Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): David R. Henderson, Robert M. McNab. Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-108). Also available online.

This doctoral thesis examines the objectives, consequences, and significance of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) policy towards Soviet Eastern Europe with special reference to Poland from 1953 to 1960. The most significant finding of this thesis is the confirmation of the close collaboration between the Chinese and Poles in the events surrounding the Polish October in 1956. This study argues that the Chinese Communist leadership played a decisive role in preventing Soviet military action in Warsaw during those few critical days in October, 1956. In successfully defusing the tension between Moscow and Warsaw, the Chinese reached a parity of prestige in which the PRC could duly consider itself equal with the Soviet Union. With the restoration of its "rightful" place in the postwar world order as the ultimate aim of the Chinese revolution, the PRC forged relations with the Soviet bloc holding the view that equality with the Soviet Union was a crucial prerequisite in recovering its global position. The PRC's Soviet East Europe policy, namely in its relations with Poland, paved the PRC's road toward reaching equality with the Soviet Union, but at the same time exposed the contradictory nature of bloc unity, the weak foundations of Soviet authority, and the deepseated belief of the Chinese leadership in the PRC's sovereign position as the centre of the world Communist revolution. Thus, contending contradictions in intra-party relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) formed the crux of the intra-bloc imbroglio which threatened Soviet authority in the bloc and led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.

This thesis is concerned with various aspects of transitional labour reallocation either between different labour market states, or between less and more efficient enterprises, or between formal and informal sectors. The possibility of irregular employment opportunities receives special attention in this work. The substantive material is arranged in three independent essays. The first, empirical study portrays the most important trends in labour reallocation in Russia, and presents analyses of two types. First, transition probabilities are studied, and some determinants of worker flows are identified using a multinomial logit modelling. Second, a survival analysis of the non-employed is conducted to reveal possible causes of growing stagnancy of unemployment and inactivity. The findings are contrasted with the stylised theory of labour reallocation in transition (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994). The directions in which theoretical modifications should be attempted in future research are suggested. The second and the third essays draw upon some of these suggestions and are aimed at making a contribution on the theoretical front. The second essay puts forward a development of the seminal model of transition from planned to market economy by Aghion and Blanchard (1994). We introduce an informal sector to show that its presence can generate the dynamics qualitatively different from the types considered in the previous literature on the topic. It is argued that convergence to qualitatively different steady states can help explain varying transitional experiences of East European countries and the former Soviet Union republics. Attention is drawn to policy implications of the model, in particular to the creation of conditions favourable for the development of the new private sector as opposed to informal private initiative. Finally, the third essay takes the issue of coexistence of formal and informal sectors in transition further to see if such duality is possible in the long run, and to discuss the role of the government in creating preconditions for it. The study draws on the standard framework of Pissarides (2000) of search in the labour market. It demonstrates that a long-run equilibrium with both formal and informal economies is possible under very mild assumptions. It is also shown that labour market imperfections can create a situation when reduction in informality may be detrimental to economic welfare. Although the foci of the essays differ, the issues raised therein are closely knit so that many threads can be drawn together. In the concluding chapter we discuss the main areas to which this thesis contributes, summarise the main findings, and make some suggestions for future research.

Proefschrift--Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht. / "Stellingen" ([2] p.) inserted. Bibliography: p. 207-215.

Thesis (doctoral)--Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 2005 / Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-137).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Notre Dame, 2010. / Thesis directed by Jackie Smith for the Department of Sociology. "April 2010." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-66).

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universität der Bundeswehr, Hamburg (Germany), 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-192).

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): David Yost, Hans-Eberhard Peters. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

All economic systems are analyzed from the point of view of (a) whether or not they offer individuals opportunities to earn capital income; (b) whether the allocation of output between current consumption and investment is determined by the “invisible hand" of the market mechanism or "visible hand" of central planner. For the purpose of this study four economic systems are defined: Capitalist market, capitalist central planning, socialist market, and socialist central planning. Ample evidence is provided to show that the economies of the East European Bloc represented almost a model cases of the socialist centrally planned system. In this sense these economies had the following three characteristics: 1. The state controlled almost all returns to capital in the economy, including the returns to human capital. 2. The state controlled the allocation of resources between investment and current consumption. 3. Households supplied labor to the state sector in exchange for compensation in the form of consumption, i.e., the state maintained only an indirect relationship with the labor factor of production. Labor effort could have been increased only by offering consumption-type incentives. In part two of this dissertation the dynamic macroeconomic equilibria possible under socialist central planning, socialist market, and capitalist systems are analyzed. It is shown that under both socialist systems (where individual households are banned from earning capital income from their personal savings) the supply of labor is suboptimal compared to the first-best solution feasible under capitalist system. The socialist market system fails to invest optimally. This failure can be improved by the introduction of a central planner. In a socialist centrally planned economy, however, the issue of the time consistency of optimal plans arises when the planner avoids commitment to the level of real wages. In the rational expectations framework households can predict the planner’s behavior and respond to it by supplying even less labor than under socialist market system. In part three an alternative program of economic reform of East European socialist centrally planned economies is outlined. / Ph. D.