Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala universitet, 1984. / Summary in German. Added t.p. with thesis statement inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 400-432) and index.

This paper compares access to information legislation in the United States and Canada and uses the findings of this comparison to test three theories of policymaking. In particular, the paper uses the comparison to explore the idea that the existence of access to information policies contradicts policymaking theories which stress the autonomy of the state. The paper begins with a detailed comparison of the Canadian and American legislation as it has been interpreted by the courts. This comparison finds that the two policies are very similar but three are some significant differences in the details of the two regimes and that these differences tend to make the Canadian access policy more restrictive than the American. The paper then examines whether these findings can be explained as being consistent with policy making theories which explain policy as being the result of a copying process, of interest group pressure or of institutional forces. In order to better understand the forces behind the legislation the legislative comparison is supplemented by reference to relevant policy papers and evidence from the period of the development of the two acts. The results of the analysis indicate that no one of the three theories is provides an adequate explanation of the two access policies. The legislation was a result of a combination interest group pressure and institutional forces and, in the case of the Canadian legislation, the process of copying also played a key role. The findings also indicate that explanations which stress the role of the state are not inconsistent with a policy that results in weakened state autonomy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis explores the issue of how to reconcile the value of individual privacy with that of freedom of speech. It argues that there ought to be legal protection against invasion of privacy by the media, and that such protection should be seen as complementary to a system of free expression rather than opposed to such a system. A definition of privacy is outlined which, it is contended, meets the criteria for a coherent, neutral definition. Various reasons for valuing privacy and in favour of protecting the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy are identified. It is argued that lack of precision in the normative realm, in defining with certainty when privacy is invaded, should not be an excuse for leaving the individual without legal protection. There follows an examination of the protection of privacy against media incursions in English, New Zealand, Australian and Canadian law, other than the coincidental protection afforded by certain common law actions. There has been significant judicial and legislative recognition of the need to safeguard privacy interests, and many interesting developments in recent years are discussed. However, none of the countries considered has yet developed effective recourse for victims of unwarranted and invasive publications. It is argued that the relationship between privacy and free speech has been wrongly conceptualised, and that in fact both interests serve the same underlying set of values. Problems arise when privacy and free speech interests are balanced in the abstract rather than in context, and when a simplistic view of press freedom is adopted in disregard of the realities of the modern mass media. Invasive publications generally do not significantly advance free speech interests unless they help to provide the information needed for public decision-making. Furthermore, this information can in many cases be conveyed without detriment by withholding details which disclose identity. A three-step test is proposed to determine whether privacy and free speech interests can be reconciled without compromise to either of them, or whether it is necessary to balance these interests in the context of the case. It will also be maintained that a contextual approach is preferable to the adoption of categories such as "public figures" and "public places". These concepts tend to be misleading, and should be eschewed as analytical tools, since they confuse important questions which require separate analysis. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

with Prof. John McGreevy, University of Notre Dame / McGuinn Hall 121

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