The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States resulted in the introduction of the National Fusion Center Network. This effort seeks to empower National Security by effectively sharing information between various law enforcement organizations. Since the establishment of the Network, information that addresses the Networks' standard operating procedures and existing barriers to share information effectively has been lacking. This caused many criticisms as to whether the network is in fact effective in fulfilling its mandate to effectively share information between the various law enforcement agencies. Utilizing Bandura's cognitive theory of behavioral change, this phenomenological study identifies the strategies utilized by the Fusion center Network to share information while addressing the barriers that arise during the process. Qualitative data consists of interviews conducted with a purposive sample of N=8 employees at two Fusion Centers in the Network. Data were inductively coded, analyzed, and summarized to answer the research questions and illustrate relevance to the framework. Findings made it clear that staff respondents believe that the Fusion Center Network has a tangible impact on Information Sharing between law enforcement, government, and non-government agencies. This expanded the field of knowledge regarding the Fusion Center Network and made room for future researchers to expound on. Recommendations offered by this study are geared towards assisting policy makers, partner organizations and the public at large to make better decisions toward protecting the Homeland from future acts of terror. This study carries implications for creating positive social change by providing recommendations to assist legislators develop effective policies and to increase national security measures of the United States.

Little is known about how effectively federal agencies share terrorism intelligence with state and local governments through fusion centers. As a result, there is a risk that local governments do not receive critical intelligence that would allow them to collaboratively prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks. Using Dawes' interagency information sharing model, the purpose of this exploratory case study was to evaluate how effectively federal agencies share terrorism intelligence with fusion centers. Data were collected through interviews with 25 senior leaders, federal agents deployed to fusion centers, and intelligence analysts in 5 fusion centers on the East Coast. These data were inductively coded and then subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. Findings indicated that, among these leaders, information sharing was hindered by both technology and inter-organizational relationships between the fusion centers and federal agencies. Participants also noted that obstacles to information sharing regarding classified data has not been sufficiently mitigated. Dawes' interagency information-sharing theory was found to be explanatory regarding intelligence sharing activities. Implications for positive social change include recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security to utilize Dawes' work on information sharing in order to alleviate the tension between federal and local agencies and remove obstacles, particularly related to classified intelligence related to counterterrorism. Doing so can be useful in developing policy recommendations to improve the dynamics between federal and local agencies, thereby allowing critical information to be shared with state and local governments in a proactive manner that may better protect communities.

This dissertation examines organizational level outcomes within a whole network--the national network of fusion centers. Fusion centers are state and local organizations that fuse threat-related intelligence and information by working with federal, state, and local law enforcement as well as other security partners in the public and private sectors. This research will ask why outcomes at the fusion center level vary within the network by exploring unique configurations of conditions at multiple levels of analysis. The results of the research will present evidence that suggests whole network effectiveness cannot be fully comprehended without first examining sub-network level impacts, such as the training or experience of analysts, organizational capacities, and the roles of relationships between network actors. This line of inquiry has ramifications for inter-organizational network theory building because it will demonstrate the individual importance of these factors, and how they interact with other factors at multiple levels within a network to influence outcomes. For practitioners in the domestic intelligence community this research will provide important insights and present paths taken by organizations in a national network to achieve a desired or undesired outcome. / Ph. D.