Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:06:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao diego a moraes etica e filosofia politica.pdf: 1249548 bytes, checksum: 9cefddcf30f677a1d97d12828d8b39b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-22 / This dissertation is aimed at analyzing Hannah Arendt's concept of Action, and consequently Power, and at showing how these two concepts are essential to the constitution of a genuine Public Space, where freedom and politics reign. I intend to divide it into three general parts, each containing pedagogically necessary subdivisions. On the first part, I will analyze Arendt's distinction between the three central categories for the understanding of modern times: labor, work and action. The action, seen as a pre-politics subjective realm, is the theoretical core of this chapter, along with how the action, side by side with speech, happens on human relations, on an inter-subjective realm. The second part talks about the unfolding of Action throughout the history of mankind, pointing out its many different interpretations, misconceptions and refutations over the centuries. Finally, the third part is set on the analysis of the resizing which the concept of action has suffered throughout the late modern period, mostly after the revolutions, especially the French and American ones, pointing to a new political horizon. / Proponho com esta dissertação de mestrado, abordar o conceito de ação e, consequentemente, de poder em Hannah Arendt, e como estas duas categorias comportam o fundamento para a constituição de um espaço público genuíno, onde reina a liberdade, conseguintemente, a política. Pretendo dividi-la em três partes gerais, contendo sub-partes necessárias, didaticamente, à sua composição. Na primeira parte, trataremos da diferenciação arendtiana para as três categorias centrais no entendimento da modernidade: o trabalho, a fabricação e a ação. Situando na ação o ponto nevrálgico de discussão, em sua esfera subjetiva , vista como manifestação pré-política, bem como a forma com que a ação paripasso ao discurso se configura nas relações humanas, passando para o terreno intersubjetivo . A segunda parte pretende dissertar sobre o curso da ação no decorrer da história da humanidade, situando suas diversas interpretações, distorções e recrudecimento ao longo dos principais eventos e épocas históricas. Por fim, a terceira parte tem como meta analisar o redimensionamento que o conceito de ação sofreu na modernidade tardia, sobretudo, após as revoluções, em especial, a francesa e a americana, apontando para um novo horizonte político.

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Attraverso la prospettiva della duplicità delle dimensioni dell’agire (archein e prattein, iniziativa individuale e collaborazione plurale), il presente lavoro intende rileggere sotto una veste nuova i concetti di azione libera e di politica elaborati da Hannah Arendt (Hannover 1906 – New York 1975), per giungere infine a un’esposizione critica del suo paradigma di fondazione della comunità politica. Ciò avverrà, inoltre, attraverso la considerazione di alcune delle esperienze politiche privilegiate dall’autrice: la polis greca, considerata soprattutto nel proprio rapporto con il mondo omerico, e la Repubblica americana, considerata invece nella propria relazione di continuità e innovazione rispetto alla res publica romana, e come collegata alla storia coloniale precedente. Per valutare il paradigma di fondazione politica, un rilievo particolare sarà accordato alla nozione arendtiana di “principio” dell’azione. Tra le fonti utilizzate e citate, compariranno anche molti paper ancora inediti, consultati presso la New School for Social Research (NY); si faranno inoltre riferimenti puntuali ad alcuni dei testi della Arendt Collection del Bard College (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY). / The aim of this work is to investigate Hannah Arendt’s (Hannover 1906 – New York 1975) conceptions of free action and political founding through the twofold perspective of archein and prattein (individual initiative and plural collaboration), that consents to see them under a new light, to come to a critical evaluation of Arendt’s theory of founding a political body. We’ll do it considering some of the most important political experiences indicated from our thinker: the Greek polis, considered in its relation with homeric world, and the American Republic, considered in its twofold relation – continuity and innovation – with Roman res publica, and in its relation with colonial history before revolution. To reach an evaluation of Arendt’s concept of political founding, we’ll concentrate on the notion of “principle” of action. We used and cited many unpublished papers, that we could see at New School for Social Research (NY), and we indicate some books of Arendt Collection at Bard College (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY) also.

This study is concerned with how educational legislation shapes and uses freedom for the purpose of governing the parent. The key question guiding the study was: How does the Act constitute the ‘parent’ as a subject position responsible for schooling the child? Central to the work is an examination of the School Education Act 1999 (the Act) using Foucault’s thinking on governmentality. This is prefaced by historical accounts that bring together freedom and childhood as contrived styles of conduct that provide the governmental logic behind the Act. The study reveals how the Act shapes and uses the truth of freedom/childhood to construct the responsible parent as a style of conduct pegged to a neo-liberal political rationality of government. It is this political rationality that provides the node or point of encounter between the technologies of power and the self within the Act which forms the ‘responsible’ identity of the parent as an active self-governing entrepreneur made more visible by the political construction of ‘others.’ This is a legal-political subjectivity centred on the truth of freedom/childhood and a neo-liberal rationality of government that believes that any change to our current ethical way of being in relation to educating the child would ruin the very freedoms upon which our civilised lifestyle depends. In essence, the Act relies on the production of ‘others’ as the poor, Aboriginal and radical who must be regulated and made autonomous to constitute the ‘parent’ as an active consumer whose autonomous educational choices are an expression of responsibility in relation to schooling the child