It seems well accepted that agents can only be morally responsible for what they voluntarily control. Yet as a matter of practice, we seem to hold agents responsible for items outside of their voluntary control, blaming others for failing to notice certain features of their environment, for having certain attitudes, or for forgetting to fulfill a promise. There is an apparent tension between philosophical theory and everyday practice. One way to explain away this tension is by appealing to a distinction between direct and derivative responsibility. When an agent S is responsible for something, X, in virtue of being responsible for something else that does not include X, Y, then S is derivatively responsible for X. When S is responsible for X but not solely in virtue of being responsible for some other thing, Y, S is directly responsible for X. One might argue that to be directly responsible for some item, one must have voluntary control over it. We are, at best, derivatively responsible for items over which we lack voluntary control, such as nonvoluntary attitudes. If we can trace back to a point at which an agent had voluntary control over some behavior and was aware of the potential nonvoluntary item that might result, the agent could be derivatively responsible for that item. Theorists who opt to relieve the tension in this way are called volitionists. They insist that voluntary control is required for direct responsibility. Recently, however, several theorists, called nonvolitionists, have denied that voluntary control is required for direct responsibility. Instead, they claim, agents can be directly responsible for nonvoluntary attitudes and other items over which they lack voluntary control. In this dissertation, I begin to assess the motivation for and merits of such nonvolitionist views. In chapter 2, I attempt to precisely articulate a volitionist thesis, which is more difficult than volitionists and nonvolitionists have yet appreciated. I argue that there are substantial problems with understanding the volitionist thesis as the claim that one is directly responsible only for what is under one’s voluntary control. Rather than formulating the volitionist thesis in this way, as others have done, I suggest that it is clearer and more useful to understand the volitionist thesis as the claim that agents are directly responsible only for their intentional actions. The volitionist thesis I offer in chapter 2 does not include direct responsibility for many omissions. While volitionists might want to amend this volitionist thesis to include these omissions, I argue in chapter 3 that they cannot do so in a justified way. If volitionists cannot comfortably extend direct responsibility to include omissions, they must account for these items derivatively via some kind of tracing strategy. In chapter 4, I argue that there are problems with proposed epistemic conditions on derivative responsibility, and some nonvoluntary faults—especially negligence and certain omissions—will prove quite difficult, if not impossible, for the tracing strategy. Accounting for responsibility for some nonvoluntary faults either directly or derivatively might be much more difficult for volitionists than they have previously appreciated. In light of this difficulty in matching our everyday responsibility ascriptions and practices, we should entertain nonvolitionist accounts. The second half of the dissertation explores the plausibility of nonvolitionism. In chapter 5, I explain and defend one of the current leading nonvolitionist accounts: Angela Smith’s rational relations view (RRV). RRV holds that agents can be directly responsible for their attitudes in virtue of a rational connection between such attitudes and the judgments and values that underlie them. The second half of chapter 5 as well as chapter 6 are devoted to defending RRV against various objections, including a recent criticism from Neil Levy. Levy argues that direct responsibility requires consciousness of the moral significance of one’s behavior. I argue that Levy fails to establish such consciousness as necessary for direct responsibility, and then offer some revisions to the rational relations view that might help to mitigate Levy’s worries. This modified version of RRV, which I call the rational control view (RCV), is thus poised to be a viable alternative to volitionist views. In chapter 7, I explain and defend RCV. My conclusion is modest: RCV is a serious and legitimate contender to volitionist views in light of the problems I highlight in the first several chapters. As such, RCV is worth developing further as we search for the best account of how and why agents are morally responsible for not only intentional actions, but also omissions and attitudes. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2016. / June 17, 2016. / Blameworthiness, Control, Moral Responsibility, Nonvolitionism, Volitionism, Voluntary Control / Includes bibliographical references. / Randolph Clarke, Professor Directing Dissertation; Martin Kavka, University Representative; Alfred R. Mele, Committee Member; Piers Rawling, Committee Member.

This thesis analyses a few selected aspects of crop biotechnology in agriculture. The thesis contains two essays; the first addresses the topic of how ethical tools can help to, especially in democratic societies, improve ethical judgments on modern biotechnologies used in agriculture and food production. The second essay explores GM crops and the question of whether engaging and promoting agriculture biotechnology would be an expression of hubris. Essay I discusses ethical tools and more specifically what makes a tool a good one. It is argued that some of the previous attempts of evaluating ethical tools are unfruitful. Myself and Per Sandin propose that ethical tools be divided into three categories with regard to their different aim(s). We suggest that the quality of an ethical tool is decided by its purposiveness, i.e. how well the tool achieves its assigned purpose(s). Essay II discusses the concept of hubris with regard to agricultural biotechnology. Several authors have claimed that supporting agricultural biotechnology is an expression of hubris. Ronald Sandler has given the argument its most structured account of yet. I argue that Sandler fails to establish a presumption against the use of GM crops and that the concept of hubris should play no role in evaluating GM crops and agricultural biotechnology. / <p>QC 20150330</p> / Mistra Biotech

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Two basic types of proposals for elucidating the concept of existential meaning have been made in the literature: 1) monist proposals; 2) family-resemblance proposals. Monist proposals attempt to give one overarching concept to which all competing conceptions of existential meaning answer. Family-resemblance proposals, on the other hand, claim that the question of existential meaning is not exhausted by any one concept of existential meaning; rather, there is a cluster or family of closely-united concepts which, as a whole, exhaust the possibilities of what we mean by ‘existential meaning’, even though no particular one does so on its own. Metz (2014) examines three monist proposals and concludes that no single one entirely captures the concept of existential meaning. At the conclusion of his analysis, he argues that because they each touch on important aspects of meaning, they should be united into a ‘family’ of closely-related concepts. For Metz, only the family – rather than any particular member – does a sufficient job of making the question of existential meaning intelligible. Without going into the details here, I argue in this dissertation that Metz’s embrace of a family-resemblance view is too quick. Certainly, family resemblance may be the only way we can characterize certain concepts, like games (Wittgenstein, 2001). But, as Metz himself acknowledges, if we can find an underlying concept shared by concepts in the ‘family’ of existential meaning, then that would be preferable. In this dissertation, I claim that the three concepts offered by Metz, along with all conceptions/theories considered in this project, share the following concept of existential meaning in common: existential meaning is an appropriate connection between a life and some significant thing(s). I draw this concept mainly from the work of Robert Nozick (1981), with some modifications to account for objections raised by Metz. Nozick thinks meaning arises as a person seeks to connect to external values. I claim that meaning arises as a person forms appropriate (valuable) connections to significant things (value). More simply stated, existential meaning is about valuable connections. Therefore, I call this the ‘Connectivity Concept’ (‘CC’ for short) and offer it as a necessary and sufficient condition of existential meaning: Connectivity Concept (CC): (a) life, L, has existential meaning if and only if L appropriately connects to some significant thing(s). I argue that this concept underlies questions about existential meaning. But the question of existential meaning requires us to specify three things when discussing existential meaning. I call these three things the ‘context’ of the discussion: 1) the L that we have in mind; 2) the ‘significant things’ we have in mind; and, 3) the ‘appropriate connection’ we have in mind. What L ‘means’, then, may change depending on the context of the discussion. I further claim, as an upshot of my thesis, that ambiguity in the question of existential meaning arises precisely insofar as we fail to specify the context of the discussion. Notice that CC contains normative claims about the connection – ‘appropriate’ – and objects of the connection – ‘significant’. These notions will need to be cashed out when discussing meaning. Realizing that we are disagreeing over the context of meaning will keep us from talking past one another when conceptualizing answers to the question. In the context of the discussion, we can think of the ‘appropriate connection’, metaphorically, as a pointing-relation: if a life does in fact have meaning, then that life ‘points’, in the right ways, to significant objects of the connection. This ‘pointing’ is why I have designated the objects as “some significant thing(s)”. Among other things, they are significant in that they are signified by the connection; the subject of meaning becomes a sign of those things in virtue of making the right connection to them. Conceptions specify what these significant things are and the manner in which the subject “successfully points”. We can state the thesis of this dissertation even more strongly: the question of existential meaning is so abstract a question as to be practically meaningless until we are given its context. Otherwise, almost any answer can qualify as legitimate when we ask: “what is the meaning of life?” – even Deep Thought’s answer of ‘forty-two’ in the epigraph of Chapter 1. I take this to be Douglas Adam’s point. Unless we are clearer in asking the question, people’s answers may come as a real surprise to us, precisely because they may assume different things about the question when they ask it. Indeed, because answers to the question often disagree about the subject, appropriate connection, and significant thing(s), it is important that theorists make arguments for why their context for the question is better, i.e. for why their subject, connection, and significant thing(s) should be prioritized. For instance, some might claim that the question of existential meaning is concerned with how a person (subject) causally influences (right connection) other lives (significant things). This question’s context is vastly different from a question which asks how a person (subject) might promote (connection) states of affairs that are the objects of that person’s propositional attitudes (significant things). These contexts are so different that their answers, too, will look drastically different. And this type of disagreement is precisely what we see in the literature. So if these questions share anything at all in common, it must be very abstract indeed. My claim is that what they share in common is CC. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / 2019 / November 15, 2019. / Axiology, Conceptual Analysis, Existentialism, Meaningfulness, Meaning of Life, Value theory / Includes bibliographical references. / David McNaughton, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, University Representative; Mark Lebar, Committee Member; Nathanael Stein, Committee Member.

This dissertation examines a four part hypothesis: (a) that liberal ethics in South Africa, particularly since the victory of the (Afrikaner) National Party in 1948, have been characterised by a sense of political powerlessness; (b) that as a consequence of this powerlessness, these ethics have been more concerned with principle, motives, conscience and internal consistency than with the consequences of liberal action; (c) that this sense of powerlessness is not justified in the social and political environment of the 1980's; and therefore, (d) that liberals should review their ethical approach with a view to developing an ethic of responsible liberal action.

Short-term volunteer mission trips account for an important aspect of global health care. The demand and desire to attend a mission trip has grown over the past decade. Self-fulfillment, altruism and philanthropy are said to be the motivating factors behind mission trips. In the present study, the motivation behind abroad short-term volunteer mission trips will be further researched and reported on. Mission trips to third-world countries, providing volunteer healthcare and oral health education have gained much popularity across the United States since their start in the 1980s. These trips are seen as selfless yet self-fulfilling opportunities. The benefits of these short-term volunteer mission trips will be evaluated in this thesis.Some characteristics that make mission trips valuable include the benefits experienced by patients, who would normally not have access to care and also by volunteer participants, who are able to give back to marginalized populations. More recently, the roles of physicians (and dentists) have been studied. Along with studying clinician’s roles on the trips, students’ educational experiences have been examined. Information on various perspectives have been written and are accompanied by a considerable amount of supporting information. Of these arguable points, many consist of discussing the enlargement of educational opportunities. By being a part of these mission’s trips, students can gain valuable skills for their future careers. Cross-cultural experiences during the trips are another alluring aspect for students. As supported by evidence, cultural awareness in the medical and dental field has had a great impact on volunteers. So much so that access to clinical experiences while abroad balances out the needs for the community while serving as a unique educational opportunity to students. The increasing popularity of volunteer trips providing third-world countries with access to healthcare has come with both advantages and disadvantages. The pitfalls and risks of volunteering abroad will be discussed including the drawbacks that include ethical dilemmas. In addition, issues with the infrastructure and framework of the visited country’s health care system are considered. This literature review takes a comprehensive look at medical/dental mission trips of all healthcare fields and proceeds to evaluate associated studies in which patients’ benefits, cross-cultural experiences and providers’ and students’ roles are affected by them.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Information Science at the University of Zululand, South Africa, 2009. / This study investigated the nature and level of information ethics education in Library and Information Science Departments in South Africa. The study was carried out using both qualitative and quantitative methods through a survey and content analysis. All 12 LIS Departments in South Africa were targeted. Within these departments, the departments’ Heads, lecturers teaching the module, and the course outlines/study guides of information ethics modules formed the target population. Data was collected via questionnaires that were emailed to the Heads of the various LIS Departments, who were also requested to forward a separate set of questionnaires to the lecturers teaching information ethics modules. Departments that offered information ethics modules were also requested to forward the study materials of their modules (i.e. their study guides) for content analysis. Of the twelve LIS Departments, responses were received from only seven. These were departments from the Universities of Zululand, Pretoria, Cape Town, South Africa, KwaZulu Natal, the Western Cape, and the Durban University of Technology. Study guides for content analyses were received from the three LIS Departments that offered information ethics as a full stand-alone module. These were the LIS Departments at the Universities of Zululand, Pretoria and South Africa. The results of the study indicate that in most LIS Departments, information ethics was taught in the content of other modules and not as a stand-alone module. In the LIS Departments that offered a stand-alone information ethics module, the module was only first offered in 2nd year, the rationale being that at this level, students are senior enough to appreciate information ethics. It was also found that the stand-alone information ethics modules were only offered by LIS Departments. Furthermore, only one lecturer from the University of South Africa had a background in both Library and Information Science and Philosophy; the rest of the lecturers in the LIS Departments had backgrounds only in Library and Information Science. The study also found that in terms of the units covered in information ethics modules, there was quite a bit of diversity, with each LIS Department offering its own version of information ethics. However, issues of intellectual property, copyright and privacy were covered across the board. The study acknowledges the ethical dilemmas facing information professionals and recommends that information ethics be made a major component of LIS education and training, in which case it would be offered as a full standalone module.

The issue of homosexual inclusivity within the Catholic Church has been and continues to be at the center of much debate. This thesis analyzes the issue by engaging the document ,“The Pastoral Care of the Homosexual Person” written by Joseph Ratzinger. New exegetical interpretations of both Old and New Testament texts are placed in dialogue with interpretations utilized by Ratzinger in his letter. These interpretations serve to provide an alternative and liberating reading of seminal texts that have been used to oppress and exclude the Queer community from the Catholic Church. Queer theology is then used to draw connections between the experience of Christ and that of the Queer person, in order to argue that in following Christ, Catholic’s must embrace the Queer community as another part of the Cosmic body of Christ.

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The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the inequities in Black communities and magnified existing disparities in health care access and treatment. By examining the role of Black communities during the 1918 influenza and 2019 Covid pandemic, we understand the resilience and leadership these communities had in promoting black health. Shifting from the context of the pandemic to strategies of community engagement, this paper frames a discussion of Black community response as a strategy for overcoming barriers to health and offers a blueprint for approaching effective community engagement in Black community health post the COVID-19 crisis.Highlighted throughout are the Bioethics principles, non-maleficence, social justice, and solidarity. / Urban Bioethics