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Das situative Desinvestitionsmodell : Entwicklung eines Instrumentariums zur Entflechtung diversifizierter Unternehmen /Weiher, Gabriele C. January 1996 (has links)
Universiẗat, Diss.--St. Gallen, 1996.
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Die Anforderungen der operationellen Entflechtung nach den Beschleunigungsrichtlinien der Europäischen Kommission : Umsetzung in Deutschland und Griechenland /Stamati, Markela. January 1900 (has links)
Zugleich: Diss. Berlin, 2007. / Literaturverz.
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Unbundling-Regulierung in der Energiewirtschaft gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vorgaben und deren Umsetzung in die deutsche EnergierechtsordnungRasbach, Winfried January 2007 (has links)
Zugl.: Bonn, Univ., Diss., 2007
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Unbundling-Regulierung in der Energiewirtschaft : gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vorgaben und deren Umsetzung in die deutsche Energierechtsordnung /Rasbach, Winfried. January 2009 (has links)
Zugl.: Bonn, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.
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Netzinfrastruktur-Management : Konzepte für die Elektrizitätswirtschaft /Stender, Andreas. January 2008 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--University of St. Gallen, 2008.
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Eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung der Übertragungsnetze unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 3. Binnenmarktpaketes für Energie /Möllinger, Claus. January 2009 (has links)
Zugl.: Mannheim, Universiẗat, Diss., 2009.
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Ownership unbundling in der Energiewirtschaft : Vereinbarkeit einer eigentumsrechtlichen Entflechtung in der Energiewirtschaft mit den Grundrechten des Grundgesetzes und des Gemeinschaftsrechts deutscher vertikal integrierter Energieversorgungsunternehmen /Wachovius, Martin. January 2008 (has links)
Zugl.: Passau, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008.
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The Impact of Different Unbundling Scenarios on Concentration and Wholesale Prices in Energy MarketsBauer, Francisca, Bremberger, Christoph, Rammerstorfer, Margarethe 16 July 2010 (has links) (PDF)
A recent highly disputed subject of regulating energy markets in Europe is the unbundling of
vertically integrated down- and upstream firms. While legal unbundling is already implemented in
most countries and indisputable in its necessity for approaching regulatory aims, continuative models
as ownership unbundling or the alternative of an independent system operator are still ambiguous.
Hence, this article contributes to the economic analyses of identifying the differences of separate
types of unbundling. Via simulation, we find that legal unbundling brings about the lowest prices in
a market under Cournot competition. Moreover, under Bertrand competition, no differences between
legal unbundling and ownership unbundling can be identified. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics
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Modeling Competition and Investment in Liberalized Electricity MarketsWeigt, Hannes 06 October 2009 (has links) (PDF)
In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.
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Vertical Disintegration in the European Electricity Sector: Empirical Evidence on Lost SynergiesGugler, Klaus, Liebensteiner, Mario, Schmitt , Stephan 11 1900 (has links) (PDF)
The EU has been promoting unbundling of the transmission grid from other stages of the electricity supply chain with the aim of fostering competition in the upstream stage of electricity generation. At presence, ownership unbundling is the predominant form of unbundling in Europe. However, the benefits of increased competition from ownership unbundling of the transmission grid may come at the cost of lost vertical synergies between the formerly integrated stages of electricity supply. The policy debate generally neglects such potential costs of unbundling, yet concentrates on its benefits. Therefore European cross-country evidence may shed some light on this issue. This study helps fill this void by empirically estimating the magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) between electricity generation and transmission based on a quadratic cost function. For this purpose we employ novel firm-level panel data of major European electricity utilities. Our results confirm the presence of substantial EVI, which put the policy measure of transmission ownership unbundling into question. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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