This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.

The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.

An effective incentivized hunting program was initiated in the United States in 2002 to reduce the population of nutria (Myocastor coypus), an invasive species of rodent contributing to wetland erosion. In this thesis, I analyze the ethics of intervening through the nutria hunting program by applying four different non-anthropocentric theories of animal and environmental ethics to the case: Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s animal rights, Paul Taylor’s respect for nature, and Aldo Leopold’s land ethic. I explain why the theories of Singer and Leopold would support intervention, while Regan’s and Taylor’s would not. Additionally, due to its unique features, the situation with the nutria is a perfect test case for evaluating the merits of these four competing theories. After taking issue with Singer’s, Regan’s, and Taylor’s theories as they pertain to the nutria case, I conclude that Leopold’s land ethic is best able to account for our considered moral belief that killing the invasive nutria in order to protect the wetlands is morally appropriate. Because Leopold’s land ethic is holistic and inegalitarian, it can explain both why the nutria are a problem and why they are less morally valuable than the native wetland species they are destroying. Of the four theories, only Leopold’s includes the entire biotic community in the sphere of moral consideration, and in so doing, recognizes that what is at stake in this case is the wetland itself, and that we have a duty to preserve its integrity, even at the cost of nutria life.

abstract: Engineering ethics is preoccupied with technical failure. To ameliorate the risk that engineering works might either blow up or fall down, the engineering code of ethics provides guidance of how engineers should conduct themselves. For example, the Fundamental Canons in the National Society of Professional Engineers code of ethics states that engineers should hold paramount the health, safety and welfare of the public. As a result, engineering designs meet basic human needs such as food, water and shelter -- at risks that are generally considered acceptable. However, even safe designs fail to meet our needs ranked higher in Maslow's hierarchy -- such as belonging, esteem and self-actualization. While these have historically not been ethical priorities, increasing expectations in developed countries now include more complex ethical concepts such as sustainability and social justice. We can expect these trends toward higher and more complex human needs to continue -- although the profession seems ill-prepared. We argue that an empathic approach to engineering design is necessary to meet these higher needs of developed and developing societies. To guide engineers towards this approach, we propose a pluralistic interpretation of empathy grounded in an understanding of the three parts of the mind: cognitive, affective, and conative. In fact, product designers already use empathy in their design processes. However, an exemplar of an empathic design is harder to find in civil engineering disciplines. This paper discusses an example of the Hoover Dam Bypass, which resulted in an award-winning design and construction that improved traffic flow, reduced vulnerability to terrorist attack, and accounted for historical factors and environmental impacts. However, this technical success is an empathic failure. Although project leaders commissioned ethnographic studies to understand the impact the bridge would have on the local Native American populations and their cultural sites, the eventual design showed little consideration of the concerns that were revealed. For engineering designs such as bridges, other infrastructure and systems to meet the needs of the various populations in which they serve, engineers need to incorporate empathy into their designs. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Civil Engineering 2016

<p> This thesis considers the prospects for including respect for patient autonomy as a value in veterinary medical ethics. Chapter One considers why philosophers have traditionally denied autonomy to animals and why this is problematic; I also present contemporary accounts of animal ethics that recognize animals&rsquo; capacity for and exercise of autonomy (or something similar, such as agency) as morally important. In Chapter Two, I review veterinary medical ethics today, finding that respect for patient autonomy is undiscussed or rejected outright as irrelevant. Extrapolating mainstream medical ethics&rsquo; account of autonomy to veterinary medicine upholds this conclusion, as it would count all patients as &ldquo;never-competent&rdquo; and consider determining their autonomous choices impossible; thus welfare alone would be relevant. Chapter Three begins, in Part I, by describing the ways we routinely override patient autonomy in veterinary practice, both in terms of <i>which</i> interventions are selected and <i>how</i> care is delivered. I also show that some trends in the field suggest a nascent, implicit respect for patient autonomy. Part II of Chapter Three presents feminist criticisms of the mainstream approach to patient autonomy. I argue that the relational approach to autonomy advocated by such critics can be meaningfully applied in the veterinary realm. I advance an approach that conceives respect for patient autonomy in diachronic and dialogic terms, taking the patient as the foremost locus of respect. In Chapter Four, I turn to issues of practical implementation, such as interpreting what constitutes an animal&rsquo;s values and concerns, and assessing the effect of positive reinforcement training on autonomy. The Conclusion offers areas for future research while refuting the objection that a simpler, expanded welfare-based approach would yield the same substantive recommendations as my account.</p><p>

Many accept that there are some acts that are ‘supererogatory’ or ‘beyond the call of duty’. Risking one’s life to save others or dedicating one’s life to helping the needy are often thought to be examples of such acts. Accepting the possibility of acts of this sort raises interesting problems for moral philosophy, as many moral theories appear to leave no room for the supererogatory. While these problems are increasingly recognized in moral philosophy, there remain a number of debates that have failed to pay sufficient attention to the existence of acts of this sort. In this thesis I investigate the implications of accepting the possibility of supererogation for three of these debates. The first issue I investigate is the relationship between morality and self-interest. One popular view is that supererogatory acts are those that demand too much sacrifice from those who could perform them. However, I argue that looking at self-reported accounts and empirical psychological studies of moral exemplars gives us good reason to reject this view, as it has the implausible implication that those with less developed moral consciences are excused from obligations that apply to those with more developed moral sensibilities. We should accept, then, that performing an act of supererogation may be in line with an agent's self-interest. The next debate I examine concerns the connection between moral judgements and motivation. Motivational judgement internalists claim that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation. However, it is often unclear which moral judgements this view is supposed to cover. The claim is made about judgements of 'moral goodness', 'moral rightness' and 'moral requirement'. I argue that internalists need to restrict their claim to moral obligation judgements. I then examine how to give an account of the relationship between moral obligations and reasons for action. It is often claimed that moral reasons are overriding. A related view is moral rationalism, which holds that agents have most reason to act in line with their moral requirements. I start by examining the differences between these two views before looking at what form of either view it is plausible to hold if we accept the existence of supererogation. I finish by looking at whether accepting the existence of supererogatory acts goes far enough or whether there is a need to make room for additional deontic categories, such as suberogation, quasi-supererogation or forced supererogation. I will argue that none of the arguments put forward in defence of these claims show that there is a need to make room for these additional categories.

The objective of the study was to examine the effect of cognitive moral development on ethical attitudes, in the presence of reward consequences, under conditions of moral ambiguity. The study is based on business stakeholders under conditions of strategic business competition. The intention of the study is to explore and understand the predictors of ethical behaviour. The participants of the experimental study were 2012/13 GIBS MBA business students with real managerial experience. They were randomly assigned to different stakeholder roles in a controlled business simulation game called the Execugame, with varying treatments of reward consequences and a strategic competitor bluff. The study sought to determine whether Reward Consequences (RC) will be a stronger predictor of Attitude towards the Ethicality of Competitor Bluffing (ATECB) amongst Stakeholder Role Players (SRPs) than their Level Cognitive Moral Development as a predictor of Attitude towards the Ethicality of Competitor Bluffing (ATECB). Overall the results didn’t find evidence to support the research hypotheses. Hence the research failed to prove a relationship and did not find evidence to support a relationship. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / lmgibs2014 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

The International Council of Nurses [ICN] Code for Nurses clearly states that the registered nurse's first obligation is to the patient (ICN, 1973). But, in the clinical setting, multiple loyalties or obligations to the patient, family, physician, employing agency, professional standards, and personal ethical beliefs may conflict. Given the diversity of obligation in nursing practice and the ever expanding array of life sustaining technologies and techniques, a problem arises for nurses when they attempt to employ clinical guidelines offered by the ICN Code. Therefore, in order to ascertain how nurses uphold patient autonomy when responding to conflicts in the empirical setting and to delineate the patterns of reasoning which contribute to the actual response as well as to the preferred response, a qualitative grounded theory methodology was selected. This exploratory approach provided evidence that when conflict occurs, perceptions of relevancy on both a cognitive and affective level, influence the nurses' response. Often nurses with apparently equal cognitive capabilities on a moral developmental level perceived conflict of loyalty situations in vastly different ways and thereby responded with a range of behavior that went from exemplary care, which supported patient autonomy, to unsafe care, which completely denied patients their autonomy. An inductively derived substantive theory outlines this variance in care. The manner in which patient autonomy is upheld in multiple loyalty conflicts can be expressed on a three dimensional categorical basis with perceptions of imposed, bounded and volitional relevance conjoined with three levels of cognitive moral development, including both descriptive and normative explanations of conflict resolution. Principles and their supporting rules for nursing action derived from each category emphasize the little researched but complex relationship between moral cognitions, perceptions and affective valuing. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Nursing, School of / Graduate

This study describes nurses' ethical perspectives on nursing dying patients in a critical care setting, as well as nurses' responses to their perspectives. The design involved a phenomenological approach, with unstructured interviews with eight critical care nurses used to generate data. The results indicated that nurses' ethical perspectives centered around a theme of senselessness; a senseless decision-making process, the experiences of patients and family members as senseless, and nurses' activities as senseless. Senselessness illustrated the multiple ethical dilemmas inherent in nurses' experiences. Nurses' ethical perspectives also involved their attempts to cope with senselessness by finding new meanings through shifting focus to patient comfort, support of the family, and to nurses' personal philosophies. The situational context of nurses' perspectives was explored in terms of influences on their perspectives. This study supports other recent nursing research identifying prolongation of the process of dying as a significant ethical problem engendering moral distress. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Nursing, School of / Graduate

This study is a qualitative analysis of the author's previous publications, academic and operational practitioners input, the literature, and accreditation requirements for ethics education in healthcare. Two research questions were addressed: 1. Is a typology of ethics education in healthcare needed, and 2. Is more specificity of ethics education in healthcare required? Both research questions were answered in the affirmative. The results indicated that a typology of ethics education in healthcare is needed with the primary reason being the need for a focused manuscript that uses content validity to illustrate the hierarchy of ethical reasoning in healthcare. No one manuscript brings together the six ethics education domains that were identified as required for appropriate ethics education in healthcare. The second research question result indicated that there are sparse educational objectives available in the context of cognitive and affective educational domains, especially for the six ethics domains presented here: 1. Decision ethics, 2. Professional ethics, 3. Clinical ethics, 4. Business ethics, 5. Organizational ethics, and 6. Social ethics. Due to the limited specificity of the ethics education objectives identified in the literature, the author developed and presented a typology, beginning with 270 ethics educational objectives, for use in healthcare instruction. A discussion is provided on how healthcare can be improved by including more specific ethics education objectives within healthcare programs. Further recommendations include the creation of a taxonomy based on the typology developed here.