No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oklahoma, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-152).

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation examines the development of armaments production in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia and the implications thereof regarding military import dependency, arms exports, and defence production cooperation among developing arms producers. The dissertation concentrates on strategic and political issues of Third world arms production and does not deal with questions of arms industries and development. The dissertation makes three broad arguments: First, that truly indigenous arms production hardly exists in the three case study countries. I illustrate this by showing the heavy dependence of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia on foreign technology, licences, foreign components and foreign capital for all major -- and many minor -- weapons manufacturing projects undertaken since the 1960s. Second, that despite billions of dollars invested in building up respective defence industry sectors, all three states (or successor states in the case of Yugoslavia) remained dependent on imports of most of the same major weapons systems at the end of the Cold War as they were 30 years earlier. Embargo of systems such as fighter aircraft, ships and tanks by the old arms supplier oligopoly was the key reason for the initiation of arms production in all three countries. But the cancellation or failure of key arms manufacturing projects in all three countries, such as the Israeli Lavi fighter, means that far from achieving weapons supply independence, this dependency is set to continue into the next century Third, that despite the above two points, Israel, South Africa, Yugoslavia and other Third World arms producers have played an expanding and important role the world arms trade and proliferation of military technology since the 1970s. This seeming paradox will be illustrated by contrasting Israel's growing dependency on the United States for advanced weapons, capital and technology from 1970 to 1990, with the Israeli role as the single most important UN arms sanctions buster to South Africa from 1977 to the early 1990s; as an arms supplier to Argentina during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and to Guatemala after the 1977 U.S. arms cut-off. The dissertation concludes that while some arms production is bound to continue in all three states (or successor states), major weapons manufacturing projects are a thing of the past and will be initiated -- if at all -- with the cooperation of arms industries from the very industrialised powers which Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia sought total independence from through indigenous arms production during the Cold War.

The thesis seeks to examine practices of British economic warfare towards Germany during the First World War. In particular it focuses on the development of methods to weaken the German will for war by convincing Germany that winning, a military victory would be pointless if it destroyed her commercial position. In doing so it brings together two separate elements of British economic warfare -trade war and control of raw materials - into a single strategy with a unified aim. It explores British attempts to destroy Germany's foreign trade organisation in order to induce German commercial interests to end to the war through fear of losing post-war markets. However, in attempting this Britain was hampered by wartime conditions which interrupted the provision of shipping, capital and goods needed to make the policy a permanent success. Many Germans believed their production and marketing methods would enable them to reclaim their share of world trade after the war. This was providing there was no punitive post-war penalisation of German trade. In June 1916 the Allies met in Pans to outline such a plan which involved the creation of an economic bloc to isolate Germany from the world trading system. At this point supplies rather than markets became the focus of economic warfare against Germany. With control of the world's raw materials, the Allies hoped to create an economic weapon capable of threatening German post-war recovery and thus have an important psychological impact on the German commercial mind-set. However such a scheme had to contend with the differing variables of Allied, American and Imperial interests. It is hoped the thesis will not only illuminate British economic policies during the First World War, but also contribute to the debate amongst historians on the relationship between international economic relations and foreign and security policies in the twentieth century.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, August, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universität Berlin, 1998.

Thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universität Berlin, 1998.