Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

Canadian remembrance of the Great War (1914-1918) in the early twenty-first century is often associated with grand gestures at national monuments like the opening of the new Canadian War Museum in 2005 and the restoration of the Vimy Ridge Memorial in 2007. However, these sites of memory, what Pierre Nora terms lieux de mémoire, are not part of the everyday environments of memory, the milieux de mémoire, of most Canadians. In my investigation of three contemporary works of Canadian literature: The Danger Tree by David Macfarlane, Broken Ground by Jack Hodgins, and Unity (1918) by Kevin Kerr, locally-based storytellers describe the continued influence of the Great War on their individual Canadian communities. The fictionalized narrating personas in these three works create what I refer to as bio-geographies: first-person accounts of the narrator’s particular social and memory environments. While the bio-geographers in these three texts lack first-hand experience of the Great War, their writing reflects the continued repercussions of the conflict in the weeks, years, and decades after the 1918 armistice. The Great War differentially affected thousands of communities in Canada and Newfoundland. Constructing a coherent national narrative that accounts for the multiple lived experiences of individuals in communities across North America is virtually impossible. Turning to local representations of the Great War (in the case of the three bio-geographic texts: depictions of communities in Newfoundland, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan) provides a sense of the nation as a diverse landscape of memory with multiple vantage points. Negotiating the complex terrain of self, place, and memory, the bio-geographers in the three works I examine create representations of the past that reveal how sites of memory, lieux de mémoire, come to be firmly embedded in the ongoing lived experiences of comunity members, the milieux de mémoire.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

Canadian remembrance of the Great War (1914-1918) in the early twenty-first century is often associated with grand gestures at national monuments like the opening of the new Canadian War Museum in 2005 and the restoration of the Vimy Ridge Memorial in 2007. However, these sites of memory, what Pierre Nora terms lieux de mémoire, are not part of the everyday environments of memory, the milieux de mémoire, of most Canadians. In my investigation of three contemporary works of Canadian literature: The Danger Tree by David Macfarlane, Broken Ground by Jack Hodgins, and Unity (1918) by Kevin Kerr, locally-based storytellers describe the continued influence of the Great War on their individual Canadian communities. The fictionalized narrating personas in these three works create what I refer to as bio-geographies: first-person accounts of the narrator’s particular social and memory environments. While the bio-geographers in these three texts lack first-hand experience of the Great War, their writing reflects the continued repercussions of the conflict in the weeks, years, and decades after the 1918 armistice. The Great War differentially affected thousands of communities in Canada and Newfoundland. Constructing a coherent national narrative that accounts for the multiple lived experiences of individuals in communities across North America is virtually impossible. Turning to local representations of the Great War (in the case of the three bio-geographic texts: depictions of communities in Newfoundland, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan) provides a sense of the nation as a diverse landscape of memory with multiple vantage points. Negotiating the complex terrain of self, place, and memory, the bio-geographers in the three works I examine create representations of the past that reveal how sites of memory, lieux de mémoire, come to be firmly embedded in the ongoing lived experiences of comunity members, the milieux de mémoire.

The myths and rumours that circulated during the First World War originated with soldiers and the general public, excepting atrocity stories. The British population used these myths and rumours to construct a discourse to explain its involvement in the First World War. This discourse reconciled the experience and understanding of civilians with the new era of Total War, offering hope and consolation in a time of crisis. It also acted as a form of mass, popularly produced propaganda which promulgated pro-war views that supported the British and Allied causes, while demonising the Germans and their methods of warfare. Belief in myths and rumours was equated with patriotism, and criticism decried as pro-German and un-British. The myths were widely disseminated and widely believed by important sections of the population. They drew on concepts palatable to British civilians: ideas of ‘just’ war and a moral cause; the nobility of their sacrifices; the bestiality of the enemy; and the necessity for the subordination of all else to the war effort. Myths about atrocities, spies and the paranormal helped the British public to survive a war that surpassed previous human and disquietude, but also experience. They also hinted at vulnerability, while expressing the unequivocal support which the majority offered the British war effort.

Despite the ubiquity of the First World War as a key moment in the development of New Zealand’s national identity in scholarship and public memory, key aspects remain under explored. This thesis addresses a particularly noticeable gap – the operation and contents of New Zealand’s official First World War propaganda campaign. Through this focus, this thesis particularly explores how such propaganda reflected New Zealand’s place within, and engagement with, the concept of the ‘British world’. Propaganda is an ideal window into the workings of the British world during the war, illustrating both the operation of the practical connections, and the ideological reflections of national, imperial, and ‘British’ identities in the British world. Therefore, New Zealand and Britain’s First World War propaganda demonstrates the nature of the British world, particularly through exploration of the ways that New Zealand’s official campaign connected to and interacted with Britain’s official wartime propaganda campaign. Specifically, the thesis argues that a gap existed between the rhetorical ‘British world’, as constructed in the content of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda, and the practical realities of how the British world operated and interacted during the war. While New Zealand was comfortable rhetorically identifying itself as ‘British’ and part of the British world, practical limitations of communication and interaction with Britain often inhibited this theoretical community. The concept of ‘Dominion perspective’ is crucial to this interpretation. New Zealand’s Dominion status was central to the operation of propaganda in and between New Zealand and Britain during the war, and to New Zealand’s identification of itself within its propaganda. This interpretation reflects a wider view of New Zealand’s experience of the British world. Though concepts of Dominion status and the British world were centrally important to New Zealand during the war, they were not unproblematic. These concepts were frequently reshaped both theoretically and practically. The First World War was crucial to this development, as the closer interaction and cooperation within the British world it demanded, laid bare both the practical shortcomings of the British world, and the contested nature of concepts of Dominion status and the British world itself. The operation of official wartime propaganda in the British world reflects this wider process, and its significance to New Zealand.

An examination of reporting during the First World War by Montreal’s two most respected newspapers shows that these newspapers articulated divergent messages about the war and domestic events. This thesis argues that during the First World War, Le Devoir refused to be limited by the traditional impassive reporting style of Montreal’s managerial class newspapers, but the Montreal Gazette did not. Where Le Devoir became more defiant and aggressive in its defence of Francophone rights, the Gazette managed to appear more detached even as it reported the same events. This divergence is important because it represents a larger pattern of wartime change taking place as quality dailies gambled their reputations on the ideals of their owners and editors. Each newspaper carefully constructed their attempts to influence public opinion, but where Le Devoir was responding to what it considered a crisis, the Gazette’s interests and alliances mandated loyalty and a calmer tone.

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This thesis explores the key permanent and temporary First World War exhibitions held at the Imperial War Museum in London over a fifty year period. In so doing, it examines the theoretical, political and intellectual considerations that inform exhibition-making. It thus illuminates the possibilities, challenges and difficulties, of displaying the 'War to End All Wars'. Furthermore, by situating these displays within their respective social, economic and cultural contexts, this produces a critical analysis of past and present practices of display. A study of these public presentations of the First World War enables discussion of the Museum’s primary agendas, and its role as a national public institution. In considering this with the broader effect of generational shifts and the ever-changing impact of the War’s cultural memory on this institution, the thesis investigates how the Imperial War Museum has consistently reinvented itself to produce engaging portrayals of the conflict for changing audiences.