This essay, as the title suggests, traces the ideological development of the Soviet conception of 'peaceful coexistence' from the October revolution of 1917 to the present. It is limited to an analytical and historical study of the Soviet doctrine, ignoring the Yugoslav and Chinese versions of the same doctrine. As a consequence the research material has been confined wherever possible to Russian sources. The essay is organized into seven chapters. Chapter I is concerned with introductory material outlining Marx's law of capital accumulation', Lenin's 'law of unequal development', and Trotsky's 'law of continuous development'. An attempt is made to show that 'peaceful coexistence' is a marked departure from the earlier Marxian theories of revolutions. Chapter two traces the development of peaceful coexistence from 1917 to 1922. First used by Bukharin to attack Lenin's 'breathing-space' tactic, peaceful coexistence by 1920 had become firmly linked with-the Soviet government and its reluctance to attempt a trial of armed strength with the West. By 1922 peaceful co-existence was used, on the one hand, to justify Soviet abandonment of its military commitment to the proletariat abroad, and, on the other, to gain respectibility and equality for the Soviet Union at international conferences. Chapter III outlines the brief period between 1923 and 1927 during which peaceful coexistence underwent a change of name from mirnoe sozhitel'stvo to mirnoe sosushchestvovanie marking a hardening of Soviet attitude towards the West as communist military and economic strength increased. Chapter IV chronicles the period before the war (1928-39) during which peaceful coexistence degenerated as an ideology, serving first as justification for Soviet industrialization and finally as a tool to assure Russia's exclusion from the impending war. Chapter V covers the period 1940 to 1955. It traces the re-establishment of orthodox marxist doctrine, and the revival of 'peaceful coexistence' as a tactical means to allay the fears of the West. Its tremendous ideological development during the Malenkov interregnum and its crucial connection with the Indian pancha shila resulted in its transformation from an ideology of disengagement and isolation to a revolutionary doctrine equal, if not superior, to the pre-revolutionary Marxian theories of revolution. Chapter Six is a synthesis of development between the XX Party Congress of 1956 and the present. After a survey of the period the fully-developed basic theory of peaceful coexistence as a great revolutionary idea is outlined. Against this background are viewed the Soviet conceptions of morality, war, the class struggle, proletarian internationalism, revolution and counter-revolution, international law, the ideological struggle, and competition and collaboration. From this analysis an attempt is made to synthesis the real principles of peaceful coexistence. Chapter VII is a concluding chapter in which peaceful coexistence is presented as a moral, challenge to the West. This moral aspect is radical reinterpretation of the economic viewpoint of Marx and the political and military conceptions of Lenin and Trotsky. Peaceful coexistence is presented as a moral dilemma for the West to solve. The notes have been placed at the end of each chapter. The bibliography follows the notes to chapter VII. The translations of Russian texts, unless otherwise stated, have been made by the author. / Arts, Faculty of / Central Eastern Northern European Studies, Department of / Graduate

Historically, moral awareness and conscience have been considered matters for philosophical and psychoanalytical speculation. Psychologists, however, viz. Friedenber, E. Z., and Havighurst, R. J. , (An attempt to measure strength of conscience, J. Personality, 1948, 17, 232-243) and Wack, Dunstan, (A psychological study of conscience, Stud. Psychol. Psychiat. Cathol. Univ. Amer. , 1952, 8, No. 3) have attempted to measure these phenomena. These studies can be criticized because the moral categories used were derived by a priori and deductive methods rather than by empirical, inductive methods. This study was undertaken as an attempt to provide an empirical basis for a scale to measure conscience and moral awareness. A review of the pertinent literature has revealed many problems which require solution but which cannot be adequately studied until an effective research tool has been devised which will enable investigation of a broader range of conscience than has previously been possible. As a step towards providing such a tool, two tasks were undertaken: 1. To describe the principal areas of moral awareness and conscience as reflected in data obtained from various groups of individuals. 2. To draw out the unifying principles therein to be used as a framework for the construction of future scales to measure conscience. So that the data would not be biased by limited populations or by strict definitions, as wide a variety of groups of people as could be obtained was used, and no definition of conscience that might colour the data was provided. Data were collected by asking individuals, chiefly through the use of a mimeographed questionnaire, what makes them feel bad. Groups contributing data included both sexes from rural and urban areas, aged from ten to middle age, and of a variety of occupations. The preponderance of data was contributed by university students. The items collected were scrutinized and like items were grouped under separate categories. The items in each category were then judged for aptness of fit, and similar items were drawn together under a general principle. A wide range of conscience material resulted from this procedure. Altogether, 944 persons contributed 3,952 items in the raw data. These were narrowed down, because of duplications, to 1,555 items. Items from the scales of Friedenberg and Havighurst and of Wack were included. From this number of items emerged 760 general principles under seventy-five categories. In the light of the broad range of conscience material which has emerged in the present study, an analysis of the content of the two previous studies has been made. Weaknesses in their content have become evident, some areas being completely neglected while others are unduly emphasized. It is felt that the general principles which have been derived empirically in this study will be useful as a framework upon which to construct a scale to measure conscience. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

In this thesis an attempt is made to shew that moral responsibility -- that a man merits praise or blame as he acts well or badly -- is compatible with the idea of an omnipotent God and a causal determinism. Moreover, a man's responsibility for his acts depends on their being his acts; i.e. he has a will, is free to choose, and acts voluntarily. Chapter one sets forth what the writer considers the best definitions of causality, chance, volition, freedom, determinism, indeterminism and necessity, Aristotle's systematic philosophy seeming the most practicable. The Christian concepts of will and predestination receive their first explanation in Saint Augustine. In the succeeding chapters the historical approach is used to set forth the attitudes of various philosophers to the problems Involved. The belief appears widespread that freedom (which is essential if one is to have responsibility) is incompatible with determinism; yet Aristotle and Spinoza shew that such is not the case. Indeterminism, rather than permitting freedom, makes it impossible, for then, man becomes subject to chance. The majority of the philosophies examined shew inconsistencies with a systematic theology and, although certain truths may be found in each, are rejected as being either unfruitful or incapable of being developed in the direction intended. The writer concludes that the most consistent and fruitful interpretation of moral responsibility Is given by Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle gives us a consistent philosophical system which Saint Thomas interprets in the light of Christian doctrine, and it is this philosophy which seems best to correlate with Catholic teaching. For Saint Thomas, that the will is free and human acts voluntary does not conflict with the idea of a divine, omnipotent Being; and necessity, providence and predestination do not conflict with free will in man. Both chance and determinism make freedom in man possible, more especially as man has intellect and reason to deliberate on courses of action. As all acts of the will are voluntary, man may be, and is, commended or censured for his acts as they are good or bad. He has choice, and this choice is free, so that the outcome of his actions is his own responsibility. As this view, despite its many difficulties, appears to be the most complete, it seems to be the best one on which to build in the future. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

In this dissertation, we have argued that liberty -freedom - is not only good but essential to what we regard a civilized life. We began with an examination of both the absolutistic and relativistic aspects of ethical doctrine. This examination revealed the expediency of accepting judgements based on sufficient reason rather than judgements made in accordance with ultimate principles, as guides to human conduct. In accepting the relativistic doctrine of value we illustrated the fact that there are many value-systems, and that the value-system we accept is basic to our way of life. Acceptance is strictly a matter of preference. We concluded our discussion of ethical theory by establishing as our generic end of action "the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people". This end of action we designated to mean a set of properties in accordance with which we make our evaluations. These evaluations become the postulates of our value-system: good and evil are only meaningful when judged in accordance with them. Furthermore, we found that these properties are contained within the framework of political and economic democracy. Over the long stretch of five thousand years of human history, democracy, as we know it, has prevailed for only a century or two, and that brief span coincides with the period of capitalist development. Logic suggests that democracy and individual freedom are closely bound up with capitalism, at least in its earlier stages of development before economic control becomes too highly centralized. But the freedom we have achieved is not due entirely to the operation of the laws of laissez-faire Capitalism. Even a Capitalist system in its simple form, with reasonable economic equality, could not provide all the freedom that we enjoy. Since it would operate without any government intervention, it would to some extent be governed by the law of the tooth and fang, and the weak would suffer at the hands of the strong. Cosequently, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the government has intervened more and more to protect the weak and the unfortunate. Although in so doing it has enlarged the sum total of human freedom, such legislation is to some extent a departure from the principles of laissez-faire capitalism. In arguing that the political and economic aspects of democracy are necessary characteristics of a just social order, we illustrated how political equality can be achieved, as in a Capitalistic order, and social justice remain as far away as ever. In this case, one type of privilege (economic) has been substituted for another (political). We also found it perfectly feasible to assume that some people may prefer equality in the distribution of wealth to political liberty. But here again, as in the case of Marxian Socialism, economic equality is gained by sacrificing political democracy. Thus, we endeavoured to achieve simultaneously, within the same system, both political liberty and social security, or equality. To achieve this end, we advocated a gradual transition from Capitalism to Democratic Socialism. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

M.B.A.

My dissertation approaches the issue of Muslim radicalization in the West from the standpoint of comparative religious ethics (CRE). As practitioners of a discipline rooted in the analysis of arguments, scholars of comparative religious ethics naturally approach issues such as radicalization by attending to the various forms of discursive reasoning involved. The best such studies historicize the discourse and attend to the kinds of procedures involved in their validation. So too, these studies generally offer a form of immanent critique and, often, work to put one tradition in dialogue with another tradition (Christian and Confucian forms of virtue, for example, or Islamic thought and human rights). My thesis is that studies in CRE could benefit from the insights of other disciplines that investigate the place of arguments in determining human behavior. More specifically, I contend that understanding radicalization requires more than the analysis of discursive reasoning. By attending to the general insights of fields such as social psychology and behavioral economics as well as specific studies that deal with radicalization, I argue that religious arguments are only part of a very large and complex set of phenomena including sociopolitical factors, developmental psychology, economics, and racism, that contribute to radicalization. At the same time, however, arguments are important, and scholars of comparative religious ethics are able to contribute to our understanding of radicalization by historicizing and analyzing the religious forms of reason-giving that are used to justify radicalization. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Religion in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester 2018. / February 28, 2018. / Comparative Ethics, Ethics, Radicalization, Religion / Includes bibliographical references. / John Kelsay, Professor Directing Dissertation; Michael Ruse, University Representative; Adam Gaiser, Committee Member; Sumner B. Twiss, Committee Member.

The project that resulted in this work had two main goals. The first was to sort out the most plausible form of the moral error theory, the view made popular by J.L. Mackie in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Second, I aimed to determine the extent of its plausibility. The first three chapters of this dissertation are the result of my attempt to accomplish the first goal, and the last two chapters are a consequence of the second. In the end, I argue that the most plausible version of the error theory (viz., Richard Joyce's development of Mackie's views) is not true. Along the way, I make three additional novel contributions to the meta-ethical literature. First, I provide a close reading of Mackie's work, and I argue that he has been misinterpreted thus far in the literature. Second, I attempt to clarify the linguistic and metaphysical components of the error theory. Third, I explicate a novel view in meta-ethics that isn't a direct descendent of Mackie's views, but which is, in many important respects, similar to his view. I call the view 'moral indecisionism', since its main thesis seems to agree with Hume when he writes, "The chief obstacle ... to our improvement in the moral ... sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms."

In this dissertation, I examine the prospects for moral particularism. Moral particularism, which, like most views, comes in a variety of flavors, is essentially the view that the role general principles have traditionally played in moral theorizing is overstated. In Chapter One, I lay out the groundwork for the theories which I will discuss in Chapters Two through Four -- a framework which I will ultimately reject. The most prominent variety of particularism in the literature, and the subject of Chapter Two, is the one offered by Jonathan Dancy in his \emph{Ethics Without Principles}. (Dancy 2004) Dancy argues for a holistic conception of practical reasons -- reasons that sometimes count in favor of Φing can, in other situations, count against Φing. He claims that the truth of holism leads rather immediately (though not directly) to moral particularism. The literature on particularism is flooded with arguments against Dancy. In Chapter Two, I discuss Dancy's particularism and rehearse what I take to be the strongest objections against his view. I take some of those arguments to be rather decisive. And so I suggest that for particularism to survive, we must move beyond Dancy's view. In Chapter Three I examine another variety of moral particularism - that offered by David McNaughton and Piers Rawling. Given the objections leveled against Dancy, one maneuver for preserving particularism would be to have a variety that is less objectionable by being more like traditional generalist theories. McNaughton and Rawling's particularism is just such a view. However, for various reasons which I discuss in that chapter, I find McNaughton and Rawling's view also to be unsatisfactory. Given that I take these two, the most prominent, strains of particularism to be the best developed, and given their problems, I suggest in Chapter Four that perhaps if particularism is untenable, particularists might best serve their aims by adopting quasi-generalist views. Essentially what particularists seem to be looking for is a view that privileges moral contexts over moral rules. The rules cannot adequately guide us, not exceptionlessly, at least, given the variety of moral situations in which we find ourselves. So, in this chapter I examine the moral contextualism offered by Margaret Olivia Little and Mark Norris Lance, as well as Pekka Värynen's theory of hedged moral principles. If extant varieties of particularism face insurmountable problems, then perhaps there are varieties of generalism which privilege moral contexts enough to satisfy particularist intuitions. Ultimately, I find these views also to be inadequate. The overarching theme of this work is that extant particularist views are inadequate in various ways all relating to their conception of a practical reason. And so, with that in mind, in Chapter Five, I argue that for particularists to maintain a foothold in the debate, they must rethink the conception of a practical reason they employ in their views. I suggest that there is room for a variety of particularism that rejects the traditional conception of practical reasons as holistic contributory considerations that we weigh together and against each other to determine what we ought to do. I call the view I am offering 'Eliminativism', as it is an attempted elimination of contributory-reasons-talk from the discourse. I reject the contributory conception of reasons and offer a more coarse-grained conception of reasons for action that privileges context above all else, thereby giving particularism a coherent conception of reasons for action that enables them to eschew general principles. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2015. / March 25, 2015. / jonathan dancy, moral generalism, moral particularism, reasons holism / Includes bibliographical references. / David McNaughton, Professor Directing Dissertation; Aline Kalbian, University Representative; J. Piers Rawling, Committee Member; Michael Bishop, Committee Member.

No description available.

Sometimes ignorance functions as a legitimate excuse, and sometimes it doesn't. It is widely maintained that, when the ignorance an agent acts or omits from is blameless, it excuses an agent. Call this claim the Blameless Ignorance Principle, or (BI). This principle is at the heart of questions concerning the epistemic condition on blameworthiness; my project explores a number of these with the aim of developing the literature in three areas. I first explore the epistemic condition on derivative blameworthiness. An agent's blameworthiness for something is derivative when it depends upon his blameworthiness for some prior thing that it resulted from. However, not just any negative consequence that a blameworthy action or omission results in is something for which the agent is thereby also blameworthy. It is often maintained that, in addition, the consequence must have been foreseeable for the agent. I develop a two-part argument against this view. First, I argue that agents can be blameless for failing to foresee what was reasonably foreseeable for them. Second, I explain that, if this is so and if (BI) is true, then the foreseeability view is false. Consequently, I consider an alternative view that requires actual foresight and is consistent with (BI). / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester 2016. / April 13, 2016. / Blameworthiness, Culpable Ignorance, Foresight, Ignorance, Quality of Will / Includes bibliographical references. / Randolph Clarke, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, University Representative; Alfred Mele, Committee Member; David McNaughton, Committee Member.