In 1986, David Lewis offered what he thought would be the decisive objection against endurantism, showing it to be an implausible theory. The problem of temporary intrinsics stated that an object cannot have two complementary intrinsic properties while maintaining identity, as endurantists claim. Perdurantism, then, must be the more plausible theory, according to Lewis. The endurantists responded to this objection by formulating different versions of endurantism designed to avoid the problem. Subsequently, the endurantist tried to undermine the perdurantist position by arguing that a perduring object cannot undergo what is considered to be genuine change. As a result, endurantism is the more plausible theory. However, the perdurantist can show that endurantism seems to fail to provide an account of change as well. In what follows, I argue that the implicit ontological commitments of the endurantists and perdurantists have prevented the problem of temporary intrinsics and change from resolving the endurantist/perdurantist debate. I offer examples of plausible ontologies for the endurantist and perdurantist in order to emphasize this problem. I will argue that, in order to resolve the debate, one must ultimately examine the ontological accounts of each theory. / Master of Arts

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In this paper I will look at two common theories about persistence and their views on parthood. The two theories are Endurantism and Perdurantism, but I will also mention exdurantism which is a theory closely related to perdurantism. Endurantism is a three-dimensional theory which states that persisting objects are at every moment “wholly present” and have no temporal extent. Perdurantism and exdurantism on the other hand are four-dimensional theories which states that objects have temporal as well as spatial extent. The four-dimensional theories apply an atemporal parthood relation between a persisting object and its temporal parts, this means that a persisting object has its parts simpliciter. Three dimensionalists usually do not talk about a thing having temporal parts, but some philosophers think that there is nothing that restricts a three-dimensionalist from applying a similar understanding of parthood as the four-dimensionalist does. I will begin by taking a look at the different theories and their solutions to two common problems associated with persistence. Later on, I will look at the atemporal parthood relation that perdurantists apply to their theory and see if it really is something an endurantist could accept as well. I will make my conclusion based on what would logically follow from accepting the concept of atemporal parthood. I will argue that, while endurantists could accept path inclusion, they can in fact not apply an atemporal parthood relation between a persisting object and its temporal parts without their view collapsing into four-dimensionalism. I will also show that path inclusion cannot do the same job in solving these two problems that will be discussed. Besides this, my point will also be to argue that it is unmotivated (or even a mistake) for a three-dimensionalist to apply any three-dimensional version of atemporal parthood to their theory.

This thesis intends to explore whether endurantism is compatible with realism. This is done by presenting an alternative approach, where instead of starting with Quine’s postulate, that being and existence are the same thing, those are treated as different things. By using minimal realism, where you only say that something exists independently of a creature, and an ontological theory based on affordances, a thesis that endurantism is compatible with realism is presented. Affordance ontology means that what something is depends on what actions it can offer a certain human. Objections that this might lead to relativism are answered, as actions are independent of a specific creature. Objections that minimal realism isn’t realism are answered on the grounds of it being independent of a human, and thus is realism. Finally, the thesis is concluded to be true, but more work is needed to explain temporal facts. / Uppsatsen syftar till att utforska om endurantism är förenlig med realism. Detta görs genom att presentera en alternativ ansats, där man istället för att utgå från Quines postulat att vara och att existera är samma sak, särskiljer dessa. Med hjälp av minimal realism, där man bara konstaterar att något existerar oberoende av en varelse, och en ontologisk teori byggd på affordanser, så presenteras tesen att endurantism är förenlig med realism. Affordansontologi innebär att vad något är är beroende av vilka handlingar det kan erbjuda en viss människa. Invändningar som att det skulle leda till relativism bemöts, då handlingar är oberoende av en specifik människa, och att minimal realism är så intetsägande att det inte rör sig om realism, bemöts med argumentet att det är oberoende av en människa, och därmed är det faktiskt realism. Slutligen konstateras att tesen är sann, men att mer arbete behövs gällande tid och affordansontologi, för att förklara tidsatta fakta.

Au sein d’un même espace muséal, qui est exclusivement dédié à l’art contemporain nous constatons la présence simultanée de formes traditionnelles d’art à côté d’installations. Il nous semble que ces œuvres d’art sont trop différentes pour être réunies sous la même appellation Art Contemporain. Dans cette étude nous analysons les présupposés philosophiques de la Modernité et de la Postmodernité, puis après avoir disqualifié la postmodernité, nous prenons l’Exposition à la Kunsthalle de Bern, en 1969, Quand les attitudes deviennent forme, comme date de naissance de l’art contemporain, et les œuvres qui y sont présentées comme la forme paradigmatique de l’art contemporain. La caractéristique essentielle des œuvres d’art contemporain,c’est qu’elles sont créées in situ et qu’elles peuvent être démontées et réinstallées. Ceci pose des problèmes de persistance d’identité dans le temps, à travers ces différents intervalles temporels. Nous analysons la théorie endurantiste des objets tridimensionnels et la théorie perdurantiste des objets quadridimensionnels. Nous adoptons comme principe méréologique de composition des parties temporelles, le principe installation réinstallation, qui permet de justifier la persistance d’une mêmeté de ces Œuvres d’art Contemporain au cours du temps. / Within the same museum space, which is exclusively dedicated to contemporary art, we find traditional forms of art beside installations. It seems to us that these works of art are too different to be labelled: Contemporary Art.In this study we analyze the philosophical assumptions of Modernity and Postmodernity and after having disqualified postmodernity, we claim that the Exhibition at the Kunsthalle in Bern, in 1969, When attitudes become form, is the birth date of art contemporary, and those works represent the paradigmatic form of contemporary art.The essential characteristic of contemporary art works (OAC) is that they are created in situ and can be dismantled and reinstalled. There is a problem of persistence of identity over time, during these different intervals of time. We analyze the endurantist theory of three-dimensional objects and the perdurantist theory of four-dimensional objects. We adopt the mereorological principle of composition of the temporal parts, the principle installation resettletment , which justify the persistence of a sameness of these contemporary art works through time .