The anticipated risk of job loss and material insecurity are related to fertility postponement in the same way as unemployment is. Given the sequential nature of fertility and occupational decisions, unfavorable working conditions should be resolved before having children, and result in an increase in people's assignment of importance to paid work when developing their childbearing plans. We aim to demonstrate this link, focusing on perceived employment and material insecurity, the importance assigned to paid work in forming fertility intentions, the construction of fertility intentions, and their realization. Using two waves of the Austrian Generations and Gender Survey, we apply probit regressions to analyze gender variations in the associations between uncertainty conditions, the importance of paid work, fertility intentions and behavior. Results reveal that work and related benefi ts become salient when they are insecure, and that material insecurity among men discourages childbearing. For women, we find support for the hypothesis that the anticipated risk of job loss inhibits the realization of fertility intentions - intentions which are less likely to be constructed under such conditions from the onset of family planning processes.

Increasing shares of European women are making large investments in their human capital. Whether and to what extent these investments are in conflict with reproductive behaviour are issues that have repercussions for fertility levels. Using two Eurobarometer survey data (2006 and 2011) on individuals clustered in the 27 EU countries, I investigate the relationship between women's education and lifetime fertility intentions. Results suggest that a positive association between women's level of education and lifetime fertility intentions exists at both the individual and country levels, as well as in a micro-macro integrated framework. The main explanation for these findings - which remains to be proven by future research - is that, in institutional contexts allowing highly educated women to have large families, women of reproductive ages are more prone to make investments in both human capital and family size, because these choices are not seen as incompatible alternatives. (author's abstract)

We study the aggregate gap between intended and actual fertility in 19 European countries and the US based on a cohort approach. This complements prior research that had mainly used a period approach. We compare the mean intended number of children among young women aged 20 to 24 (born in the early 1970s), meas ured during the 1990s in the Fertility and Family Surveys, with data on completed fertility in the same cohorts around age 40. In a similar manner, we compare the share who state that they do not want a child with actual cohort childlessness. Our exploration is informed by the cognitive-social model of fertility intentions devel- oped by Bachrach and Morgan (Popul Dev Rev 39(3):459-485, 2013). In all coun- tries, women eventually had, on average, fewer children than the earlier expectations in their birth cohort, and more often than intended, they remained childless. The results reveal distinct regional patterns, which are most apparent for childlessness. The gap between intended and actual childlessness is widest in the Southern Euro- pean and the German-speaking countries and smallest in the Central and Eastern European countries. Additionally, we analyze the aggregate intentions-fertility gap among women with different levels of education. The gap is largest among highly educated women in most countries studied and the educational gradient varies by region, most distinctively for childlessness. Differences between countries suggest that contextual factors-norms about parenthood, work-family policies, unemployment-shape women's fertility goals, total family size, and the gap between them.

Using the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and ordered logistic regression, the relation of intergenerational child care and short-term fertility intentions is explored in the gender-egalitarian Swedish family policy context. Overall, receiving child care help from parents or grandparents does not seem to influence whether women or men with one or two children plan to have another child. The results support the Swedish public child care system's effectiveness in facilitating relatively high fertility and work- and family compatibility, while informal child care is at best complementary. Only women and men aged 18-29 years old with two children were found to be significantly more likely in having another child within three years when receiving intergenerational child care support.

This thesis studies different aspects of reproductive behaviour on the international, national, and local levels in post-communist countries. The main focus is Ukraine, where fertility rates are very low and the population is in severe decline. The studies contribute new knowledge about the applicability of a family policy typology developed on the basis of Western countries’ experience for post-communist countries, and about the influence of family policies on fertility levels in these countries. Moreover, the studies investigate whether and how macro-level influences impact on individuals’ reproductive behaviour. Four articles are included in the thesis: Family policies in Ukraine and Russia in comparative perspective analyses the institutional set-up of family policies in both countries and compares the findings to 31 other countries. The results show that Ukrainian family policies support a male-breadwinner type of family, while the benefit levels of Russian family policies are low, compelling families to rely on relatives or the childcare market. Family policies and fertility - Examining the link between family policy institutions and fertility rates in 33 countries 1995-2010 comparatively explores whether family policies have an effect on fertility rates across the case-countries. Pooled time-series regression analysis demonstrates that gender-egalitarian family policies are connected to higher fertility rates, but that this effect is smaller at higher rates of female labour force participation. To have or not to have a child? Perceived constraints on childbearing in a lowest-low fertility context investigates the influence of the perception of postmodern values, childcare availability and environmental pollution on individuals’ fertility intentions in a city in Eastern Ukraine. It is shown that women who already have a child perceive environmental pollution as a constraint on their fertility intentions. Prevalence and correlates of the use of contraceptive methods by women in Ukraine in 1999 and 2007 examines changes in the prevalence and the correlates of the use of contraceptive methods. The use of modern contraceptive methods increased during the period and the use of traditional methods decreased, while the overall prevalence did not change. Higher exposure to messages about family planning in the media is correlated with the use of modern contraceptive methods.

According to prior studies, female researchers in Austria exhibit a very high level of childlessness and, consequentially, a low mean number of children. Following up on these studies, we analyse childlessness intentions of young female researchers and compare them to those of other highly educated women in other occupations. We examine factors that are related to female researchers' intent to stay childless. The analysis is based on a survey of 196 female researchers between the ages of 25 and 45 (with the majority being between age 25 and 34). Results indicate that few young, childless researchers plan a life without children: Only 7% intend to stay childless and most of them want to have two children (66%). Their intentions are strikingly close to those of their highly educated peers in other occupations. We discuss three factors that play a role for childlessness intentions of female researchers: work-related conditions (employment uncertainty and work-family reconciliation), personal career orientation, and partnership context.

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Discussions about fertility in developed countries refer almost exclusively to the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR). We argue that the use of this indicator frequently leads to incorrect interpretation of period fertility levels and trends, resulting in distorted policy conclusions and, potentially, in misguided policies. We illustrate this with four policy-relevant examples, drawn from contemporary Europe. These illustrations show that the TFR (a) inflates the presumed gap between fertility intentions and realised fertility, (b) erroneously suggests a significant fertility increase in many countries of Europe after the year 2000, (c) often exaggerates the level of immigrants fertility and (d) frequently suggests that family-related policies which led to shorter birth spacing in fact brought an upward swing in fertility level. There seems to be no policy-relevant question for which the period TFR would be the indicator of choice to be preferred over other existing measures.

Over the past decades, the world has witnessed significant social and demographic changes, including a declining fertility rate in Europe, a decrease in job security and flexibilisation of the labour market, and an increasing flow of migrants to the Global North. Especially migrants have been affected by precarious work arrangements. However, little research has been conducted on the specific impact of employment uncertainty on migrant fertility intentions. Using binary logistic regression models, this study looks at the effect of both objective and subjective indicators of a precarious employment situation on short-term fertility intentions using the Swedish GGS-II survey data. The analysis includes both migrants and Swedish-born individuals and covers men and women separately, which is rare in previous research that has focused chiefly on women only. The findings suggest that the impact of unemployment on fertility intentions differs between migrant and Swedish-born women and men. Specifically, being an unemployed migrant, compared to being unemployed and Swedish-born appears to increase the likelihood of expressing a positive fertility intention. The time since arrival for female migrants does not moderate the effect of employment status. However, for female migrants in education who have resided in Sweden for at least five years, the probability of stating a positive fertility intention is substantially reduced compared to newly arrived migrant women. Moreover, the probability of expressing a positive fertility intention increases when a migrant woman perceives job loss as likely in the near future relative to Swedish-born women with similar job security perceptions. Regarding men, the results are less conclusive, with no substantial differences observed in the impact of the likelihood of job loss on fertility intentions between migrant and Swedish-born men. The study suggests that despite the importance of the institutional setting for fertility decision-making, other mechanisms are at play, too: migrants and Swedish-born individuals seem to respond differently to labour market uncertainties and especially unemployment.