Inaug.-diss.--Greifswald. / Lebenslauf.

Diss. / Lebenslauf. Includes bibliographical references.

Inaug.-Diss.--Göttingen. / Lebenslauf.

Thesis (B.A.) Magna Cum Laude--Butler University, 1926. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf [2]).

Erlangen-Nürnberg, Universiẗat, Magisterarbeit, 2007.

This thesis uses Cicero’s letters as evidence for an interpretation of Cicero’s φιλίαι that is at variance with his professed views on φιλία as well as with the conclusions of modern scholars. As the use of the term φιλία over amicitia or “friendship” suggests, the thesis provides a discussion of Cicero’s philosophical beliefs as reflected by his relationship not only with his friends and allies, but also with his family. While there have been several noteworthy studies of his relationship with Atticus and with his family, there is a tendency to accept his claims in his letters to them as genuine. This approach differs significantly from the caution that can be found in the studies of his public speeches and the letters to his allies. This thesis examines the discrepancies between his words and deeds in order to determine the degree of his sincerity. It argues that the inconsistencies and contradictions in his correspondence and philosophical treatises suggest a deliberate effort to use their mutual φιλία for his personal gain. Scholars have assumed that Cicero’s public affiliation with the Academy and his well-attested attack on Epicureanism prove that he did not see any merit in Epicurean philosophy. This thesis rejects this assumption. On the contrary, it argues that his negative attitude towards Epicureans stemmed from a concern about his public persona and a desire to distance himself from Epicurus. After examining Cicero’s relationship chiefly with Atticus, his family, and some of his allies, the thesis concludes that his φιλίαι with them resembled more the Epicurean than the Aristotelian account of φιλία.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington. / Bibliography: l. [146]-150.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1961. / Typescript (carbon copy). eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 164-169).

Στην ανά χείρας εργασία θα ασχοληθούμε με το φόβο του θανάτου. Ο στόχος είναι να δούμε κατά πόσον ο φιλόσοφος είχε δίκιο να υποστηρίζει πως ο θάνατος δεν είναι τίποτε για μας. / Was Epicurus right about his thesis that death is nothing to us?

The main aim of this thesis is to present and compare the approaches of the two important Hellenistic philosophical schools - the Old Stoics and Epicurus - to the phenomenon of death in relationship to the concept of the soul. First, the problem is viewed through the perspective of physics. Epicurus and the Stoics adhere to the belief in the substantial (and not individual) immortality of the soul, resembling in some aspects the view of presocratic philosophers. The soul is uderstood by both schools as basis of life functions connected with heat and breath. Second, the ethical approaches to death by Epicurus and the Stoics and their different proposals for disposing of the fear of death are shortly introduced.