The problem of scientific explanation as it pertains to the explanation of singular facts or events turns on the problem of characterizing the nature of explanatory relevance. In motivating an account of this relation, I examine the views of explanation advanced by Carl Hempel, Wesley Salmon, and Bas van Fraassen. I defend Hempel's covering-law model against the traditional objections which have been raised against it, and then argue that this model ultimately fails on grounds that it is typically impossible to fill in the explanans in sufficient detail so as to effect a sound derivation of the explanandum. In regard to Salmon's causal theory, I seek to demonstrate that his account of causation can not be successfully applied to the problem of explanation. I then present some general considerations which indicate that no purely causal analysis of explanation will work. For van Fraassen's pragmatic proposal, I try to show that the formal constraints he places on explanation are both too weak and too strong. In addition, given that van Fraassen allows explanatory relevance to be most anything a person wants it to be, I question whether he has clarified the nature of this relation in any interesting way. To overcome the problems encountered by these three major views, I suggest that explanatory relevance is a nomological relation which is to be analyzed in terms of the notion of nomic responsibility. I then characterize this notion on the basis of subjunctive probability relations which are tied to counterlegal situations. In addressing the problem of statistical explanation, I argue that the notion of explanation admits of degrees to the effect that some events are objectively more explainable than others. Thus, both high and low probability events can be explained, but only partially.

While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other. / Master of Arts / While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

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This paper explains the mathematics behind the model for portfolio selection presented by Boyle et al. in their 2012 paper, Keynes Meet Markowitz: The Trade-Off Between Familiarity and Diversification. First, I unpack the theoretical background of portfolio selection, as developed by Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe. Second, I explain the model proposed by Boyle et al. and also connect their work to their theoretical forefathers. Lastly, I replicate some of the results of their paper and comment on the significance of their model.

In this report I argue that a popular account of the nature of ethical thought and talk -- non-cognitivism -- cannot make sense of our attempts to explain why some things are right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust. After introducing the process by which we attempt to explain these sorts of ethical features (a process I call ethical explanation), I consider how we might test whether non-cognitivism can account for this process. We can test whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation, I argue, by testing whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, the sentences we use to express explanatory thoughts in ethics. After considering how non-cognitivism might account for ethical explanatory sentences (and so the thoughts these sentences express), I develop a series of problem cases on which, I argue, no plausible non-cognitivist account of these meanings of these sentences is possible. Because non-cognitivism cannot account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, I conclude, non-cognitivism cannot account for ethical explanation. / text

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The twentieth century was dominated by two rival views of scientific explanation. The first is the causal view in which causation is primitive. According to this view, the best explanations are the ones that tell us the cause of a phenomenon, organism, or state of affairs. The second is the unification view, which seeks to unify seemingly disparate bodies of knowledge. Philip Kitcher shook up the debate by synthesizing the two views. He developed a unification theory in which causation is derivative of explanation. The intuitive idea is that the best explanations are the ones that can draw the most conclusions from the fewest basic premises, and these premises just are the causal explanations. There is a problem though. Like any theory of scientific explanation, Kitcher must show that his respects explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we want our scientific theories to say that the height of a flagpole is explanatory of the length of the flagpole's shadow, and not vice versa. Kitcher's view has come under serious attack from Eric Barnes, who claims that Kitcher's theory cannot respect the problem of asymmetry. He gives three examples in which he thinks Kitcher's view fails. Todd Jones tried to defend Kitcher in a paper, but there is still much left to be said. One of his arguments, involving a Newtonian particle system, fails. The status of two of his other arguments is unclear. My goal is to step into the debate between Jones and Barnes and tip the scales in favor of the position that Jones defended. Additionally, I consider new potential cases of asymmetry and show how Kitcher's theory is equipped to accommodate these cases too.

Abstract This paper is based upon my musical work¡§Soliloquy¡¨, Duet for Flute and Violoncello, to present the musical ideas and the compositional techniques. Structurally,¡§Soliloquy¡¨can be divided into three parts. And the unity of the music is achieved by manipulating musical elements such as pitch materials, motives and dynamics. However, the timbre is always significant, as one of these elements to fulfill the imagination of the composer. The paper consists of four chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, generalizing my ideas and thoughts on arts and composing. The second chapter illustrates several musical examples and statements by three Asian composers who did inspire my composition. On the following chapter, the relationship of the musical elements manipulating in the piece are explained. The last chapter is the conclusion. By reading the paper, the listeners are expected to comprehend further more the compositional process and the composer¡¦s intent.