Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1980.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1977. / Typescript.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed October 3, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 60-64).

Thesis (B. Ec.(Hons.))--University of Adelaide, 1972. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-98).

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, Division of Economic and Financial Studies, Dept. of Economics, 1999. / Bibliography: p. 232-255.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (University of Texas Digital Repository, viewed on Sept. 9, 2009). Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 118-130).

Thesis (M. Dev.) --University of Limpopo, 2011 / The research report gives a critical review of the factors that contributed to the nonsustainability of the employment of the beneficiaries of the Expanded Public Works Programme in the Limpopo Province of South Africa with special focus on the Greater Giyani Municipality. The main problem as identified by the researcher is that a large majority of former Expanded Public Works Programme beneficiaries end up being unemployed despite the fact that the government spent money on skills training for them in an effort to equip them with skills so that they can be employable in other sectors of the economy when they exit the programme. The report clarifies the factors that contributed to the beneficiaries not managing to get new employment after exiting the programme. The report also clarifies the roles played by the different stakeholders in the implementation of the programme and this assists in clarifying the origin of the problems that led to the failures of the programme. From the research done the researcher found that skills’ training has not been done in most projects and also that where training was done the skills training was for none accredited courses which were not equipping the beneficiaries to be employable in the job market. The key words in the research are Expanded Public Works Programme, Employability, and Skills training.

The rate of unemployment in South Africa remains stubbornly high despite vastly improved macroeconomic fundamentals and relatively high rates of economic growth for most of the post-1994 democratic era. Employment growth was much weaker than might have been expected given the improved economic outlook. This thesis investigates how the sectoral employment intensity of output growth in the eight non-agricultural sectors of the South African economy has evolved from 2000 to 2012, with a view to identifying key growth sectors that are employment intensive. An econometric model of the demand for labour is used to estimate employment elasticities in the major Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) divisions of the economy. The results suggest that aggregate employment and economic growth diverged and that jobless growth occurred in South Africa during the period under review. South Africa has become less labour intensive and more capital intensive, reflecting a structural adjustment that has weakened the employment-growth relationship. At the sectoral level, the results suggest the presence of a long-run relationship between employment and growth in finance and business services, manufacturing, transport and the utilities sectors. In particular, the results suggest that the tertiary sector performed best in terms of the employment intensity of output growth. This reflects the changing structure of the economy and the nature of employment shifting away from the primary towards the tertiary sectors. Investment in the tertiary sector may help to foster new employment opportunities and assist in improving the overall employment intensity of output growth in South Africa. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

This dissertation is a collection of essays on bids and offer matching in a labor market for new entrants to white-collar jobs. The papers compare some of the different institutions for determining wages and conducting the hiring process in the market for new entrants to white collar jobs. The first essay analyzes how does a firm announce and commit to a wage prior to deriving specific information about applicants' productivity and the consequences of following this hiring process. In the model there are two firms and at least as many applicants as the number of firms. All applicants apply simultaneously to both firms in response to the job advertisement which also mentions a wage. Each firm derives the firm-specific productivity of the applicants from their applications which is private information to each firm. None of the applicants have any information about the firms' evaluation. There are four pure strategy Nash Equilibria in wage announcements. Both firms announce a high wage, both firms announce a low wage, both firms announce a high or a low wage, and one firm announces a high wage and the other firm announces a low wage. In the latter case there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium reflecting a firm's uncertainty about the choice of the other firm. In equilibrium one or both firms may not hire and the equilibrium may not exhibit wage dispersion. The second essay analyzes the question; which is better, to announce and commit to a particular wage prior to deriving specific information about applicants' productivity or to offer wages privately after deriving the firm-specific productivity. The equilibrium policy, to be followed by the firms in the first place, is determined endogenously by comparing the ex ante expected profits associated with the equilibria under the different policies. Lack of prior information and the uncertainty about the possible match results in "offer wages privately" as always an equilibrium policy. However, if a low wage is the equilibrium strategy under all the policies, then "any pair of policies" is an equilibrium. This justifies one of the circumstances in which different policies might coexist. In equilibrium a firm's position is always filled and the equilibrium outcome may not exhibit wage dispersion. The third essay analyses the question, if "announcing a wage" is the strategy rule to be followed by the firms, then what should be the equilibrium timing of wage announcement, before or after receiving specific information about applicants' productivity. Two policies are compared. Under the first policy a firm announces and commits to a particular wage prior to deriving the match-specific productivity. Under the second policy a firm solicits applications, derives the firm-specific productivity, and then announces and commits to a wage. The equilibrium timing of wage, to be followed by the firms in the first place, is determined endogenously by comparing the ex ante expected profits associated with the equilibrium strategy under the different timings. It turns out that announcing and committing to a particular wage after deriving specific information is always an equilibrium timing because of the informational advantage. However, if a low wage is the equilibrium strategy under all the policies then any pair of policies is an equilibrium. In equilibrium one of the firm's position may remain unfilled. The equilibrium outcome may not exhibit wage dispersion. / Ph. D.