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none / Thesis / Bachelor of Arts (BA)

L’histoire de la Bourse de Beyrouth ne se différencie pas de celle des autres nations. Créée en 1920, cette institution sedistingue cependant des autres bourses mondiales par un phénomène singulier. Elle a attendu 34 ans pour être dotée d’uneréglementation spéciale.La fonction la plus traditionnelle de la bourse est de collecter l’épargne en vue de contribuer au financement de l’économie, touten exerçant un rôle primordial de liquidité des capitaux investis à long terme.Donc, mon étude de recherche doit se baser sur l’histoire financière de la Bourse de Beyrouth dès sa naissance en 1920 et lesétapes qui les a surmonté jusqu’à présent.Elle devra se faire suivant quatre axes principaux :§ Une série d’études et de recherche (qualitative et quantitative) concernant les sociétés cotées depuis 1920 avecdes tableaux et des statistiques basées sur les informations boursières (cours et actions) et leur évolutiontemporelle ainsi que leur contribution au développement de l’économie.§ La création de deux indices généraux d’actions : mensuel et annuel§ Etude de la microstructure du marché boursier libanais et de sa nature à travers les différentes sous périodesanalysées§ Une étude financière basée sur des tests économétriques dans le but de vérifier l’efficience, ou non, du marchébeyrouthin des actions.La problématique dans cette étude de recherche est d’utiliser les outils théoriques et techniques de la finance moderne pourcomprendre les phénomènes relevant de l’histoire financière.L’objectif sera de fournir un éclairage sur quelques exemples caractéristiques dans l’histoire de la Bourse de Beyrouth résultantde la tentative d'application concernant sa contribution dans l’économie libanaise.Le rôle de la Bourse de Beyrouth dans le financement de l'économie locale demeure pour le moment négligeable. Depuis sanaissance en 1920, jamais la Bourse de Beyrouth n'est parvenue à jouer le rôle que l'on pouvait en attendre dans l'Economielibanaise.Est-ce encore le signe d'un manque de confiance dans le pays, d'une inadéquation entre les fortes structures familiales dans laplupart des entreprises et l'ouverture du capital qu'elle induit? Toujours est-il que les efforts structurels entrepris dès sa fondationpour relancer cette institution ne sont pas encore récompensés ? / The history of the Beirut Stock Exchange does not differ from that of other nations'. Founded in 1920, this institutiondistinguishes itself from other international stock exchanges through a unique phenomenon. It awaited 34 years to be endowedwith special regulations.The most traditional function of the stock market is to collect savings to contribute towards financing growth. It holds anessential role of liquidity on long-term investments.My research study must build itself on the history of the Beirut Stock Exchange, going back to its birth in 1920 and followingthe steps it has overcome through its evolution so far.It shall be developed through four principal axes:§ A series of studies and research (qualitative and quantitative) pertaining to companies listed since 1920, with chartsand statistics based on stock information (courses and activities) as well as their temporal evolution and theircontribution to the development of the Economy.§ The creation of two general stock indexes: the monthly index and the annual index.§ The study of the microstructure of the Lebanese Stock Market and its nature through the various analyzed periods.§ A thorough analysis of the problems confronting the development of the Stock Exchange at the administrative,structural and conceptual levels.The problematic of this research study are the use of theoretical and technical tools of modern finance to understand thephenomena linked to financial history.The objective is to provide insight into some typical examples in the history of the Beirut Stock Exchange resulting from theattempt of application relative to its contribution in the Lebanese economy.The role of the Beirut Stock Exchange in financing the local economy remains negligible. Since its birth in 1920, the BeirutStock Exchange has never succeeded in holding the role it may have been expected to play in the Lebanese Economy.Is this another reflection of a lack of confidence in the country or an unsuitability between the strong family structures in mostbusinesses and the resulting opening of the capital? Nonetheless, the structural efforts undertaken since the founding of thisinstitution have yet to be rewarded...

The thesis is concerned with the history of financial supervision in Sweden during the twentieth century up to the financial crisis in the early 1990s. To this end a theoretical framework is developed which is based on institutional economics, law and economics, theories on bureaucracies, regulatory enforcement and policy analysis. Except for the attempt to propose how financial supervision and supervisors could be understood theoretically, the thesis address problems ranging from the organization of supervision in relation to regulation and the changes of the regulated market, the constraints and abilities put on supervisors in different institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes, and the competence of supervisors. The extensive use of empirical data aims to make the thesis a contribution also to financial history research in general, and the growing research on the histories of financial supervision in particular.

This thesis investigates the economic accountability of women in eighteenth-century England, particularly within the informal credit market. In the past few decades, substantial scholarship has demonstrated women's regular involvement in active income generation. At all levels of the economy - from servants to investors - and stages of working life - from training to retirement - women have been shown to have engaged in a far more active manner than was previously appreciated. Older narratives of working opportunities being eroded by capitalism or the industrial revolution have been significantly challenged and the continuity of women's work largely demonstrated, with women whether single or married trading under their name, sometimes with phenomenal success. However, there have been no detailed examinations of how, or even if, women were held accountable when their business was not successful and failed. This thesis examines the extents to which women were held accountable for their own failures, asserting that, to understand female business in this period, it is not merely enough to prove its continued existence. The degree and extent of female business independence must also be determined. To achieve this it focusses on the often underappreciated role that debtors' prisons played in the eighteenth-century economy. Bankruptcy, traditionally the mechanism used to examine failure and insolvency, was artificially restricted during the period to those owing over £100 and who were defined as a 'trader' by a 1571 statute. Therefore principally only the wealthier merchants went bankrupt. Debtors' prisons were much less restrictive. Anyone owing over £2 could be imprisoned indefinitely under the common law on a pre-trial basis with little guarantee that trial would ever take place. However, debtors' prisons have received little scholarly attention due to untested assumptions about their lack of effectiveness. That which exists has focussed upon conditions or reform and has broadly ignored or denied the presence of women as prisoners. Due to the lack of existing knowledge about how prisons functioned, the thesis is split into complementary sections, first exploring the prisons themselves before turning to female prisoners within them. Part One reconfigures eighteenth-century debt imprisonment from a medieval hangover to a fundamental element of the credit market. It posits that, as contemporary sales credit was substantially based upon individual reputation rather than entirely upon financial reality, it was logical that prisons focussed on the confinement of the body behind reputation to enforce informal contracts. The first chapter illustrates the hypothesis fully, demonstrating the importance of debtors' prisons over bankruptcy and court process. It also examines the hierarchy of prisons. Superior court prisons like the King's Bench and the Fleet, catering generally for higher status prisoners, functioned as an obstacle to easy debt recovery by allowing debtors to live outside in relative liberty. Much of the existing scholarship has been skewed by focus on these prisons. The second chapter tests the hypothesis through a quantitative analysis of the surviving commitment registers of the Wood-Street Compter, later the Giltspur-Street Compter (1741-1815). Analysing commitment rates, monthly population estimates, release mechanisms, length of commitment, debt averages, as well as providing indicative data on debtor occupational structure the chapter demonstrates that prisons underlined the credit system by providing the trading classes with a speedy debt recovery mechanism. Chapter Three acts as a caveat to this evidence by demonstrating the fragility of the system of debt imprisonment and that simple reforms, intended to improve the rights of the debtor, undermined the purpose of debtors' prisons by diluting indefinite confinement. It focusses on the 1761 Compulsive Clause and the schedules of debtor estates produced out of it, as well as the qualitative change to imprisonment by the imposition of term limits on those owing less than £2 from 1786. Part Two uses the knowledge that debt imprisonment was an effective and normal facet of the credit market which processed both those who had temporarily found themselves unable to meet the demands of creditors and those whose economic ventures had failed absolutely. Chapter Four, acknowledging that the very existence of female prisoners for debt has been readily denied, investigates how the women within came to be confined through prison records along with memoirs and other personal documents relating to prisoners. It questions the absolute nature of coverture, demonstrating that some married women were confined for their debts, contrary to the letter of the law. It also argues that simply because the majority of female prisoners were either spinsters or widows, this did not mean their confinement was the result of anyone other than themselves. We should see female imprisonment as an action of their being held accountable. Finally, Chapter Five examines the quantitative reality of female debt imprisonment to measure accountability over time. It shows that the female experience was not substantially different from that of men within debtors' prisons, though some degree of separation appeared after 1780 particularly in the size of the debt for which they were committed. Finally, by combining the compter data on female percentages with that of other prisons in London with limited surviving material and with nationwide data drawn from the Insolvency Acts it is able to suggest the female accountability over the long eighteenth century. It posits that female accountability and therefore economic independence, declined across the period as the number of permanent spinsters and the age at first marriage fell. While it does not suggest that the rate of business run by women declined in this period, that more of them were covered by male ownership suggests a significant qualitative change in female business's societal place.

This dissertation describes and analyzes the financial boom that made Russia the largest net international debtor in the world by 1914, as well as the Bolshevik default of 1918 -- one of the biggest in international financial history. For the Bolsheviks the default was a highly significant attack on "finance capital." Yet few historians have paid much attention to the financial history of the Russian Revolution. This study focuses in particular on the decision-making of the small but influential group of financiers and government officials who acted as the "gatekeepers" of international finance, channeling international capital to Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. / History

From 1716 to 1845, the Scottish financial system functioned with no official central bank or lender of last resort, no public (or private) monopoly on currency issuance, no legal reserve requirements, and no formal limits on bank size. In support of previous research on Scottish "free banking," I find that this absence of legal restrictions on Scottish banking contributed to a proliferation of what Adam Smith derisively referred to as "beggarly bankers" which rendered the Scottish financial system both intensely competitive and remarkably resilient to a series of severe adverse shocks to the small developing economy. In particular, despite large speculative capital flows, a fixed exchange rate, and substantial external debt, Scotland's highly decentralized banking sector effectively mitigated the effects of two severe balance of payments crises arising from exogenous political shocks during the Seven Years' War. I further find that the gradual introduction of regulations and legal restrictions into Scottish banking was the result of aggressive political lobbying by the largest Scottish banks, and effectively raised barriers to entry and encouraged banking sector consolidation. I argue that while these results did not cause the severe financial crisis of 1772, they amplified the level of systemic risk in Scottish credit markets and increased the likelihood that portfolio losses in the event of an adverse economic shock would be transmitted to depositors and noteholders through disorderly bank runs, suspensions of payment, and institutional liquidation. Finally, I find that unlimited liability on the part of Scottish bank shareholders attenuated the effects of financial instability on the real economy. The financial crisis of 1772 in Scotland thus offers a valuable historical perspective on issues relating to the political economy of financial regulation, regulatory and intellectual capture, and institutional reform in banking. / History

The War of 1812 brought daunting financial challenges to the national government of the United States. At the onset of war, policymakers were still in the process of sifting through a developing body of American economic thought while contemplating the practicalities of banking and public finance. The young nation's wartime experience encompassed the travails of incompetent and cautious leadership, the incautious optimism that stemmed from several previous years of economic growth, the inadequacies of the banking system, and, ultimately, the temporary deterioration of the financial position of the United States. While not equivalent to great tragedy, the war did force Americans to attend to the financial infrastructure of the country and reevaluate what kinds of institutions were truly necessary. This study of the financing of the War of 1812 provides a greater understanding of how the early American economy functioned and the sources of its economic progress during that era. Financial studies have typically not been a primary focus of historians, and certainly with regard to the War of 1812, it is easy to understand a preoccupation with political and military affairs. To a large degree, however, economic realities and financial infrastructure determine a nation's capacity for growth and change as well as national strength. The War of 1812 offers a prism through which to view the tensions of economic and financial policymaking during an emergency situation and reveals an important turning point in the development of distinctly American financial ideas and institutions.

This study aims to generate a more robust understanding of public attitudes regarding non-renewable natural resource markets. Employing a comparative-historical case study method, it analyzes three waves of widespread fear that swept the United States over the course of the twentieth century regarding an imminent, irreversible shortage of oil. Each of these periods of fear over oil supply availability coincided with a significant rise in the price of crude oil, only to be followed by a sudden collapse as new production came onstream in response to higher prices. The study utilizes process tracing and pattern matching techniques to examine the linkages between fundamental supply-demand conditions in the crude oil market, oil price movements, and expert predictions of and other public expressions of belief that oil in the United States would become scarcer and more expensive in the future. This dissertation’s core arguments contribute to existing theoretical debates in three ways. First, by providing a comparative historical portrait of cyclical patterns in public and expert beliefs regarding non-renewable resource availability and long-term price behavior, the study puts contemporary debates over the future of oil supply in historical perspective. It allows the rampant claims of, and widespread belief in, a global shortage of oil that have gained popularity over the last decade—most notably, in the so-called “peak oil” movement—to be situated within a broader chronological context. It also extends and deepens earlier historical work analyzing oil shortage scares in the United States, both in terms of their underlying dynamics and their effect on federal government policy relative to the oil industry. Second, the study establishes the link between fundamental supply-demand conditions in the oil market, generally reflected in oil prices, and the degree of media attention given to, and apparent public belief in, an imminent, irreversible shortage of oil in the United States over the course of the twentieth century. In so doing, it demonstrates the applicability of Shiller’s (2000, 2005) conceptualization of new era economic theory formation and popularization to observed phenomena in the oil market, but with a crucial difference. Rather than new era economic thinking taking the form of unbounded optimism about the future, in the case of the oil market new era thinking has tended to be manifested as the pessimistic belief that an impending, irreversible shortage of oil would lead to a long-term, even perpetual, rise in oil prices. The study suggests two modifications to the concept that enhance its greater explanatory leverage with regard to exhaustible resource markets: one, that often the new era predictions most widely cited during shortage scares were actually made prior to the boom in prices, to little fanfare, but subsequently deemed prophetic by new era proponents; and two, that the new era narratives often contained normative elements. Moral judgments—in particular, condemnation of the oil economy’s degradation of the natural environment—have often intertwined with predictions that the oil supply was more limited than widely believed and that prices were destined to continue rising. Third, the study demonstrates that the concept of narratives of decline, as described by Bennett (2001) and Lieber (2008), constitutes a powerful theoretical lens through which to understand trends in popular opinion with regard to non-renewable resource availability, and to asset prices more generally—a link that has heretofore gone unrecognized. It finds that a positive feedback loop tended to exist between popular fears of a new era of oil shortages, marked by a long-term rise in prices, and related narratives of the environmental and relative political-economic decline of the United States.

The three chapters of this thesis revolve around the trade in English stocks in the Amsterdam market during the 18th century. In the first chapter I use the primitive communication technology of that time to identify the impact of news on stock price volatility. I find that the arrival of news through sailing boats can explain between 30 and 50% of the price movements of the English stocks in Amsterdam. In the second chapter I provide evidence for the use and revelation of private information in the Amsterdam market. I show that price movements in Amsterdam and London are correlated, even when no information could be transmitted between the two markets. In the final chapter (joint with Hans-Joachim Voth) we study the impact of distressed trade in Amsterdam on stock prices. We show that prices responded immediately to news about the distress, but that actual distressed transactions were delayed. / Esta tesis estudia el negocio en acciones ingleses en el mercado de valores de Amsterdam durante el siglo XVIII. En capítulo uno aplico la comunicación primitiva de esa época para identificar el impacto de noticias sobre la volatilidad de cotizaciones de acciones. Observo que la llegada de noticias mediante barco a vela explica entre 30 y 50% de los movimientos en las cotizaciones de acciones ingleses en el mercado de Amsterdam. En capítulo dos enseño que en Amsterdam se utilizó información privada sobre las acciones ingleses. Muestro una correlación entre los movimientos en las cotizaciones de Amsterdam y Londres, incluso cuando no hay intercambio de información entre los dos mercados. En el último capítulo (junto con Hans-Joachim Voth) estudiamos el impacto de transacciones forzados en Amsterdam sobre las cotizaciones. Mostramos que las cotizaciones responden notablemente a noticias sobre la necesidad de negociar, pero que las transacciones forzados fueron aplazadas.