<p>An aspect of the South African law of trusts which has, despite the abovementioned evolution of South African trust law, not been clarified, is the ambit of a trustee's fiduciary duty. This, however, is not only the position in South Africa, but Scotland and, until recently, England as well. It is opined that the &quot / fiduciary obligation&quot / is a concept in search of a principle. Thus, the aim of the present research was to define this concept in terms of the South African trust law context.</p>

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the effect of applying a corrective structure to fiduciary obligations is edifying. Corrective justice is a bipolar relationship where each of the poles refers to individuals conceptually linked through the legal relationship between them. Because corrective justice is bipolar, the upshot of such an approach ought to result in the promise of greater integrity and clarity flowing from a renewed interest in the relationship between fiduciary and principal. Underlying this polishing of the fiduciary relationship is the long-held ambition for the fiduciary relationship not to suffer from ambiguity as a symptom of its expansion beyond the sphere of trusts.

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the effect of applying a corrective structure to fiduciary obligations is edifying. Corrective justice is a bipolar relationship where each of the poles refers to individuals conceptually linked through the legal relationship between them. Because corrective justice is bipolar, the upshot of such an approach ought to result in the promise of greater integrity and clarity flowing from a renewed interest in the relationship between fiduciary and principal. Underlying this polishing of the fiduciary relationship is the long-held ambition for the fiduciary relationship not to suffer from ambiguity as a symptom of its expansion beyond the sphere of trusts.

<p>An aspect of the South African law of trusts which has, despite the abovementioned evolution of South African trust law, not been clarified, is the ambit of a trustee's fiduciary duty. This, however, is not only the position in South Africa, but Scotland and, until recently, England as well. It is opined that the &quot / fiduciary obligation&quot / is a concept in search of a principle. Thus, the aim of the present research was to define this concept in terms of the South African trust law context.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM / An aspect of the South African law of trusts which has, despite the abovementioned evolution of South African trust law, not been clarified, is the ambit of a trustee's fiduciary duty. This, however, is not only the position in South Africa, but Scotland and, until recently, England as well. It is opined that the &quot;fiduciary obligation&quot; is a concept in search of a principle. Thus, the aim of the present research was to define this concept in terms of the South African trust law context. / South Africa

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. <p>While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. <p> This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. <p>While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. <p> This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.