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This thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what this objection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams's integrity objection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to undermine the objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensome conception of morality fail, and that accepting their `extreme' view would leave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the third chapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible to demandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors (the conduct and expectations of one's community) and psychological factors as potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of these potential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) the responses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy, which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features. In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationship to moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action's difficulty can affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent proposal by Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains why they are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficulty as providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I draw attention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need an excuse, suggesting that there is no `default' obligation to do the best. In the final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated, utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, and giving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingness objections.

後果論（Consequentialism）和義務論（Deontology）是規範倫理學裏兩個基本理論。兩個理論之間的差異，經常成為討論基本倫理問題的框架。一方面，義務論認為後果論道德上容許任何能達到最好結果的行為，這是過於寬鬆。另一方面，後果論認為義務論是自相矛盾的；因為它既禁止某些行為，視之為不道德，但又不容許人們以違反義務為手段，整體減少這類行為發生的次數。 / 這篇論文的旨趣是研究用後果論的理論框架，來表達義務論的可能性。這將提供一個新的視角，以了解後果論和義務論的基本理論差異。 / 全文共分四個部分。第一章，我會檢視兩個理論的一些基本特徵。第二章，我第一次嘗試用後果論的理論框架來表達義務論。方法是給違反義務的行為分配一個負面道德價值。然而，這方法不能成功把義務論表達為一種後果論。因為它引申了一些義務論不接受的道德判斷。第三章，我會檢視義務論和道德價值之間的關係；並順著 Louise (2004) 提出的理論，論證後果論的理論框架可以用來表達義務論。方法是把遵從義務的行為視為把時間和行動者相對 (time-relative and agent-relative) 的道德價值最大化。第四章，我將嘗試回應對這理論可能提出的反駁。 / Discussions in basic ethical problems are often framed by the essential differences between consequentialism and deontology - two fundamental theories in normative ethics. Most arguments in those ethical problems are basically reiteration of how the two theories differs from each other: Deontology holds that consequentialism is too lax as it allows all actions that leads to the best outcome, while consequentialism holds that deontology is essentially paradoxical because it forbids agents to act against a constraint even when doing so can avoid more violations. / My interest in this thesis is to examine a possible alternative in characterizing the differences between consequentialism and deontology, namely the doctrine of "consequentializing deontology". This doctrine holds that all deontological theories can be given a representation in consequentialist form. / This thesis consists of four parts. In Chapter 1, I will first examine three essential features of consequentialism, namely it is structurally axiological, teleological and maximizing. Then I will examine various formulations of deontological constraints and argue that they are best formulated as agent-relative reasons for action. In Chapter 2, I will explicate the first attempt to consequentialize deontological constraints by assigning a negative weighing to any violation. I will show that this attempt is not satisfactory because it entails a number of implausible claims. In Chapter 3, I proceed to examine various accounts that explain the normative power of deontological constraints in terms of values. Following Louise (2004), I argue that deontology can be consequentialized by giving a consequentialist representation to deontology, so that when an agent acts upon a deontological constraint, he is maximizing values that are both agent-relative and temporal-relative in nature. In Chapter 4, I will examine possible challenges to consequentializing deontology and respond to them. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Chan, Pui Yee June. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Delineating Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology: A Possible Alternative to Characterizing the Differences between Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Thesis Overview --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- What Makes a Theory in Normative Ethics Consequentialist? --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Conception of Outcome: Future-Oriented is Not a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.13 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Maximizing is a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.17 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Consequentialism Essentials Summarized --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4 --- Deontological Constraints --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Absolute and Threshold Deontological Constraints --- p.26 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Agent-Relative & Agent-Neutral Reasons for Action: Two Approaches --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Deontological Constraints & Reasons for Action --- p.31 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Attempt of Consequentializing Deontology without Agent-Relativity --- p.36 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction & the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Threshold Constraints --- p.39 / Chapter 2.3 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Absolute Constraints --- p.42 / Chapter 2.4 --- Limits and Problems with Consequentializing Deontology --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5 --- Responding to Challenges --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.50 / Chapter 2.6 --- Summary: Consequentializing Deontology Fails --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Deontology and Agent-Relative Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology and Agent-Relativity in Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction in Values --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Agent-Relative & Temporal-Relative Values --- p.58 / Chapter 3.2 --- Nagel: Agent-Relative Reasons and Agent-Relative Values --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Reasons of Autonomy --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Reasons of Deontology --- p.63 / Chapter 3.3 --- Korsgaard: Deontology and Inter-subjectivity --- p.70 / Chapter 3.4 --- Pettit: The Honoring/Promoting Distinction as the Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction --- p.78 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Values that cannot be honored --- p.80 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- It is not always clear what counts as "honoring" a value --- p.82 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Honoring is promoting agent-relative value --- p.83 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Consequentializing Deontology - Its Limits and Implications --- p.88 / Chapter 4.1 --- Thesis Project Recap --- p.88 / Chapter 4.2 --- Consequentializing deontology and agent-relativity --- p.94 / Chapter 4.3 --- Extended application of consequentializing to other ethical theories --- p.99 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fragmentation of values and consequentializing --- p.101 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion: How successful consequentializing contributes to moral discussions --- p.104 / Bibliography --- p.107

Thesis (D. Min.)--Erskine Theological Seminary, 2000. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-172).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2007. / Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 183 p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Erskine Theological Seminary, 2000. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-172).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Erskine Theological Seminary, 2000. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-172).

Thesis (M.Ed.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2005. / Bibliography: leaves 53-56.

Thesis (M.A.B.S.)--International School of Theology, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-57).

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1993. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-65). Also available via the Internet.