Deregulation is a growing trend and the electricity industry has not escaped its reaches. With worldwide experiences spanning only thirty years, there is substantial interest in analyzing current and future market designs so that market power cannot be used to increase the price of electricity significantly. / This thesis analyzes market power in electricity markets through the notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) and, more specifically, through Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). We will examine how SFE can be modified to incorporate capacity constraints on generators and generating companies (gencos) controlling more than one generator for a Poolco electricity market with marginal pricing. / A genco's supply function is assumed to be of the form gi=l-aibi . Gaming is done either with ai or bi only, while keeping the other parameter at true cost. Gaming with both variables cannot be analyzed since the problem would have too many degrees of freedom. For each possible generator output level (minimum output, maximum output, or in between), analytical methods are employed to determine all candidate Nash equilibria. Then, simulations are performed over the range of possible genco offers to determine whether these candidates meet the complete set of Nash equilibrium criteria, specifically whether any genco can or cannot improve its profit by gaming. / For various inelastic demand levels, study cases indicate that there are either no Nash equilibria or only one. In the multi-unit genco case, the price of electricity is found to be higher than in the case where each genco owns only one generator, illustrating the effect of market concentration on the price. Whether capacity constraints are considered or not, the price of electricity appears to be higher if gencos are allowed to game with bi instead of ai. / The inclusion of capacity constraints on generators and the consideration of the multi-unit genco case will allow for better genco modeling in a Poolco market with marginal pricing. In turn, this will lead to more accurate analysis of the effects of current and possible rules and regulations on the price of electricity.

The last decade has delivered rapid structural change to the Australian electricity sector. The common conceptualisation of the sector's restructuring has been narrowly based around sector-specific regulatory change and the creation of a national electricity market. This thesis argues that such a focus provides an incomplete and inaccurate explanation of the transformation. Three closely interrelated layers of policies and actions embodying the precepts of neoliberalism, and implemented by the state, have driven the sector's transformation. These policies and actions transcend 'electricity-centric' policies and encompass policies which have become systemic to the Australian public sector as well as a third layer which has transformed the prevailing industrial paradigm across all industry sectors. The drivers of the electricity sector's restructuring -- and the outcomes and beneficiaries arising -- form the core research focus of this thesis. The research task is addressed by using the analytical framework of the French theory of r??gulation. The analysis reveals that the electricity sector has been Australia's second largest contributor of privatisation proceeds, remains dominated by government ownership and has falling levels of foreign ownership. Higher relative wage levels and union membership are also evident as have been job losses and substantial real price increases for households whereas those for business have generally fallen. The purported 'reform' centrepiece, the national electricity market, was found to be increasingly uncompetitive due to its own regulatory regime and market manipulation by government-owned companies. In addition, the sector exhibits a heightened precariousness: an unprecedented financial vulnerability arising from a strong appetite for debt and derivatives and exacerbated by payments to government owners not by new investment in generation capacity; increasing tensions between the nation-state and local-state concerning the national electricity market and compromises with labour; and an exposure to political and financial risks from the sector's global integration. The clear winners from the sector's restructuring are the owners of capital and the state, particularly the local-state, although the sustainability of this situation is questionable. The analysis also generates a number of propositions about the application of r??gulation theory to sector-based research.

Thesis (M. Ec.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Economics, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-225).

Thesis (M.S. in computer science)--Washington State University, December 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-109).

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Western Sydney, 2004. / "A thesis presented to the University of Western Sydney, in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy" Bibliography : leaves 273-285.

"Dissertation, Humboldt-Universitäte zu Berlin, 2008"--T.p. verso. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-212) and index.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 272-293). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph.D.)-- University of Gothenburg, 2008. / "PV-ESCO Project"--Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-103).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1946. / Without thesis note.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2004. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-96). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.