This research examines an attorney’s reporting obligation in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA) to report suspicious and unusual transactions, which are not subject to legal professional privilege. In order to contextualise this reporting obligation and to understand its application, terminology such as the proceeds of crime and money laundering is explained. Global best practice anti-money laundering guidelines, as manifested in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, are evaluated as well as typologies related to attorneys as targets for money laundering purposes. The establishment and development of the domestic regulatory and legislative frameworks to address the challenges around the proceeds of crime and money laundering are discussed, with specific reference to the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, which inter alia criminalised money laundering, and the FICA. Special focus is placed on section 29 of FICA and terminology such as “transaction” and “suspicion” is evaluated as well as section 37 of the FICA, which acknowledges the legal professional privilege. The research explains the principles around the legal professional privilege and the requirements for the privilege to sustain and also indicates that there are clear limitations to the application of the legal professional privilege, as mere confidential information is not privileged and the right to confidentiality can be limited by legislation. The research also evaluates contradictory views around the section 29 FICA reporting obligation by attorneys and addresses possible reasons for low reporting. As attorneys have a definite reporting obligation in terms of section 29 of FICA, ramifications of non-reporting may include an attorney being the subject of a criminal investigation for possible association with predicate offences, offences under POCA as well as FICA non-reporting offences. Relevant role players will therefore need to partner towards assisting the profession in understanding and discharging this reporting obligation. Recommendations addressing the role of the provincial law societies as well as the Financial Intelligence Centre in assisting towards maturing the regulatory regime are also discussed. The research concludes with an ethical and positivistic approach towards discharging the reporting obligation and suggestions regarding the way forward in order to protect the reputation of an elite profession. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Public Law / unrestricted

Magister Legum - LLM

This article explores the role of financial intelligence in the context of intelligence studies. Reviewing relevant literature, the field of intelligence studies is divided into a public, and a private sphere, which is directly related to businesses and organizations. Consequently, this context is clarified before financial intelligence could be placed in a theoretical framework and further defined in a content-related way. The recent lack of a useful definition, that addresses several aspects, was emphasized by providing an appropriate explanation of financial intelligence. For illustration purposes, a link to the theory on organizational power (bases of power) is made to show how organizational power can be promoted by financial intelligence. Thus, financially intelligent individuals have good opportunities to increase their expert power and informational power for example. In fact, it is advantageous for both individuals and organizations. Within our line of argumentation, we assume that financial intelligence is a good source for power, because finance in general is recognized as essential for organizations and business success. In a nutshell, there are good reasons for focusing financial intelligence in future studies and in practice.

Magister Legum - LLM / Money laundering (hereafter ML) is a multidisciplinary topic which has become important since the late 1980s. The term ‘laundering’ literally means ‘washing’ or ‘removing dirt’. It has been defined as the conversion of criminal income into assets that cannot be traced back to the underlying crime. Criminals use ML as a way of keeping control over the proceeds of crime and to provide, ultimately, a cover for their income and wealth. ML occurs every time any transaction takes place, regardless of whether it involves any form of property or benefit, whether tangible or not tangible, which is derived from criminal activity. ML is regulated at the global, regional and national levels. To combat ML and other financial crimes, Malawi enacted the Financial Crimes Act (hereafter FCA). The FCA establishes the Financial Intelligence Authority (hereafter FIA) as an institution whose objectives include collecting financial intelligence regarding suspicious transactions.

The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre. The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions. This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

With the implementation of more and more stringent measures to prevent money laundering, criminals are resorting to the expertise of lawyers for assistance in the formulation of increasingly complex money laundering schemes. This expertise is provided both wittingly and unwittingly. The purpose of this research was to consider whether the South African anti-money laundering legislation places suspicious transaction reporting obligations, which are in line with and meet international directives, conventions and best practice frameworks, on attorneys. The study entails a consideration of the suspicious transaction reporting obligations of lawyers introduced by the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, the United Kingdom and South Africa and provides an understanding of the concept of money laundering, the money laundering process and the areas in which lawyers are vulnerable to money laundering. The research found that the suspicious transaction reporting responsibilities of attorneys in terms of South African anti-money laundering legislation are not in line with international frameworks and best practice. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / tm2015 / Auditing / MPhil / Unrestricted

Criminals make use of accountants to assist them, knowingly or unknowingly, with complex money laundering schemes. The nature of the accounting profession places accountants in an ideal position to identify possibly money laundering activities. The purpose of this research is to consider whether the reporting obligations of South African accountants in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, corresponds sufficiently with the services they provide so as to constitute an effective anti-money laundering measure. In order to evaluate the relevance of section 29, the reporting requirements of accountants practising in South Africa are compared with those of the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force. The research study will also analyse the money laundering process and the nature of the accounting profession and consider some of the methods used to perpetrate money laundering applicable to accountants. The research found that accountants in South Africa have a duty to report suspicious transactions only when they are party to such transactions or when they are going either to receive the proceeds of crime or be used for money laundering purposes. Accordingly, in view of the fact that accountants are more likely to be in a position to observe money laundering than to be party to such a transaction, the requirements of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, are not effective when applied to accountants. Copyright / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Accounting / unrestricted

The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre. The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions. This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

Magister Commercii - MCom (Business and Finance) / The dawn of democracy in South Africa (SA) in 1994 i.e. post-apartheid era came with inherent societal gender deficiencies and in all Sectors of the SA economy women experienced challenges. Specifically in the Banking Sector women were under represented in leadership and executive positions. The legal framework changed to correct the inequalities of the past resulting in various charters encouraging the private and public sector to transform.

Department of Criminal Justice and Procedure / Money laundering (ML) evolves in tandem with global technological advancement. This phenomenon calls for multi-faceted responsive measures at national and international levels to combat this nefarious crime.1 Today, combating ML requires co-operation among, inter alia, financial intelligence units (FIUs), reporting institutions, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, as well as inter-state co-operation. In response to the ML threat, Kenya has adopted comprehensive anti-money laundering (AML) laws, such as the Proceeds of Crime and Anti- Money Laundering Act No. 9 of 2009 (POCAMLA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012. These, among other statutes, constitute the principal arsenal of the AML legal framework.