Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on November 26, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF J. Edward Hackett, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Philosophy, presented on December 6, 2012 at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. TITLE: Scheler's Phenomenological Ontology of Value: Implications and Reflections for Ethical Theory MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Kenneth W. Stikkers My dissertation provides the first comprehensive account of what values are in Max Scheler's Formalism in Ethics (Formalism hereafter). As a phenomenologist, Scheler did not attempt to invent a new ontological language to describe value experience clearly as Heidegger invented for his fundamental ontology of Dasein. In so doing, Scheler's phenomenological descriptions often use metaphysically rich language and in so doing, Scheler generates ambiguity surrounding what he most sought to make clear, value. To remedy this confusion, I argue that Scheler's concept of Aktsein can supply an ontological understanding of value given the dearth of a clear ontological explanation of value in his phenomenological period culminating in the Formalism. This inquiry is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1, I explain the central concepts in his phenomenology of value at root in the Formalism. I both explain and reveal the central ambiguities in the Formalism. For the most part, Chapter 1 is expository and develops an interpretation of the central ambiguities in Scheler's phenomenology of value. In Chapter 2, I problematize these central ambiguities and take note of when and where phenomenology collapses into ontology. This transition can best be made clear in his Idealismus und Realismus essays where Scheler explicates the structure of being-in-an-act at the very moment he "ontologizes" phenomenology. In addition to that moment in this work, I make analogies to Heidegger's phenomenology as a way into ontology. By making specific analogies to being-in-an-act and being-in-the-world, I show how the similar ontological tendencies in Heidegger provide us with a way to regard Scheler's Aktsein. In making this analogy, I do not reduce Scheler's phenomenological ontology to Heidegger, but instead put them into dialogue with each other revealing the solution of Scheler's ontology of value is realized in the act-intentionality of love. When I draw my conclusions both from the analysis of the Idealismus und Realismus essays and Heidegger, I label Scheler's ontological account of value: participatory realism. In Chapter 3, participatory realism is, then, put into contact with philosophers from the emotivist tradition. I define the emotivist tradition to include a noncognitivist interpretation of David Hume, A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. While I could have been content to seek out a solution to this ambiguity in Scheler's work and conclude the merits of my interpretation, I am a firm believer in Scheler's position as a solution to the problem of value ontology. As such, participatory realism's uniqueness and merit are better served by putting it into contact with another decided alternative. Given that the analytic tradition had supplied emotivism as a view that connects the emotions with value-experience, it seemed only fitting that Scheler could call into question a dominant answer to value ontology and further clarify the resources Scheler brings to bear on the problem itself.

Modernity has generally been interpreted as a radical expression of human progress in the light of the advances of modern science and technology. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, however, modernity is a project "doomed to failure". Given the progressive-linearity of the modern model of rationality, the past has, in principle, been ruled out as a source of moral-political wisdom and guidance. From the perspective of modernity, the present (as the progressive moment of the future) has therefore nothing to learn from past traditions. MacIntyre contends that the moral confusion within modernity comes from its loss of telos, mediated in terms of the past. Modernity therefore harbours a paradox based on its inability to provide a philosophical justification for establishing the possibility of human solidarity in the present, while simultaneously affirming its faith in the future. In this regard, MacIntyre's work is an important contribution to the philosophical debate on modernity. / Philosophy / M. A. (Philosophy)

Modernity has generally been interpreted as a radical expression of human progress in the light of the advances of modern science and technology. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, however, modernity is a project "doomed to failure". Given the progressive-linearity of the modern model of rationality, the past has, in principle, been ruled out as a source of moral-political wisdom and guidance. From the perspective of modernity, the present (as the progressive moment of the future) has therefore nothing to learn from past traditions. MacIntyre contends that the moral confusion within modernity comes from its loss of telos, mediated in terms of the past. Modernity therefore harbours a paradox based on its inability to provide a philosophical justification for establishing the possibility of human solidarity in the present, while simultaneously affirming its faith in the future. In this regard, MacIntyre's work is an important contribution to the philosophical debate on modernity. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M. A. (Philosophy)

No description available.

A presente tese trata da teoria da justiça de Adam Smith, especialmente das operações de linguagem realizadas por ela no conceito de justiça distributiva, contribuindo para o processo histórico de deslizamento deste conceito, a resultar na inexigibilidade jurídica dos temas distributivos e sua confusão com o conceito de caridade. Para isso, valemo-nos da metodologia proposta por Quentin Skinner e J.G.A. Pocock, de acordo com a qual é necessária a contextualização do texto, para se identificarem as linguagens da teoria política com as quais o autor teve que dialogar. Assim, a tese é divida em duas partes. Na primeira, buscando se tal contextualização, foram estudados autores que antecederam ou conviveram com Adam Smith, para se identificarem os problemas filosóficos por ele enfrentados e a maneira como buscaram resolvê-los. No primeiro capítulo foram vistas as instituições tradicionais escocesas, especialmente a jurisprudênciade Lord Stair (1619-1695). No seguinte, examinou-se o movimento de transição dos filósofos escoceses, buscando reformular tais instituições, a fim de adaptá-las à sociedade comercial inglesa, tendo em vista o Ato de União de 1707. Assim, trata-se da teoria da justiça de Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) e Lord Kames (1696-1782). Desta primeira parte, notou-se que, na transição filosófica moral escocesa, foi dedicada especial atenção à concepção de virtude. Na segunda parte, no terceiro capítulo se fez uma contextualização histórica e notou-se que o conceito de virtude desempenhou um papel fundamental nos debates políticos ingleses dos séculos. XVII e XVIII. No quarto, tratou-se do papel da imaginação na teoria do conhecimento de Smith, falando-se sobre a imaginação simpatética (da filosofia moral), mas especialmente da imaginação teorética (das ciências naturais). Constatando-se a pretensão de Smith em aplicar o método da ciência especulativa a todas as áreas do conhecimento, conclui-se por sua necessidade de naturalizar as instituições sociais, a fim de que houvesse um objeto a ser espelhado (speculum) pelas ciências especulativas. Assim, no quinto, se viu como Smith procurou naturalizar a instituição social da linguagem. No sexto, como, através de sua história conjectural, buscou naturalizar a própria sociedade. No sétimo, como, apropriando-se de diversas tradições filosóficas, e operando deslizes em seus conceitos de virtude, Smith naturaliza sua concepção geral de virtude, decorrente da naturalização de suas quatro virtudes particulares (prudência, benevolência, justiça e autodomínio), fazendo com que ela não mais dependa de uma perspectiva de racionalidade prática. No oitavo, como a virtude particular da justiça foi restrita ao campo da justiça comutativa, que seria a única exigível, e como a justiça distributiva se tornou objeto da benevolência (caridade). No nono, como os temas distributivos foram relegados à política econômica. Ao final, concluiu-se que, com a naturalização da virtude e a restrição da exigibilidade da justiça ao campo comutativo, a possibilidade de distribuição deixou de ser matéria deontológica e passou a depender ontologicamente da eficiência produtiva, deixando a lógica distributiva a se referir a um critério racional deontológico de igualdade, passando sua causa a se submeter à lógica econômica de eficiência, e a maneira da distribuição, ao sentimentalismo moral da caridade. / The present thesis concerns Adam Smiths theory of justice, in particular the operations of language realized by it in the concept of distributive justice, contributing to the historical process of erosion of this concept and resulting in the judicial uncoerciveness of the distributive themes and their confusion with the concept of charity. For that, we make use of the methodology proposed by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, according to which the text must be contenxtualized, in order that the political theory language with which the author had to hold a dialogue with can be identified. In that manner, the thesis is split into two parts. In the first, aiming for such a contextualization, we study the authors that either preceded Adam Smith or were his contemporaries, so that the philosophical problems by him faced and the manners in which resolutions were attempted can be identified. In the first chapter the traditional Scottish institutions are seen, in particular the jurisprudence of Lord Stair (1619 -1695). In the following, we examined the movement of transition of the Scottish philosophers, which aimed to reformulate such institutions with the goal of adapting them to the commercial English society, in the light of the Union Act of 1707. Thus, the treatment is of the theories of justice of Gershom Carmichael (1672 -1729), Francis Hutcheson (1694 -1746) and Lord Kames (1696 -1782). From this first part, it was noted that in the transition of the Scottish moral philosophy special attention was given to the concept of virtue. In the second part, in the third chapter, after performing a historical contextualization, it is noted that the concept of virtue played a fundamental role in the English political debates of the XVII e XVIII centuries. In the fourth, the role of imagination in Smith\'s theory of knowledge is treated, discussing sympathetic imagination (of moral philosophy), but particularly the theoretical imagination (of the natural sciences). Having established Smith\'s intention in applying the speculative science method to all areas of knowledge, his necessity in naturalizing the social institutions in ascertained, in order that there is an object to be mirrored by (speculum) the speculative sciences. Hence, in the fifth, it is seen how Smith aimed to naturalize the social institution of language. In the sixth, how, through his conjectural history, he aimed to naturalize society itself. In the seventh, appropriating himself of various philosophical traditions and operating shifts in his concepts of virtue, Smith naturalizes his general conception of virtue, itself derived from the naturalization of his four particular virtues (prudence, benevolence, justice and self-command), so that it no longer depends on a practical rationality perspective. In the eighth, it is seen how the particular virtue of justice was restricted to the field of commutative justice, which would be the only claimable one, one, and how distributive justice became the object of benevolence (charity). In the ninth, we see how distributives themes were relegated to economic policy. Finally, it is concluded that with the naturalization of virtue and the restriction of the liability of justice to the commutative field, the possibility of distribution ceased to be a deontological matter and became ontologically dependent on productivec efficiency, leaving distributional logic to refer to a criterium of deontological equality, its cause submitted to economic\'s logic of efficiency, and the manner of distribution, to the moral moral sentimentalism of charity.

A presente tese trata da teoria da justiça de Adam Smith, especialmente das operações de linguagem realizadas por ela no conceito de justiça distributiva, contribuindo para o processo histórico de deslizamento deste conceito, a resultar na inexigibilidade jurídica dos temas distributivos e sua confusão com o conceito de caridade. Para isso, valemo-nos da metodologia proposta por Quentin Skinner e J.G.A. Pocock, de acordo com a qual é necessária a contextualização do texto, para se identificarem as linguagens da teoria política com as quais o autor teve que dialogar. Assim, a tese é divida em duas partes. Na primeira, buscando se tal contextualização, foram estudados autores que antecederam ou conviveram com Adam Smith, para se identificarem os problemas filosóficos por ele enfrentados e a maneira como buscaram resolvê-los. No primeiro capítulo foram vistas as instituições tradicionais escocesas, especialmente a jurisprudênciade Lord Stair (1619-1695). No seguinte, examinou-se o movimento de transição dos filósofos escoceses, buscando reformular tais instituições, a fim de adaptá-las à sociedade comercial inglesa, tendo em vista o Ato de União de 1707. Assim, trata-se da teoria da justiça de Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) e Lord Kames (1696-1782). Desta primeira parte, notou-se que, na transição filosófica moral escocesa, foi dedicada especial atenção à concepção de virtude. Na segunda parte, no terceiro capítulo se fez uma contextualização histórica e notou-se que o conceito de virtude desempenhou um papel fundamental nos debates políticos ingleses dos séculos. XVII e XVIII. No quarto, tratou-se do papel da imaginação na teoria do conhecimento de Smith, falando-se sobre a imaginação simpatética (da filosofia moral), mas especialmente da imaginação teorética (das ciências naturais). Constatando-se a pretensão de Smith em aplicar o método da ciência especulativa a todas as áreas do conhecimento, conclui-se por sua necessidade de naturalizar as instituições sociais, a fim de que houvesse um objeto a ser espelhado (speculum) pelas ciências especulativas. Assim, no quinto, se viu como Smith procurou naturalizar a instituição social da linguagem. No sexto, como, através de sua história conjectural, buscou naturalizar a própria sociedade. No sétimo, como, apropriando-se de diversas tradições filosóficas, e operando deslizes em seus conceitos de virtude, Smith naturaliza sua concepção geral de virtude, decorrente da naturalização de suas quatro virtudes particulares (prudência, benevolência, justiça e autodomínio), fazendo com que ela não mais dependa de uma perspectiva de racionalidade prática. No oitavo, como a virtude particular da justiça foi restrita ao campo da justiça comutativa, que seria a única exigível, e como a justiça distributiva se tornou objeto da benevolência (caridade). No nono, como os temas distributivos foram relegados à política econômica. Ao final, concluiu-se que, com a naturalização da virtude e a restrição da exigibilidade da justiça ao campo comutativo, a possibilidade de distribuição deixou de ser matéria deontológica e passou a depender ontologicamente da eficiência produtiva, deixando a lógica distributiva a se referir a um critério racional deontológico de igualdade, passando sua causa a se submeter à lógica econômica de eficiência, e a maneira da distribuição, ao sentimentalismo moral da caridade. / The present thesis concerns Adam Smiths theory of justice, in particular the operations of language realized by it in the concept of distributive justice, contributing to the historical process of erosion of this concept and resulting in the judicial uncoerciveness of the distributive themes and their confusion with the concept of charity. For that, we make use of the methodology proposed by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, according to which the text must be contenxtualized, in order that the political theory language with which the author had to hold a dialogue with can be identified. In that manner, the thesis is split into two parts. In the first, aiming for such a contextualization, we study the authors that either preceded Adam Smith or were his contemporaries, so that the philosophical problems by him faced and the manners in which resolutions were attempted can be identified. In the first chapter the traditional Scottish institutions are seen, in particular the jurisprudence of Lord Stair (1619 -1695). In the following, we examined the movement of transition of the Scottish philosophers, which aimed to reformulate such institutions with the goal of adapting them to the commercial English society, in the light of the Union Act of 1707. Thus, the treatment is of the theories of justice of Gershom Carmichael (1672 -1729), Francis Hutcheson (1694 -1746) and Lord Kames (1696 -1782). From this first part, it was noted that in the transition of the Scottish moral philosophy special attention was given to the concept of virtue. In the second part, in the third chapter, after performing a historical contextualization, it is noted that the concept of virtue played a fundamental role in the English political debates of the XVII e XVIII centuries. In the fourth, the role of imagination in Smith\'s theory of knowledge is treated, discussing sympathetic imagination (of moral philosophy), but particularly the theoretical imagination (of the natural sciences). Having established Smith\'s intention in applying the speculative science method to all areas of knowledge, his necessity in naturalizing the social institutions in ascertained, in order that there is an object to be mirrored by (speculum) the speculative sciences. Hence, in the fifth, it is seen how Smith aimed to naturalize the social institution of language. In the sixth, how, through his conjectural history, he aimed to naturalize society itself. In the seventh, appropriating himself of various philosophical traditions and operating shifts in his concepts of virtue, Smith naturalizes his general conception of virtue, itself derived from the naturalization of his four particular virtues (prudence, benevolence, justice and self-command), so that it no longer depends on a practical rationality perspective. In the eighth, it is seen how the particular virtue of justice was restricted to the field of commutative justice, which would be the only claimable one, one, and how distributive justice became the object of benevolence (charity). In the ninth, we see how distributives themes were relegated to economic policy. Finally, it is concluded that with the naturalization of virtue and the restriction of the liability of justice to the commutative field, the possibility of distribution ceased to be a deontological matter and became ontologically dependent on productivec efficiency, leaving distributional logic to refer to a criterium of deontological equality, its cause submitted to economic\'s logic of efficiency, and the manner of distribution, to the moral moral sentimentalism of charity.