The aim of this thesis is to defend a version of volitionism from objections concerning the epistemic condition of moral responsibility (especially of moral culpability). My view states that an agent is morally blameworthy for her action only if (a) the action is morally wrong and (b) she has performed the action against her better judgement that the action is wrong or from a state of culpable ignorance. In chapter 1 I provide reason in favour of volitionism and against attributionism to motivate further articulation of volitionism. In chapter 2 I discuss when it is appropriate to blame an agent for holding a false belief. In chapter 3 I defend the thesis that an agent is blameworthy for performing an action only if the action is objectively wrong (the Objective View). In chapter 4 I defend the thesis that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts (the Ignorance Thesis). In chapter 5 I defend the thesis that moral culpability always involves akrasia (the Akrasia Thesis). Finally, in chapter 6 I will conclude the defence of my version of volitionism by undermining the thesis that in order for an agent to be morally responsible for an action, it is necessary (and sufficient when the other conditions are met) that some facts she takes to be playing a role in explaining why the action is good or bad be personally available to her (The Consciousness Thesis).

This thesis examines the problem of moral objectivity, which is constituted by the ontological, epistemological and motivational challenges. It gradually develops an account of moral objectivity that has the dual function of dealing with the enemies of moral objectivity as well as giving a positive account of what moral objectivity is. It establishes these aims by arguing for the following theses. The first set of arguments show that relativist theories of ethics provide us with no forceful grounds for being sceptical about moral objectivity. The second set of arguments deepens the response to those who are sceptical about moral objectivity. It does so by showing in greater detail how rationality plays a substantive role in our practical deliberation, our notion of agency as well as our reactive attitudes. These arguments provide further reasons why we should have faith in the possibility of developing an adequate account of moral objectivity. The last set of arguments provides the positive account of moral objectivity. This positive account ends with the discussion of a paradigmatic moral fact that gives full expression (to the features of moral objectivity that have been articulated and defended.

Ethics is becoming important in organisations today as organisations strive to create strong ethics cultures. There are different ways in which ethics can be conveyed to employees. This dissertation was aimed at establishing whether induction is an appropriate vehicle to convey organisational ethics to employees, and if so, how it could ideally be utilised. To seek an answer to the research question posed above, a literature study that explored the themes of business ethics and induction was firstly conducted. Thereafter, from a qualitative research paradigm, personal, in-depth interviews were conducted with human resources managers, line managers and new employees who attended a company’s induction programme. The responses were coded, analysed and significant themes were extracted. It was found that induction is indeed a useful vehicle to contribute to the institutionalisation of organisational ethics. Induction should, however, be used in conjunction with other interventions should the organisation aspire to creating an ethics culture over time. Implications of the findings for managerial tertiary education were indicated. Recommendations for further research into the topic were also presented. / Prof. L.J. Van Vuuren

<p> Egoism is the view that self-interest is the exclusive standard of morally right action. In this dissertation, I present two arguments for egoism: a naturalistic argument and an intuitive argument.</p><p> The naturalistic argument grounds egoism in a theory of what the end of every living thing is: The end of a living thing is, I will argue, only to survive. I set the stage for and develop this argument across the first four Chapters. In Chapter 1, I present the case for the prevailing, neo-Aristotelian view of the end of a living thing: The end of a living thing is to instantiate its species. The pursuit of this end is typically understood to involve not only survival, but also flourishing, reproducing, and helping other members of one&rsquo;s species, all in species-characteristic ways.</p><p> In Chapter 2, I argue that the aforementioned species view is false. </p><p> In Chapter 3, I develop the view that the end of every living thing, including every human living thing, is only to survive.</p><p> In Chapter 4, I argue that human well-being (or self-interest), the notion of what intrinsically benefits a human being, consists in and only in survival. </p><p> In the fifth and final Chapter, I develop the intuitive argument, which adopts the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that egoism aligns well with a critical mass of our intuitions about the moral life.</p><p>

<p> Leadership plays a significant role in the advancement of the church, the followers, and the community that the church serves. If the church fails to train leaders, growth within the church becomes hindered, and its mission becomes aborted. The problem researched in this study is the declining support church leaders are receiving from the community. The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore church leadership effectiveness in meeting the expectations of followers, the local church community, and the church. The target population consisted of 3 nondenominational church leaders located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The conceptual framework for this study was leadership that captured the connection between effective leadership, organizational growth, financial stability, and success for the local church. Interviews were conducted, and the research questions revealed the best practices, procedures, and leadership behaviors used by the study church leaders for the success of the 3 local churches. Based on the methodological triangulation of the interview data, 10 themes emerged after the using NVivo 11 data analysis software: (a) people-centeredness, (b) communication between the leader and followers, (c) good morals, (d) prayer life that involves constantly talking with God, (e) strategic planning, (f) Christ-centeredness that causes the leader to acknowledge God at all times, (g) love, (h) integrity, (i) God, and (j) Biblical education. As a result of the findings from this study, the potential contributions to social change can include a blueprint for developing future church leaders, increased strategies for creating employment opportunities, and strengthening the family unit through leading people to follow the laws of God and man.</p><p>

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This paper provides a philosophical understanding of state apologies by applying Gewirth's deontological theory. Through application of the principle of generic consistency, I contend that a state apology can be understood as a moral obligation concurrent with human rights. Subsequently, I attempt to solidify the Gewirthian understanding of state apology by integrating current understandings of the practice into the Gewirthian model of the community of rights. Here, I also suggest that the psychosocial biography of the community of rights strengthens the Gewirthian interpretation of state apology. Finally, I examine the merits of the U.S. apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study from this Gewirthian perspective. Ultimately, I conclude that the Gewirthian application is successful in its ability to clarify the reasons for which state apologies are given, as well as the goals they should accomplish.

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