This article explores the role of financial intelligence in the context of intelligence studies. Reviewing relevant literature, the field of intelligence studies is divided into a public, and a private sphere, which is directly related to businesses and organizations. Consequently, this context is clarified before financial intelligence could be placed in a theoretical framework and further defined in a content-related way. The recent lack of a useful definition, that addresses several aspects, was emphasized by providing an appropriate explanation of financial intelligence. For illustration purposes, a link to the theory on organizational power (bases of power) is made to show how organizational power can be promoted by financial intelligence. Thus, financially intelligent individuals have good opportunities to increase their expert power and informational power for example. In fact, it is advantageous for both individuals and organizations. Within our line of argumentation, we assume that financial intelligence is a good source for power, because finance in general is recognized as essential for organizations and business success. In a nutshell, there are good reasons for focusing financial intelligence in future studies and in practice.

The thesis investigates how the historical analogy to mercantile companies, privateers, and pirates between the 16th and 19th century can elucidate the relationship between non-state actors and states in cyber(in-)security, and how such an application changes our understanding of cyber(in-)security. It contributes to a better integration of non-state actors into the study of cyber(in-)security and international security by clarifying the political challenges raised by the interaction between these players and states. Drawing on the literature of non-state armed actors, the thesis defines a spectrum of state proximity to develop an analytical framework categorizing actors as state, semi-state, and non-state. The historical investigation utilizes primary and secondary sources to explore three periods in British naval history: the late 16th, late 17th, and mid-19th centuries. A comparison of the two security domains - the sea and cyberspace - identifies the pre-18th century periods as the most useful analogues for cyber(in-)security. The thesis evaluates the analogy by conducting empirical case studies. First, the case of the attacks against Estonia (2007) and three criminal court cases against Russian hackers (2014/2017) examine the analogy to pirates and privateers. Second, the analogy to mercantile companies focuses on the attacks against Google (2009), the attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment (2014), and the collaboration between large technology companies and Five-Eyes signals intelligence agencies. The thesis makes three main claims: first, the analogy to piracy and privateering provides a new understanding of how state proximity is used politically by attackers and defenders, and offers lessons for understanding attribution in cyberspace. Second, the longevity of historical privateering sheds light on the long-term risks and rewards of state collaboration with cyber criminals, and offers insight into the political constitution of cyber(in-)security. Third, the mercantile company lens improves our understanding of how cooperative and conflictive relations between large technology companies and states influence cyber(in-)security.