Inaug. _ Diss.: Philosophische Fakultät: Leipzig: 1925. _ Bibliogr. p. 107 à 111.

Uma das principais características do Behaviorismo Radical de B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) é sua crítica sistemática às explicações mentalistas para o comportamento. Contudo, o próprio conceito de Mentalismo pode ter muitos sentidos. O objetivo do trabalho foi descrever o que Skinner definia por Mentalismo e que críticas fazia a ele no período de 1931-1959. Após a análise de alguns trabalhos de Skinner nesse período, observou-se que o Mentalismo criticado entre os anos 30 e 40 foi principalmente o presente na Fisiologia Conceitual e nos Behaviorismos de Tolman, Hull, Boring e Stevens. Do final dos anos 40 até 1959, a crítica era dirigida especialmente à Psicanálise de Freud e à Psicologia da Consciência. Em relação aos tipos de críticas feitas por Skinner, não foram observadas mudanças significativas na argumentação de Skinner. As objeções foram apoiadas principalmente na natureza não científica de tais explicações, em sua circularidade, no seu reducionismo, no seu efeito negativo de afastar o estudo do comportamento em si mesmo, impedindo dessa forma a identificação das causas reais da ação, atrasando assim a criação de uma tecnologia do comportamento capaz de ajudar na solução de problemas humanos. Discute-se também como o Antimentalismo seria a principal razão de existir do Behaviorismo Radical, que teria a responsabilidade de abrir espaço para uma Ciência do Comportamento que viesse a substituir a própria Psicologia. As possibilidades dessa missão ser bem sucedida também são avaliadas. / One of the main characteristics of B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism (1904-1990) is his constant criticism against mentalistic explanations for behavior. However, the concept of Mentalism itself may have several different meanings. The purpose of this work is to describe what Skinner meant by Mentalism and what criticism he made against it between 1931 and 1959. After analyzing some of Skinners' works at that period, it was noticed that the Mentalism criticized between the 30's and 40's was the one that was found at Conceptual Physiology and at Tolman, Hull, Boring and Stevens' Behaviorism. From the late 40's to 1959, criticism was directed specially towards Freud's Psychoanalysis and to the Psychology of Consciousness. In relation to the type of criticism made by Skinner, no meaningful change in his argumentation was found. The objections were mainly supported by the non-scientific nature of such explanations, their circularity and reductionism, their negative effect of avoiding the study of behavior in itself, in this way, preventing the identification of the real causes of action, then delaying the creation of a behavioral technology capable of helping to find the solution to human problems. It was also discussed how Antimentalism would be the main reason for the existence of Radical Behaviorism which would be responsible for leading the way to a Science of Behavior that would replace Psychology itself. The possibilities of success of such endeavor will also be evaluated.

A liberdade é tema de discussões há muito tempo na humanidade. Enquanto algumas filosofias defendem essa noção de forma estrita, outras questionam sua própria existência. Duas filosofias que discutem a liberdade humana de forma aparentemente antagônica são o anarquismo e o behaviorismo. O presente trabalho teve por objetivo analisar se os conceitos de liberdade apresentado na obra de dois autores representativos dessas filosofias (Bakunin e Skinner, respectivamente) são similares entre si. Seu objetivo básico foi responder à seguinte questão: quais são as compatibilidades e as incompatibilidades entre o anarquismo e o behaviorismo radical, propostos por esses autores, no que diz respeito à concepção de liberdade do ser humano? Como método geral, foram analisadas algumas obras desses autores, com destaque para aquelas em que a discussão do conceito de liberdade se sobressai. A análise foi centrada na abordagem dessas filosofias sobre a ciência, a educação e o Estado. Como resultado, identificou-se como semelhante o fato de que ambos os autores defenderam que a natureza humana não tem qualidades intrinsecamente boas ou más, morais ou imorais. Para Bakunin, é possível conceber uma conjuntura de sociedade/cultura capaz de gerar homens com características defendidas pelos anarquistas como próprias do homem livre tais como solidariedade, cooperação e respeito às diferenças entre os indivíduos. Embora utilizando linguagem diferente, esse homem livre descrito por Bakunin não difere do suposto por Skinner ao analisar que o ambiente (ou as contingências ambientais) é que seleciona os comportamentos do indivíduo. Portanto, para ambos, o indivíduo é formado no seu contato com o ambiente. Apesar de concordantes nesse aspecto, eles se diferenciam pela maior ou menor ênfase nas ferramentas propostas para promover mudanças no comportamento e para planejar culturas que se aproximem da ideal. Skinner fornece essas ferramentas com base nas proposições de uma ciência do comportamento, enquanto Bakunin apenas descreve características das relações interpessoais em uma sociedade que a levaria a produzir homens que ele chamaria de livres, sem deixar clara a forma pela qual se estabeleceria essa cultura. Portanto, conclui-se que, a despeito do antagonismo geralmente sugerido entre ambas as filosofias, a concepção de liberdade presente na obra de Bakunin não é incompatível com a proposta por Skinner. Sugere-se que um diálogo entre as duas filosofias pode ser profícuo, obtendo-se do anarquismo os objetivos para uma sociedade mais igualitária e justa e do behaviorismo, o caminho para atingi-los / Freedom is the subject of long discussions in humanity. While some philosophies argue that notion in a strict way, others question their own existence. Two philosophies that argue the human freedom so seemingly antithetical are the anarchism and behaviorism. This study aimed to analyze the concept of freedom presented in the work of two authors representing those philosophies (Bakunin and Skinner, respectively) are similar. Its basic purpose was to answer the question below: What are the compatibilities and incompatibilities between anarchism and radical behaviorism, proposed by these authors, with regard to the conception of human freedom? As a general method, were analyzed some of the works of these authors, especially those in which the concept of freedom was highlighted. The analysis was centered on the approach that these philosophies have on science, education and the state. As a result, it was identified as similar to the fact that both authors have argued that human nature is not intrinsically good or bad qualities, moral or immoral. For Bakunin, it is possible to conceive of a scenario of society/culture capable of generating men with characteristics defended by anarchists themselves of a free man such as solidarity, cooperation and respect for differences among individuals. Although using different language, this free man, described by Bakunin, does not differ from the assumed by Skinner to examine the environment (or environmental contingencies) that selects the behavior of the individual. Therefore, for both, the individual consists in his contact with the environment. Although consistent in this respect, they differ by a greater or lesser emphasis on the tools proposed to promote changes in behavior and make the planning of cultures that are close to the \"ideal\". Skinner provides these tools based on the propositions of a science of behavior, while Bakunin only describes characteristics of interpersonal relationships in a society that would produce men he would call \"free\" without making clear the way to establish this culture. Therefore, we conclude that, in spite of the generally suggested antagonism between the two philosophies, the concept of freedom present in the work of Bakunin is not incompatible with the one proposed by Skinner. It is suggested that a dialogue between the two philosophies can be fruitful, having regard to the goals of anarchism to a more egalitarian and just society, while from the behaviorism can derive the path to achieve them

A liberdade é tema de discussões há muito tempo na humanidade. Enquanto algumas filosofias defendem essa noção de forma estrita, outras questionam sua própria existência. Duas filosofias que discutem a liberdade humana de forma aparentemente antagônica são o anarquismo e o behaviorismo. O presente trabalho teve por objetivo analisar se os conceitos de liberdade apresentado na obra de dois autores representativos dessas filosofias (Bakunin e Skinner, respectivamente) são similares entre si. Seu objetivo básico foi responder à seguinte questão: quais são as compatibilidades e as incompatibilidades entre o anarquismo e o behaviorismo radical, propostos por esses autores, no que diz respeito à concepção de liberdade do ser humano? Como método geral, foram analisadas algumas obras desses autores, com destaque para aquelas em que a discussão do conceito de liberdade se sobressai. A análise foi centrada na abordagem dessas filosofias sobre a ciência, a educação e o Estado. Como resultado, identificou-se como semelhante o fato de que ambos os autores defenderam que a natureza humana não tem qualidades intrinsecamente boas ou más, morais ou imorais. Para Bakunin, é possível conceber uma conjuntura de sociedade/cultura capaz de gerar homens com características defendidas pelos anarquistas como próprias do homem livre tais como solidariedade, cooperação e respeito às diferenças entre os indivíduos. Embora utilizando linguagem diferente, esse homem livre descrito por Bakunin não difere do suposto por Skinner ao analisar que o ambiente (ou as contingências ambientais) é que seleciona os comportamentos do indivíduo. Portanto, para ambos, o indivíduo é formado no seu contato com o ambiente. Apesar de concordantes nesse aspecto, eles se diferenciam pela maior ou menor ênfase nas ferramentas propostas para promover mudanças no comportamento e para planejar culturas que se aproximem da ideal. Skinner fornece essas ferramentas com base nas proposições de uma ciência do comportamento, enquanto Bakunin apenas descreve características das relações interpessoais em uma sociedade que a levaria a produzir homens que ele chamaria de livres, sem deixar clara a forma pela qual se estabeleceria essa cultura. Portanto, conclui-se que, a despeito do antagonismo geralmente sugerido entre ambas as filosofias, a concepção de liberdade presente na obra de Bakunin não é incompatível com a proposta por Skinner. Sugere-se que um diálogo entre as duas filosofias pode ser profícuo, obtendo-se do anarquismo os objetivos para uma sociedade mais igualitária e justa e do behaviorismo, o caminho para atingi-los / Freedom is the subject of long discussions in humanity. While some philosophies argue that notion in a strict way, others question their own existence. Two philosophies that argue the human freedom so seemingly antithetical are the anarchism and behaviorism. This study aimed to analyze the concept of freedom presented in the work of two authors representing those philosophies (Bakunin and Skinner, respectively) are similar. Its basic purpose was to answer the question below: What are the compatibilities and incompatibilities between anarchism and radical behaviorism, proposed by these authors, with regard to the conception of human freedom? As a general method, were analyzed some of the works of these authors, especially those in which the concept of freedom was highlighted. The analysis was centered on the approach that these philosophies have on science, education and the state. As a result, it was identified as similar to the fact that both authors have argued that human nature is not intrinsically good or bad qualities, moral or immoral. For Bakunin, it is possible to conceive of a scenario of society/culture capable of generating men with characteristics defended by anarchists themselves of a free man such as solidarity, cooperation and respect for differences among individuals. Although using different language, this free man, described by Bakunin, does not differ from the assumed by Skinner to examine the environment (or environmental contingencies) that selects the behavior of the individual. Therefore, for both, the individual consists in his contact with the environment. Although consistent in this respect, they differ by a greater or lesser emphasis on the tools proposed to promote changes in behavior and make the planning of cultures that are close to the \"ideal\". Skinner provides these tools based on the propositions of a science of behavior, while Bakunin only describes characteristics of interpersonal relationships in a society that would produce men he would call \"free\" without making clear the way to establish this culture. Therefore, we conclude that, in spite of the generally suggested antagonism between the two philosophies, the concept of freedom present in the work of Bakunin is not incompatible with the one proposed by Skinner. It is suggested that a dialogue between the two philosophies can be fruitful, having regard to the goals of anarchism to a more egalitarian and just society, while from the behaviorism can derive the path to achieve them

Uma das principais características do Behaviorismo Radical de B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) é sua crítica sistemática às explicações mentalistas para o comportamento. Contudo, o próprio conceito de Mentalismo pode ter muitos sentidos. O objetivo do trabalho foi descrever o que Skinner definia por Mentalismo e que críticas fazia a ele no período de 1931-1959. Após a análise de alguns trabalhos de Skinner nesse período, observou-se que o Mentalismo criticado entre os anos 30 e 40 foi principalmente o presente na Fisiologia Conceitual e nos Behaviorismos de Tolman, Hull, Boring e Stevens. Do final dos anos 40 até 1959, a crítica era dirigida especialmente à Psicanálise de Freud e à Psicologia da Consciência. Em relação aos tipos de críticas feitas por Skinner, não foram observadas mudanças significativas na argumentação de Skinner. As objeções foram apoiadas principalmente na natureza não científica de tais explicações, em sua circularidade, no seu reducionismo, no seu efeito negativo de afastar o estudo do comportamento em si mesmo, impedindo dessa forma a identificação das causas reais da ação, atrasando assim a criação de uma tecnologia do comportamento capaz de ajudar na solução de problemas humanos. Discute-se também como o Antimentalismo seria a principal razão de existir do Behaviorismo Radical, que teria a responsabilidade de abrir espaço para uma Ciência do Comportamento que viesse a substituir a própria Psicologia. As possibilidades dessa missão ser bem sucedida também são avaliadas. / One of the main characteristics of B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism (1904-1990) is his constant criticism against mentalistic explanations for behavior. However, the concept of Mentalism itself may have several different meanings. The purpose of this work is to describe what Skinner meant by Mentalism and what criticism he made against it between 1931 and 1959. After analyzing some of Skinners' works at that period, it was noticed that the Mentalism criticized between the 30's and 40's was the one that was found at Conceptual Physiology and at Tolman, Hull, Boring and Stevens' Behaviorism. From the late 40's to 1959, criticism was directed specially towards Freud's Psychoanalysis and to the Psychology of Consciousness. In relation to the type of criticism made by Skinner, no meaningful change in his argumentation was found. The objections were mainly supported by the non-scientific nature of such explanations, their circularity and reductionism, their negative effect of avoiding the study of behavior in itself, in this way, preventing the identification of the real causes of action, then delaying the creation of a behavioral technology capable of helping to find the solution to human problems. It was also discussed how Antimentalism would be the main reason for the existence of Radical Behaviorism which would be responsible for leading the way to a Science of Behavior that would replace Psychology itself. The possibilities of success of such endeavor will also be evaluated.

Frederic Rzewski (1938- ) is a composer and pianist fluent in the styles of traditional pianism as well as the contemporary avant-garde. His musical breadth is most clearly demonstrated through his piano compositions, which are often large-scale, virtuosic, and tonal. For these reasons, they are frequently compared to works of the Romantic era. Furthermore, his pieces also display experimental, avant-gardistic leanings and thereby demonstrate complexity and eclecticism. The thread of continuity in Rzewski's works may be found through his incorporation of programmatic associations, which embrace controversial and universal socio-political themes.This study examines three of Rzewski's compositions for piano that typify the composer's diverse yet communal approach to composition: 36 Variations on "the People United Will Never Be Defeated!, the North American Ballads, and De Profundis. Through the integration of a predominantly tonal musical language with bold, contemporary techniques, all three pieces represent a melding of the past with the present. Thus, they celebrate the complex nature of the human experience through the realm of musical expression.Frederic Rzewski was interviewed by this author, as was pianist Ursula Oppens (a strong advocate of contemporary works generally and Rzewski's pieces specifically). Their insights appear throughout the document, on topics ranging from the generally relevant to specific items connected to the above-mentioned compositions. Related issues of prominent educational influences, the contemporary avant-garde movement, critical review, extant dissertations, improvisation, neo-tonality, and the trend of political music were researched for their invaluable associations with the above-mentioned pieces.This study contends that, through these works, Frederic Rzewski demonstrates a commanding ability to weave varied musical and programmatic components into compelling, cohesive compositions. Furthermore, these pieces offer keen insights into compositional style and practice for piano in the latter half of the twentieth century and thereby present pianists and pedagogues with the opportunity for the introduction to (and immersion in) essential, idiomatic writing as related to late twentieth-century piano composition. / School of Music

Thesis (M.A.)--Villanova University, 2009. / Theology and Religious Studies Dept. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 1986. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 153-154). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (D.M.A.)--Boston University.

My thesis is one artist's response to the question of the relevance of landscape painting today, focusing on the communication of the idea of environmental stewardship. The process of studying nature and transferring that vision to canvas promotes greater understanding of the beauty and complexity of elements that comprise ecosystems. The artist possesses a creative impulse finding satisfaction in making artwork that expresses a love of nature as part of a larger worldview. If done well, the persuasive power of such art may be enormous. Comprised of oil paintings and written work, this thesis establishes a way of approaching both landscape painting and the natural environment. Literature pertaining to the contributions of landscape artist Frederic Church, varying aesthetic theories, nature writings, and selected contemporary artists are discussed. The focus then turns to particular landscape elements, introducing the artwork created for the thesis. The thesis concludes with the artist's purpose statement.