Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / MBA Professional Report / This purpose of this Master's of Business Administration Professional Report is to deliver an enabling concept future joint expeditionary contracting execution. The Commanding General of the Joint Contracting Vommand-Iraq/Afghanistan )JCC-I/A) pioneered Effects-Based Contracting (EBC) during the Enable Civil Authority phase of Operation Iraqi Freedon to align tactical contracting efforts with the strategic objectives of the Combatant Commander's Campaign Plan. JCC-I/A accomplished this by integrating contingency contracting officers into the warfighters' operational planning cycles, linking contracting efforts with desired strategic operational effects and prioritizing contracting work based on the warfighters' main effort. This report applies components of EBC and the Systems Engineering Process (SEP), and with them, introduces the general framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES), and a researcher proposed Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) to enable forward-leaning, responsive expeditionary contract support. This framework emphasizes providing the future Joint Expeditionary Contracting Force with a rapidly deployable, pre-awarded acquisition capability, creating greater efficiency and effectiveness.

This project is both a wartime biography and an examination of the American effort in France during the First World War. At its core, the narrative follows the military career of Major General James G. Harbord. His time in France saw Harbord serve in the three main areas of the American Expeditionary Forces: administration, combat, and logistics. As chief of staff to AEF commander General John J. Pershing, Harbord was at the center of the formation of the AEF and the development of its administrative policies. He organized and managed the AEF General Staff and served as Pershing's most trusted subordinate. In May of 1918, Harbord transferred to the fighting line, taking over command of the 4th "Marine" Brigade. During his time with the 4th Brigade, and later as commander of the 2nd Division, Harbord played a significant part in the battles of Belleau Wood and Soissons. A dedicated supporter of Pershing's tactics of "open" warfare, Harbord's failings as a combat commander showed the limits of American tactical experience. For the final four months of the war, Harbord took over control of the AEF's logistical system, the Services of Supply. Though he proved an able administrator, the American supply system approached total collapse in the fall of 1918, and was prevented only by the signing of the Armistice. In all three of these roles, Harbord embodied the emergence of the military manager in the American army. The First World War illustrates that war had grown so large and complex that it required officers whose primary talents lay not in leading men in combat, but in the areas of administration and management of large bureaucratic organizations. James Harbord was one of the first, and best, examples of this new type of officer.

This project is both a wartime biography and an examination of the American effort in France during the First World War. At its core, the narrative follows the military career of Major General James G. Harbord. His time in France saw Harbord serve in the three main areas of the American Expeditionary Forces: administration, combat, and logistics. As chief of staff to AEF commander General John J. Pershing, Harbord was at the center of the formation of the AEF and the development of its administrative policies. He organized and managed the AEF General Staff and served as Pershing's most trusted subordinate. In May of 1918, Harbord transferred to the fighting line, taking over command of the 4th "Marine" Brigade. During his time with the 4th Brigade, and later as commander of the 2nd Division, Harbord played a significant part in the battles of Belleau Wood and Soissons. A dedicated supporter of Pershing's tactics of "open" warfare, Harbord's failings as a combat commander showed the limits of American tactical experience. For the final four months of the war, Harbord took over control of the AEF's logistical system, the Services of Supply. Though he proved an able administrator, the American supply system approached total collapse in the fall of 1918, and was prevented only by the signing of the Armistice. In all three of these roles, Harbord embodied the emergence of the military manager in the American army. The First World War illustrates that war had grown so large and complex that it required officers whose primary talents lay not in leading men in combat, but in the areas of administration and management of large bureaucratic organizations. James Harbord was one of the first, and best, examples of this new type of officer.

Thesis (M.A.A.S.) -- Air University, 2004. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 24, 2009). "June 2004." Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-136).

The Portuguese Expeditionary Force fought in the trenches of northern France from April 1917 to April 1918. on 9 April 1918 the sledgehammer blow of Operation Georgette fell upon the exhausted Portuguese troops. British accounts of the Portuguese Corps’ participation in combat on the Western Front are terse. Many are dismissive. in fact, Portuguese units experienced heavy combat and successfully held their ground against all attacks. Regarding Georgette, the standard British narrative holds that most of the Portuguese soldiers threw their weapons aside and ran. the account is incontrovertibly false. Most of the Portuguese combat troops held their ground against the German assault. This thesis details the history of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

Abstract: This thesis examines the origins, selection process, training, promotion and general performance, at battalion and regimental level, of combat officers of the New Zealand Expeditionary Forces of the First and Second World Wars. These were easily the greatest armed conflicts in the country’s history. Through a prosopographical analysis of data obtained from personnel records and established databases, along with evidence from diaries, letters, biographies and interviews, comparisons are made not only between the experiences of those New Zealand officers who served in the Great War and those who served in the Second World War, but also with the officers of other British Empire forces. During both wars New Zealand soldiers were generally led by competent and capable combat officers at all levels of command, from leading a platoon or troop through to command of a whole battalion or regiment. What makes this so remarkable was that the majority of these officers were citizen-soldiers who had mostly volunteered or had been conscripted to serve overseas. With only limited training before embarking for war, most of them became efficient and effective combat leaders through experiencing battle. Not all reached the required standard and those who did not were replaced to ensure a high level of performance was maintained within the combat units. Casualties were heavy among the battalion officers, especially with platoon commanders. The constant need for replacements during both wars led to the promotion of experienced non-commissioned officers from the ranks who had proven their leadership abilities in the turmoil of fighting on the front line. Such measures further enhanced the performance of the New Zealand divisions, where a team ethos, reflective of the character of New Zealand society, was embraced. The opportunities for promotion on merit at all levels, regardless of previous civilian social class or occupation, provided a sense of egalitarianism seldom found in professional military forces. This, together with the familiarity between the officers and other ranks within the regional-based infantry battalions that formed the foundations of the forces, led to a preferred style of leadership that the New Zealanders responded well to. It was these officers who provided this leadership in the cauldron of battle who helped forge the expeditionary forces into elite fighting formations.

The entry of the United States into the Great War was enthusiastically endorsed by Congress on April 3, 1917. Even after the declaration of war, however, the exact nature of American participation was unclear. This thesis examines the role of American involvement in the war, as it responded to requests for support from Great Britain and France.

Os documentos da participação do Brasil durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, enquanto Força Expedicionária Brasileira encontram-se em diversas instituições do País, somados aos documentos pessoais que constituem os arquivos e acervos dos veteranos. São diferentes locais com histórias próprias que mantém estes documentos. O presente trabalho tem o proposito de mapear os principais mantenedores de memória que contém documentos a respeito da FEB, assim como traçar um panorama teórico a respeito de patrimônio histórico e cultural. O objetivo aqui é deixar aparente a importância da documentação da FEB na história do país, bem como demonstrar seu papel diante do patrimônio documental brasileiro. Explora, ainda, a contextualização da FEB e seus trâmites políticos, bem como a atuação em terreno italiano até chegar a sua desmobilização. Esta dissertação possui o olhar arquivístico a guisa dos documentos e os coloca em primeiro plano, ilustrado aqueles que pontuam situações históricas ou que trazem ricos detalhes a respeito da participação do Brasil na guerra. / The official documents which document the Brazilian participation in the IIWW as Brazilian Expeditionary Force are spread in several institutions around Brazil. In addition to the officials documents we also have the personal archive from the veterans. This paper will try to identify the main institutions which keep the documents about Brazilian Expeditionary Force. It will also give a theoretical, cultural and historical panorama about this time. The main goal of the paper is to show how important the documents are to Brazilians history and the importance as a document. Lately it will try to show the political context and performance from Brazilian Expeditionary Force, the time in Italy and the demobilization. This paper was written with an archivist point of view, where the documents come in the first position. You can find several pictures which are very important examples about Brazilian performance during the IIWW.