The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, Mark Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is outlined and discussed as an application of social contract theory to animal ethics. It is shown that we can make a social contract with animals, and that there is nothing ridiculous about the idea. It is even shown that animals should (in principle) participate in negotiating a social contract (if we make one). Rowlands’ argument for vegetarianism is outlined as an example of how his Neo-Rawlsianism is applied. This argument relies to some extent on the claim that animals are harmed by a painless death, and an attempt is made to support this claim. But it is ultimately argued that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism falls foul of a reductio ad absurdum that puts it out of contention, thus implying that we should not make a social contract with animals. In the second part of the thesis, Tzachi Zamir’s approach to animal ethics is outlined and discussed as a minimalist approach. Zamir proposes a Speciesist-Liberationism. This is explained, and it is shown how it avoids the reductio ad absurdum Neo-Rawlsianism falls foul of. Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism is outlined as an example of how his Minimalism is applied. Various weaknesses are observed in Zamir’s argument, and a more minimal Minimalism is suggested as providing the best argument for vegetarianism and animal liberation, at least until a better substantive moral argument is found.

The main problem addressed in animal ethics is on what grounds and to what extent we owe animals moral consideration. I argue that many animals deserve direct moral consideration in virtue of their agency, selfhood and autonomy. I start by providing an account of agency and selfhood that admits of degrees, from minimal to complex, among animal species that is supported by current research on consciousness and the mental capacities of animals. I posit that agency and selfhood are morally valuable as they allow for subjective mental experiences that matter to conscious individuals. I then develop a view of autonomy that corresponds to my view of agency and selfhood, whereby the degree to which an individual is self-aware indicates the degree to which that being is autonomous. I argue that autonomy not only consists in the rational and reflective capacities of humans, but also at a more minimal level where autonomy is simply the ability to make choices. I support this view of autonomy as choice with an account of ???naturalized autonomy??? and explain some of the implications of this view for animals. After considering the views of Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Bernard Rollin on animal ethics, I analyze the flaws in their reasoning and argue that my own view provides a stronger account for the direct moral consideration of animals. This is due to my inclusion of agency, selfhood and autonomy, which these philosophers mainly neglect. I review some current reinterpretations of Kant???s moral arguments that claim animals ought to be considered ends-in-themselves. I present reasons why the inclusion of selfhood would strengthen this claim and further develop my argument for respecting the autonomy of animals. I conclude that a theory of animal ethics based on agency, selfhood and autonomy provides the strongest account for the direct moral consideration of animals, as it is empirically informed and provides a moral middle path between animal welfare and animal rights.

Capacity-oriented accounts of animal ethics have been fairly successful in establishing that the interests of animals ought to be included in moral considerations. Yet, even when individual animals have identical capacities and interests there remains a strong intuition that we have greater moral obligations to some animals, such as pets, than to others, such as animals in the wild. This thesis argues that contemporary relational approaches to animal ethics offer a plausible, more direct means of accounting for this intuition that do current forms of capacity-oriented approaches such as those offered by Peter Singer an Tom Regan. / Graduate

An effective incentivized hunting program was initiated in the United States in 2002 to reduce the population of nutria (Myocastor coypus), an invasive species of rodent contributing to wetland erosion. In this thesis, I analyze the ethics of intervening through the nutria hunting program by applying four different non-anthropocentric theories of animal and environmental ethics to the case: Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s animal rights, Paul Taylor’s respect for nature, and Aldo Leopold’s land ethic. I explain why the theories of Singer and Leopold would support intervention, while Regan’s and Taylor’s would not. Additionally, due to its unique features, the situation with the nutria is a perfect test case for evaluating the merits of these four competing theories. After taking issue with Singer’s, Regan’s, and Taylor’s theories as they pertain to the nutria case, I conclude that Leopold’s land ethic is best able to account for our considered moral belief that killing the invasive nutria in order to protect the wetlands is morally appropriate. Because Leopold’s land ethic is holistic and inegalitarian, it can explain both why the nutria are a problem and why they are less morally valuable than the native wetland species they are destroying. Of the four theories, only Leopold’s includes the entire biotic community in the sphere of moral consideration, and in so doing, recognizes that what is at stake in this case is the wetland itself, and that we have a duty to preserve its integrity, even at the cost of nutria life.

No description available.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Jacques Derrida’s The Animal that Therefore I Am published posthumously first in France (2006) and then translated in English (2008) has potentially become one of the most powerful philosophical discourses on animal ethics to date. His seminal undertaking begins with a personal experience the philosopher has with his cat that one day follows him into the bathroom. What follows is a classic deconstructive reversal when Derrida, ashamed at his nudity in front of the cat, reverses the perspective and asks what the cat sees and thinks when faced with a man – a naked one at that, and how he, as a shamed human, responds to it. Using his well-established deconstructive methods Derrida weaves through the pillars of traditional philosophy and rigorously unpicks our traditional and historical thinking about how we regard animals and calls into question both the humananimal distinction as well as the latent subjectivity on the matter. It is this text primarily that I utilized in my thesis, as well as some of Derrida’s earlier influential works, to show that deconstruction is a powerful and persuasive strategy toward providing a new ethic for (other) animals. As with Derrida, my point of departure is to put traditional philosophy under the hammer by showing how deconstruction as a post-modern tool unpicks the inherent flaws within its structure. I hope to reveal that a deconstruction of the anthropocentric and logocentric attitude of humans toward other animals is necessary in providing a new ethic for (other) animals. I begin first by breaking down the traditional hierarchy of humans over (other) animals – anthropocentrism, logocentrism and ‘carnophallogocentrism’ – as well as, in a separate chapter, a deconstruction of contemporary animal rights thinkers, and replace these perceptions and theories with what Matthew Calarco called a ‘proto-ethical imperative’ (Calarco, 2008: 108), which, I argue, is a foundation stone toward a new ethic. Then, by multiplying the possibilities of an equitable co-existence between human and other animals, I chart a path toward a better understanding and approach to our relationship with non-human animals. In short, this thesis is an attempt to discover, through deconstruction, a way toward an applied (animal) ethic. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Jacques Derrida se The Animal that Therefore I Am wat postuum die eerste keer gepubliseer is in Frankryk (2006) en daarna vertaal is in Engels (2008) het potensieel een van die mees kragtige filosofiese diskoerse oor diere-etiek tot op datum geword. Sy seminale onderneming begin met 'n persoonlike ervaring wat die filosoof het met sy kat wat hom een dag in die badkamer volg. Wat daarop gebeur is 'n klassieke dekonstruktiewe omkeer toe Derrida, skaam oor sy naaktheid voor die kat, die perspektief omswaai en vra wat die kat sien en dink wanneer gekonfronteer met 'n man – en boonop nog 'n naakte man, en hoe hy, as 'n beskaamde mens, daarop reageer. Met behulp van sy goed gevestigde dekonstruktiewe metodes weef Derrida deur die pilare van die tradisionele filosofie en met sy streng ontledings ontrafel hy ons tradisionele en historiese denke oor hoe ons diere beskou, en bevraagteken hy sowel die mens-dier onderskeiding as die latente subjektiwiteit oor die aangeleentheid. Dit is hoofsaaklik hierdie teks wat ek gebruik in my tesis, sowel as 'n paar van Derrida se vroeëre invloedryke werke, om aan te toon dat dekonstruksie 'n kragtige en oortuigende strategie is om 'n nuwe etiek ten aansien van (ander) diere te voorsien. Soos by Derrida, is my uitgangspunt om tradisionele filosofie onder die hamer te plaas deur aan te toon hoe dekonstruksie as 'n post-moderne denkstrategie die inherente gebreke in sy struktuur kan blootlê. Ek hoop om aan te toon dat 'n dekonstruksie van die antroposentriese en logosentriese ingesteldheid van mense teenoor ander diere noodsaaklik is vir die formulering van 'n nuwe etiek vir (ander) diere. Ek begin deur die tradisionele hiërargie van die mens oor (ander) diere – antroposentrisme, logosentrisme en 'carnophallogosentrisme' af te breek – asook, in 'n ander hoofstuk, met 'n dekonstruksie van kontemporêre diereregtedenkers, en vervang hierdie sieninge en teorieë met wat Matthew Calarco 'n sogenaamde 'proto-etiese imperatief' noem (Calarco 2008: 108), wat ek argumenteer 'n hoeksteen is van 'n nuwe etiek. Dan, deur die moontlikhede van 'n billike mede-bestaan tussen mens en ander diere te vermenigvuldig, karteer ek 'n weg na 'n beter begrip van, en benadering tot ons verhouding met niemenslike diere. In kort, hierdie tesis is 'n poging om deur middel van dekonstruksie, 'n pad na 'n toegepaste (diere-)etiek te ontsluit.

Thesis advisor: Katie Rapier / Through the years, people began to breed their dogs and cats with the intention for the pets to be useful in a certain skill. However, that has shifted to focus on their looks rather than their skills thanks to kennel clubs imposing standards on each breed. This has led irresponsible breeding practices to occur which in turn caused breeds to evolve negatively as breeds began to suffer from preventable genetic disorders and negative physical changes. Genetically manipulating soon shifted from pets to humans with PGD/IVF and CRISPR-Cas9. At first, there was a focus to use these methods to help cure and prevent genetic disorders. That has since shifted to people wanting to create the perfect child. In this thesis I will argue that designer breeds help lead the way to designer babies, and that any genetic manipulation to embryos should only be done if a medical reason is present. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy.

While throughout the ages prominent thinkers have denounced for various reasons mistreatment and killing of animals for food or sacrifice, the dominant western view has been that only rational beings merit moral respect and value. Augustine developed, from Aristotle‘s thought of a hierarchy of souls as well as from the Stoic concept of animals‘ irrationality, the idea that animals share no fellowship with humans and thus are to be excluded from moral consideration. In Aquinas‘ thinking the difference between rationality and irrationality became the difference between immortal and mortal souls. This view furthered the development of an instrumental view of animals. The perception that lower species are created to benefit the higher species has become a dominant part of western Christian thought. The main aim of this study is to investigate whether a respectful attitude towards animals, as lived by Francis of Assisi and Albert Schweitzer, has a mystical basis (following the model of Evelyn Underhill), and subsequently to consider whether and how mystical qualities as lived by Francis and Schweitzer may contribute to an animal spirituality. In this thesis I explore the moral valuation of animals in the Christian biblical and spiritual tradition, and further present the outcome of this exploration as an alternative to an anthropocentric tradition and as a contribution to contemporary protectionist approaches. Franciscan sources and Schweitzer‘s oeuvre have been examined while applying Underhill‘s concept of various characteristics and stages of the mystic way. I conclude that both Francis and Schweitzer in their own unique ways qualify to be categorized as ‗mystics‘. Not through rationality, but through experience and feeling, both have achieved real contact with other beings and attained to the Mystery of life. Through their purified view they have been able to perceive animals in a non-instrumental way and through their mystical experiences of union they have sensed the common ontological basis and kinship between humans and animals—our interdependency, utility, aesthetic value and theophany. On the basis of scrutiny of biblical texts which touch upon the relations of humans and animals with God I observe that an animal-inclusive moral concern, as demonstrated by Francis and Schweitzer, finds biblical support. Each creature, as created and animated by God‘s rûaḥ (‗Spirit‘) is transparent to God‘s glory and therefore able to reveal something of the Creator. The Bible proclaims animals as God‘s property, with their own relation with their Creator, not as created to satisfy human wants and wishes. A non-instrumental understanding of animals, as found in biblical texts and as realized by Francis‘ and Schweitzer‘s awe for life, has ethical implications for human-animal relations. Francis‘ and Schweitzer‘s views call us to question our use of animals as our property, therewith sacrificing animal interests for our own. A spirituality in which animals are contemplated as God‘s creatures, with their own worth and their own relation to God, may lead to a different attitude towards animals. To the various elucidated positions in the contemporary animal debate, with its emphasis on rights and reason, Francis and Schweitzer may contribute through their example of an approach calling for empathy, sympathy and compassion as an alternative point of departure. / PhD (Dogmatics), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in cooperation with Greenwich School of Theology, 2015

While throughout the ages prominent thinkers have denounced for various reasons mistreatment and killing of animals for food or sacrifice, the dominant western view has been that only rational beings merit moral respect and value. Augustine developed, from Aristotle‘s thought of a hierarchy of souls as well as from the Stoic concept of animals‘ irrationality, the idea that animals share no fellowship with humans and thus are to be excluded from moral consideration. In Aquinas‘ thinking the difference between rationality and irrationality became the difference between immortal and mortal souls. This view furthered the development of an instrumental view of animals. The perception that lower species are created to benefit the higher species has become a dominant part of western Christian thought. The main aim of this study is to investigate whether a respectful attitude towards animals, as lived by Francis of Assisi and Albert Schweitzer, has a mystical basis (following the model of Evelyn Underhill), and subsequently to consider whether and how mystical qualities as lived by Francis and Schweitzer may contribute to an animal spirituality. In this thesis I explore the moral valuation of animals in the Christian biblical and spiritual tradition, and further present the outcome of this exploration as an alternative to an anthropocentric tradition and as a contribution to contemporary protectionist approaches. Franciscan sources and Schweitzer‘s oeuvre have been examined while applying Underhill‘s concept of various characteristics and stages of the mystic way. I conclude that both Francis and Schweitzer in their own unique ways qualify to be categorized as ‗mystics‘. Not through rationality, but through experience and feeling, both have achieved real contact with other beings and attained to the Mystery of life. Through their purified view they have been able to perceive animals in a non-instrumental way and through their mystical experiences of union they have sensed the common ontological basis and kinship between humans and animals—our interdependency, utility, aesthetic value and theophany. On the basis of scrutiny of biblical texts which touch upon the relations of humans and animals with God I observe that an animal-inclusive moral concern, as demonstrated by Francis and Schweitzer, finds biblical support. Each creature, as created and animated by God‘s rûaḥ (‗Spirit‘) is transparent to God‘s glory and therefore able to reveal something of the Creator. The Bible proclaims animals as God‘s property, with their own relation with their Creator, not as created to satisfy human wants and wishes. A non-instrumental understanding of animals, as found in biblical texts and as realized by Francis‘ and Schweitzer‘s awe for life, has ethical implications for human-animal relations. Francis‘ and Schweitzer‘s views call us to question our use of animals as our property, therewith sacrificing animal interests for our own. A spirituality in which animals are contemplated as God‘s creatures, with their own worth and their own relation to God, may lead to a different attitude towards animals. To the various elucidated positions in the contemporary animal debate, with its emphasis on rights and reason, Francis and Schweitzer may contribute through their example of an approach calling for empathy, sympathy and compassion as an alternative point of departure. / PhD (Dogmatics), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in cooperation with Greenwich School of Theology, 2015

Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka aktuella mediedebatter om köttkonsumtion ur ett djuretiskt perspektiv. Studien bygger på teorin om karnism och kritisk diskursanalys. Artikelsökningen gjordes genom Mediearkivet Retriever och avgränsades till de fyra största tidningarna i Sverige, Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen och Svenska Dagbladet, från 2014 fram till idag. Det empiriska materialet bestod av 25 artiklar och ur dessa framkom fem diskurser: köttnormsdiskursen, djurrättsdiskursen, hälsodiskursen, marknadsdiskursen och miljödiskursen. Diskurserna gick ofta in i varandra och hade ofta fler än ett perspektiv. Studiens resultat visade att köttnormsdiskursen är den hegemoniska diskursen. Även om flera av artiklarna förespråkade konsumtion av enbart svenskt och ekologiskt kött, var köttkonsumtion ändå normen. Trots att köttkonsumtionen idag är rekordhög, var de flesta artiklarna oväntat eniga om att köttkonsumtionen måste minska drastiskt för hälsan, miljön och djurens skull. / The essay examines the recent media coverage of meat consumption from an animal ethical perspective. The study is based on the theory of carnism and critical discourse analysis. For the article search Mediearkivet Retriever was used and the search was limited to four main newspapers in Sweden, Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen and Svenska Dagbladet. The time span was from the beginning of 2014 until today. The essays material consisted of 25 articles and from them five discourses were identified: The meat norm discourse, the animal rights discourse, the health discourse, the market economy discourse and the environmental discourse. The discourses often related to one another and often included more than one perspective. The study showed that the hegemonic discourse is the meat norm discourse. Although many of the articles were in favor of a drastic cut down of meat consumption, and suggested consumption of only Swedish and organic meat, the norm was still to consume meat. Although statistics show very high meat consumption, there seem to be a surprising consensus in the articles that meat consumption must decrease drastically, for health reasons, the environment and for the wellbeing of animals.