<p>The aim of this study is to clarify the Swedish government’s purpose of participating in the</p><p>European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Taking as its departure point state-centric</p><p>international political economy this study presents three plausible hypotheses on what the</p><p>purpose might be. Either it is to promote consumers interests, or to promote the Swedish</p><p>national climate goal “Reduced impact on climate”, or to promote the profit of Swedish</p><p>companies. The study sets out to test the hypotheses through four different methods in order</p><p>to disprove them. Through a text analysis of four different government proposals, through a</p><p>questionnaire sent out to 98 companies included in the Swedish National Allocation Plan,</p><p>through an interview with a ministerial civil servant and through a game theoretical matrix</p><p>based on the government’s own preferences.</p><p>The conclusion should be of interest to industry, environmentalists, politicians as well as to</p><p>journalists and scientists. From a theoretical point of view the conclusion explains the reason</p><p>for priorities and setting of rules by the government within energy politics as well as within</p><p>climate politics. The study concludes that the climate is priority number one and industry is</p><p>priority number two and this explains why, according to an industrial spokesperson, industrial</p><p>interests are not being met to a full extent. However the tide may turn in the future if the</p><p>government decides to include carbon dioxide sinks in the Emission Trading Scheme. The</p><p>government believes that storing carbon dioxide for a limited amount of time is worse than</p><p>reducing actual emissions.</p>

The aim of this study is to clarify the Swedish government’s purpose of participating in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Taking as its departure point state-centric international political economy this study presents three plausible hypotheses on what the purpose might be. Either it is to promote consumers interests, or to promote the Swedish national climate goal “Reduced impact on climate”, or to promote the profit of Swedish companies. The study sets out to test the hypotheses through four different methods in order to disprove them. Through a text analysis of four different government proposals, through a questionnaire sent out to 98 companies included in the Swedish National Allocation Plan, through an interview with a ministerial civil servant and through a game theoretical matrix based on the government’s own preferences. The conclusion should be of interest to industry, environmentalists, politicians as well as to journalists and scientists. From a theoretical point of view the conclusion explains the reason for priorities and setting of rules by the government within energy politics as well as within climate politics. The study concludes that the climate is priority number one and industry is priority number two and this explains why, according to an industrial spokesperson, industrial interests are not being met to a full extent. However the tide may turn in the future if the government decides to include carbon dioxide sinks in the Emission Trading Scheme. The government believes that storing carbon dioxide for a limited amount of time is worse than reducing actual emissions.