Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-51).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010. / Prepared for: Dept. of Educational Studies. Title from title-page of electronic thesis. Bibliography: leaves 114-122.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / UMI no. 3156225 - authorized facsimile from the master copy of the original, available from ProQuest/UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, MI. Includes bibliographical references. Available on the internet.

Les fonds d’investissement, plus connus sous le nom de private equity, constituent un acteur très important du marché financier. Leur performance dépasse souvent celle du marché. Ces fonds sont constitués suite à un accord entre les apporteurs de capitaux (les limited partners) et les gérants du fonds (les general partners). Cette thèse s’intéresse plus particulièrement à la rémunération accordée aux managers du fonds en contrepartie de leurs compétences de gestion. Cette rémunération est constituée d’une partie fixe (management fees) et une partie variable indexée sur la performance du fonds (carried interest). Tout d’abord, cette thèse examine les différents facteurs économiques, culturels, spécifiques aux gérants…qui affectent le choix des partenaires du fonds concernant les clauses de rémunération et de partage de profit. Ensuite, elle se penche sur le problème du traitement fiscal du carried interest. La différence d’imposition entre les États-Unis et certains pays européens s’explique par une difficulté de définition de cet instrument financier. Le rapprochement du carried interest à des options financières permet de mieux identifier le traitement fiscal le plus approprié. Pour finir, cette thèse propose une méthode d’estimation de la juste valeur de la rémunération des GPs en utilisant des simulations Monte Carlo. La prise en compte des clauses contractuelles et des caractères optionnels permet de réaliser une analyse de sensibilité de cette rémunération / Private equity funds are a very important actor of the financial market. Their performance often exceeds the market performance. To establish a private equity fund, there are some agreements between the capital providers (limited partners) and the fund managers (the general partners). This thesis particularly treats the fund managers’ compensation granted to them for their management skills. This compensation consists of a fixed part (management fees) and a variable part indexed on the performance fund (carried interest). First, this thesis examines the various economic, cultural, specific managers’ factors ... that affect the choice of fund partners concerning compensation and profit sharing terms. Then, it studies the tax treatment problem of carried interest. The difference of taxing treatment between the United States and some European countries is explained by a difficulty in defining this financial instrument. The approximation of the carried interest to a financial option allows a better identification of the most appropriate tax treatment. Finally, this thesis proposes an estimating method of the GPs compensation fair value using Monte Carlo simulations. Varying contract clauses and optional characteristics allows a sensitivity analysis of this remuneration

This project uses system engineering and system management principles to analyze the problem of transactions in Nigerian universities and tertiary institutions. System management principles shall be used to highlight the imperfections in the transaction method currently in use especially the disconnect between the bank and the institutions using their services. It will explore other payment systems available in the country. This project will provide a recommendation of how to implement a better payment option through automating the process of school payments by using a system with a cloud-based educational software at the school bursary office and through the online payment processing on the school website. The system software will enable cashiering and payment management: centralized data, automated reports, and inventory controls. It will generate automatic invoices and receipts. This system will bridge the disconnect between the bank and the school since students would not need to deposit cash directly into the school account but into their accounts and then pay with their debit cards. The system will provide debit card encryption and protection using the Secure Socket Layer technology.

This article examines whether the use of impact fees and special assessments affect the level of capital spending and two major own source revenues of local capital spending (taxes and long-term debt) by analyzing a panel of 695 American cities with populations over 20,000 during the time period of 1980-2000. Since impact fees and special assessments are heavily used in a growing community and because it covers less than half the costs of new development, the findings demonstrate that the private financing of public infrastructure (impact fees and special assessments) increases the level of local capital spending. It also leads to an increase in the level of long-term debt use. Although it provides partial tax relief, it is not a strong substitute for taxes. Thus, impact fees and special assessments are not a substitute for local capital spending. It is rather a supplemental revenue source to fund local capital infrastructure.

The dissertation consists of three studies examining three different regulatory issues that affect the auditing profession. The first study has two main foci. First, the study investigates the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the Big 4 fee premium. Second, the study investigates the relationship between the size of an audit client and annual fee change. The results show that in the post-SOX environment, clients of non-Big 4 firms have experienced greater increases in audit fees than the clients of the Big 4 firms, resulting in a diminishing Big 4 premium. This is consistent with the notion that non-Big 4 clients had to make significant adjustments to meet post-SOX quality requirements by increasing their effort (and consequently audit fees). The results also show audit firms’ large clients experience the largest percentage increase in audit fees. This is consistent with the theoretical view of consumer surplus, where the large clients, with more resources, have greater levels of consumer surplus, which is being captured by the audit firms. The study contributes to our understanding of the impact of SOX on audit fee premium and the economics of audit market competition in different client segments. The second study is focused on three main areas: 1) the relationship between audit fees and audit market concentration on a country level; 2) the effect of a country’s litigation regime on the relationship between audit fees and market concentration and 3) the inter-relations between competition, fees, and quality in the market for audit services. The study is motivated by the current debate in the United States and the European Union about the possible problems associated with the current oligopolistic structure of the audit market. The contribution of this study lies in the fact that it provides a multi-national empirical investigation of the audit competition-fee relationship, and examination of how country-level fees affect the competitionquality relationship, while controlling for country level factors. Results show a negative iv relationship between country-level market concentration and audit fees but only in highly litigious countries, suggesting that the firms are able to obtain economies of scale in more concentrated markets and are willing to pass savings down to their clients. However this relationship only holds for the clients of the Big N firms. Analysis of audit quality suggests that audit quality is higher in more concentrated markets but mediation analysis did not show that the fees mediate the relationship between audit quality and market concentration. The third study addresses current regulatory debate about the responsibility of the principal auditor in the group audit environment. Current United States standards allow the principal auditor to disavow responsibility for parts of the audit which were performed by a third party auditor by referencing them in the auditor’s opinion and then indicating the part of the audit which was performed by them. This disclaimer of responsibility is prohibited under the international auditing standards, which require the principal auditor to be responsible for the entire group audit. Specifically, this study examines 1) audit quality implications related to such opinions, and 2) the relationship between having a shared opinion and audit fees. The results show that the audit quality is significantly lower for the firms whose audit opinion referenced a third party auditor. The results also provide some evidence that audit fees are lower in shared responsibility situations.

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This paper has four chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction. The second chapter studies the transaction fees in the bitcoin system. The transaction fees and transaction volume in the bitcoin system increase whenever the network is congested and results from a simple VAR show that it is indeed the case. To account for the empirical findings, we build a model where users and miners together determine the transaction fee and transaction volume endogenously. Even though the fluctuating transaction fee mechanism in bitcoin introduces the extra cost of uncertainty to users, a back-of-envelope calculation shows that the cost of using the bitcoin network for transactions is still smaller than the cost of using the current conventional payment system with a fix transaction fee rate. The second chapter studies the time-varying price dispersion among different bitcoin exchanges. We identify the sources of price dispersion using a standard time-varying vector autoregression model with stochastic volatility. The results show that shocks to transaction fees and bitcoin price growth explain on average 20%, and sometimes more than 60%, of the variation of price dispersion. The third chapter studies the relationship between connections and returns in the bitcoin investor network. Using transaction data from the bitcoin blockchain, we reach three conclusions. First, on average, the annualized returns of connected addresses in the network are 20.75% above those of their unconnected peers. Second, returns also differ among those connected addresses. By dividing the connected ad- dresses into ten deciles based on their centrality, we find that addresses in the two most-connected deciles earn higher returns than the other connected addresses. Third, eigenvector centrality is more related than degree centrality to higher returns, implying that quality of connections matters. / Doctor of Philosophy / This paper has four chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction. The second chapter studies the transaction fees in the bitcoin system. The transaction fees in the bitcoin system can fluctuate given the amount of unconfirmed transactions in the bitcoin network. Our results show that the transaction fees and transaction volume in the bitcoin system increase whenever the network is congested. To account for this findings, we build a model and show that users and miners together can determine the transaction fee and transaction volume. Even though the fluctuating transaction fee mechanism in bitcoin introduces the extra cost of uncertainty to users, a back-of- envelope calculation shows that the cost of using the bitcoin network for transactions is still smaller than the cost of using the current conventional payment system with a fix transaction fee rate. The second chapter studies the price dispersion among different bitcoin exchanges. Our results show that transaction fees and bitcoin price growth can be important explanatory factors for the price dispersion among different bitcoin exchanges. The third chapter studies the relationship between connections and returns in the bitcoin investor network. Using transaction data from the bitcoin blockchain, we reach three conclusions. First, on average, those connected addresses in the network earn higher returns than their unconnected peers. Second, returns also differ among those connected addresses. By dividing the connected addresses into ten groups based on their centrality, we find that addresses in the two most-connected groups earn higher returns than the other connected addresses. Third, eigenvector centrality, which measures the quality of connections, is more related than degree centrality, which measures the quantity of connections, to higher returns, implying that quality of connections matters.