I examine whether cultural differences in trust towards others, materialism, and risk aversion lower financial statement comparability between countries that require International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”). Evidence from various academic disciplines suggest that cultural beliefs and values affect individuals’ estimates and judgments and their consequent decisions, including economic and financial decisions. I posit that certain cultural beliefs and values also affect the estimates and judgments of corporate managers, resulting in inconsistent reporting decisions for given economic events and lower financial statement comparability. I find that two countries have lower comparability when there are greater cultural differences in trust towards others, materialism, and risk aversion. In cross-sectional tests, I find weak evidence that stronger enforcement of IFRS moderates the cultural effects on cross-country financial statement comparability. Stronger enforcement of regulations and law does not moderate the cultural effects. These findings suggest that having a strong IFRS, regulatory, or legal enforcement does not effectively moderate the impact of culture on cross-country financial statement comparability. A possible explanation is that cultural influence on financial reporting is also manifested through enforcement officials; in other words, those in charge of the enforcement are also subject to the same cultural beliefs and values as others involved in the reporting process, making moderation less likely.

Firm closeness or comparability is an important concept to investors. Knowing that two firms have been historically close and observing an information announcement by one of the firms gives the investor cues as to the future performance of the other firm. Furthermore, from a methodological point of view, researchers commonly control for firm--group closeness by using industrial classification schemes such as the SIC. To the extent that these schemes group dissimilar firms, the advantage of using these schemes is undermined. This paper more formally examines the comparability concept and develops two new measures of firm--group accounting closeness. Both measures are based on the co--movement of accounting fundamentals. I provide insight regarding the extent to which the SIC and GIC schemes group similar firms. Furthermore, a trading strategy utilizing information in the measures is developed and tested. Results indicate that, when industry closeness is high enough, abnormal returns in the range of 1-3% over a 1-3 day window can be earned around leader information announcement dates. Finally, I contribute to the contagion/information transfer literature, most notably Gleason et al. (2008), by showing that the contagion effects of accounting information announcements are increasing in the closeness of the industry.