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The topics of Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation have been at the forefront of research and debate within metaphysics for the last decade. Grounding is commonly taken to be a relation of non-causal dependence. In this thesis I address the pertinent question as to what sorts of entities are related in instances of grounding. There has so far been little enquiry into this issue, and it therefore requires urgent attention. I argue here that the entities involved in grounding are facts, where facts are true Fregean propositions. True Fregean propositions are abstract entities composed of senses, and are individuated according the senses which they involve. I proceed by setting out some desiderata which the entities involved in grounding will fulfil. Firstly, they will be individuated sufficiently finely as to provide instances of grounding to back all putative cases of non-causal explanation. Secondly, they will ensure that there is unity between instances of grounding and instances of causation. Finally, they will be mind- independent. I survey different types of entity and show that true Fregean propositions are best-equipped to fulfil these desiderata. We therefore have reason to believe that grounding relates facts, so understood. The conclusion of this thesis therefore makes it incumbent upon us to extend our ontology to include true Fregean propositions.

In this paper I give a thorough account of the history of the open question argument. I have provide Moore’s original impetus for it and its traditional formulation. I then examine the Cornell Realists’ objection to that original formulation and showed that their objection does indeed show the open question argument to be incorrect in its conclusions. Having presented the history of the open question argument and having assessed the most challenging objections to it, I turn to Andrew Altman’s powerful reconstruction of the open question argument in order to see how well, if at all, it sidesteps the objections leveled against the classical formulation. I then argue that while Altman does present the most coherent defense of the open question argument available, I conclude that insofar as he has rested upon a commitment to Carnap's philosophy of language over a Fregean semantic and an untenable rendering of post-Kripkean philosophy of language as it concerns rigid designation, we must reject his reformulation. Given that rigid designation itself undermines Altman’s position, I conclude that the open question is still in need of a defense before it can regain its position as a major player in the discipline of ethics.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:12:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 909251 bytes, checksum: f9883bf7dcc4b47a3888ca6bf9dd40b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This research's main motivation is to understand how significant Gottlob Frege's criticism of psychologism was, in the nineteenth century, as well as to determine its real theoretical basis. One points to the most significant Fregean a ntipsychologist attacks, especially to Frege's arguments that support the antipsychologist criticism, having as one of the problems to attempt for psychologist reduction of logic. To this end, one understands as central to the ontological aspects. In this work, one will see Frege's point of view confroted with psychologism in naturalistic bases, as it emerges from nineteenth-century scientificism, leading clearly to an opposition between a knowledge based on empirical facts, on the one hand, and a speculative philosophical knowledge, on the other hand. In the end, one recognizes the Fregean undertaking against psychologism as preservation not only of the "objective non-effective", but also as recognition of the need for a priori speculation in philosophy itself. / Esta investigação teve como principal motivação entender de que maneira se fez pertinente a crítica de Gottlob Frege ao psicologismo do século XIX, assim como garimpar as reais bases teóricas deste. Aponta-se quais os mais relevantes ataques antipsicologistas de Frege, e se concentra, mais especificamente, nas críticas ao empirismo/psicologismo de J. S. Mill. Esta dissertação analisa ainda os argumentos que corroboram para a crítica antipsicologista, tendo como um dos problemas a tentativa de redução psicologista da lógica. Para isso, entende-se como fundamental para as críticas de Frege sua própria noção de objetividade, através de seus aspectos semânticos e ontológicos. No decorrer deste trabalho, depara-se com um psicologismo de caráter naturalista, baseado em um emergente cientificismo oitocentista, levando claramente a uma oposição entre, de um lado, um conhecimento amparado em fatos empíricos e, de outro, um saber especulativo filosófico. No fim, reconhece-se a empreitada fregeana contra o psicologismo como uma redenção não somente do "objetivo não-efeito", mas do reconhecimento da necessidade de bases especulativas e a priori para a própria filosofia.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-01-25T18:55:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinaorlandobastos.pdf: 562875 bytes, checksum: bc873fc79b912b1c579a5487dea94672 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-01-25T19:41:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinaorlandobastos.pdf: 562875 bytes, checksum: bc873fc79b912b1c579a5487dea94672 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-25T19:41:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinaorlandobastos.pdf: 562875 bytes, checksum: bc873fc79b912b1c579a5487dea94672 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-21 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A pesquisa em questão quer ser a verificação em duas obras agostinianas (Confissões e Do Mestre), de três conceituações formais da filosofia analítica contemporânea; a partir da nomenclatura conceitual específica do segundo Wittgenstein (jogos de linguagem) e da articulação de dois conceitos em Frege (sentido e referência), chegar-se-a detectar e analisar uma intrínseca aproximação no que tange ao conhecimento e ao estudo da linguagem, no sentido de sua formação, utilização e aplicação através de vivências, inclusive a religiosa. A linguagem como forma de vida, como linguagem da vida (inclusive a religiosa) se estabelece e se afirma como ponto de contato, na presente dissertação, entre a articulação crítica das três conceituações em obras específicas dos três autores aqui estudados. / This research aims to be apresent verification, in two of Augustine’s works, Confessions and De Magistro (On the teacher), of three formal conceptualizations from contemporary analytic philosophy; starting with the specific conceptual nomenclature of second Wittgenstein (Language-games) and the articulation of two concepts in Frege (sense and reference), we shall be able to detect and analyse an intrinsic similarity with respect to knowledge and language study, concerning its formation, usage and application through living experiences, including religious ones. Language as a form of life, as language of life, including religious life, establishes and affirms itself as an intersection, in this dissertation, between the critical articulation of those three conceptualizations in specific works by those three authors under study.