporate money and a candidate, but rather political actions that take place outside the public sphere. Political actions that take place in the private sphere are outside the realm of political accountability. The people stand powerless against private outside organizations.

In 2010, our definition of democracy in America was drastically changed by the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC. The Court ruled that under the First Amendment, corporations have the right to free speech. The decision removed the final ban on corporations, which prohibited corporate money used for direct advocacy. The consequences of this have been tremendous. The decision has allowed for the creation and rise of Super PACs and political active nonprofits. As a result, Super PACs and nonprofits now act as “shadow campaigns”. Outside groups have the ability to engage in voter suppression tactics without politically hurting the candidate. Unlike political candidates, there are no direct ramifications for an outside organization to get caught engaging in voter suppression. They are not held accountable by anyone. The ability to take political action that is independent from the government or campaigns allows for a new form of corruption. Corruption is no longer a coordinated act between corporate money and a candidate, but rather political actions that take place outside the public sphere. Political actions that take place in the private sphere are outside the realm of political accountability. The people stand powerless against private outside organizations.

published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

No description available.

No description available.

The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms signaled a new and vastly expanded role for the judiciary. By entrenching our civil liberties into the Canadian Constitution, the courts were given the express authority to override inconsistent statutes. Due to the inherent overlap between law and politics, election law is an area that is particularly sensitive to this recent enlargement of judicial power. Despite this, the courts have scrutinized many areas of election law and many federal and provincial statutes have been fundamentally altered. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the courts have developed a uniform theory of judicial review where election law is concerned via four case studies: electoral boundary redistribution, prisoner voting rights, the publication of opinion polls during campaigns and third party spending limits. Through an extensive review of the relevant case law and literature, I conclude that the courts have failed to develop a coherent and consistent theory judicial review regarding the application of the Charter to election law. My analysis reveals that the inconsistencies stem largely from three main sources: first is the failure of the courts to adopt a single vision of what constitutes a fair electoral system; second is that the case studies are dealing with two different sections of the Charter (ss. 2(b) and 3); and third is the Oakes test which has expanded judicial discretion along with the potential for disparity. If consistency is ever going to be achieved, the courts need to adopt a single vision of democracy in Canada. Until then, we are left to guess when our political rights may be justifiably restricted under the Charter.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-75).