<p>This thesis asks who is able to answer the call to action that the problems of global injustice pose. It focuses on the concept of institutions such as states, intergovernmental organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations as moral agents and whether such institutions can be said to be morally responsible for creating or responding to global injustice. It examines three theories of institutional moral agency as presented by Peter French, Toni Erskine and Onora O’Neill and the way in which their conceptions of moral agency are based on the idea of attributing moral responsibility. It argues that the nature of organisational decision-making structures provides an unstable basis on which to establish the moral responsibility of institutions. It presents an alternative account of moral agency that includes institutions but separates the concept of moral responsibility from that of moral agency. The thesis contends that it is only individual agents who are able to bear moral responsibility, in the sense of blame or duty, for moral problems but that a coherent account of institutional moral agency is important for understanding the moral responsibilities of individuals in terms of the power of their collective actions. It argues that while institutions are capable of responding to the call to action that global injustice poses,  it is individuals who bear a moral responsibility to do so.</p>

<p>There is so much hunger in the developing poor countries of the world that the extent of inequality calls for a re-examination of global resources distribution especially as it concerns global debt crisis. The debts and their servicing obligation worsen the condition of the poor. Their cancellation could grant some respite to these global poor. This is why the call for a total and unconditional cancellation of Third World debt becomes a moral imperative. This needs to be given a normative approach especially as most of the debts were said to have arisen from morally questionable contracts. The demand for their cancellation is therefore a demand for global justice viewed from the stand point of rectification and distribution.</p>

This thesis asks who is able to answer the call to action that the problems of global injustice pose. It focuses on the concept of institutions such as states, intergovernmental organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations as moral agents and whether such institutions can be said to be morally responsible for creating or responding to global injustice. It examines three theories of institutional moral agency as presented by Peter French, Toni Erskine and Onora O’Neill and the way in which their conceptions of moral agency are based on the idea of attributing moral responsibility. It argues that the nature of organisational decision-making structures provides an unstable basis on which to establish the moral responsibility of institutions. It presents an alternative account of moral agency that includes institutions but separates the concept of moral responsibility from that of moral agency. The thesis contends that it is only individual agents who are able to bear moral responsibility, in the sense of blame or duty, for moral problems but that a coherent account of institutional moral agency is important for understanding the moral responsibilities of individuals in terms of the power of their collective actions. It argues that while institutions are capable of responding to the call to action that global injustice poses,  it is individuals who bear a moral responsibility to do so.

There is so much hunger in the developing poor countries of the world that the extent of inequality calls for a re-examination of global resources distribution especially as it concerns global debt crisis. The debts and their servicing obligation worsen the condition of the poor. Their cancellation could grant some respite to these global poor. This is why the call for a total and unconditional cancellation of Third World debt becomes a moral imperative. This needs to be given a normative approach especially as most of the debts were said to have arisen from morally questionable contracts. The demand for their cancellation is therefore a demand for global justice viewed from the stand point of rectification and distribution.

In exploring how to decisively address global poverty the question of what should be the content of nations’ global justice duties has been debatable. Nationalism has usually been regarded as incompatible with cosmopolitanism. It is against extending principles of social justice to the entire globe as cosmopolitanism demands on the grounds that the global context lacks the special attachments that generate national solidarity which is regarded as what ensures distributive justice realizable. For nationalism there cannot be motivation for global distributive justice since this solidarity is only national. As such the nationalist perspective holds that only humanitarian obligations constitute global justice duties. Nationalists also restrict global justice duties to humanitarian assistance due to the fact that nations have a moral obligation to respect another nation’s political culture’s values manifested in the type of national policies they pursue. For nationalists fulfilling the moral requirement of mutual respect of nations’ political cultures would entail letting nations face the consequences of their preferred choices which in some cases lead to poverty. Only when a humanitarian crisis looms do other nations have moral obligations of helping out. Cosmopolitanism agrees with the idea of respecting nations’ right to self-determination and letting nations face consequences of their choices. However it demands the precondition that the background context in which the self-determination is exercised should be just and fair. This demands that before nations respect poor nations’ political cultures the global cooperation which interferes with the exercise of self-determination should be rid of its interference tendencies that negatively restrict nations’ choices. It further demands that nations’ political cultures that are harmful to individuals by subjecting them to poverty ought to be reformed. What cosmopolitanism demands is that there should be a new understanding of nationalism with respect to the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern. It also regards the lack of solidarity on the globe context as a resolvable challenge that would be faced in the implementation of global justice in the non-ideal real life. It does not in any way invalidate the moral worth of cosmopolitan principles of justice.

The immense inequalities between the world’s poor and the world’s rich have compelledphilosopher Thomas Pogge to develop a moral framework based on the Universal Declarationof Human Rights that challenges our most commonsense political moral views. Poggedisputes minimally and universally that we all have a negative duty not to harm so long as theharm is foreseeable and avoidable, rather than a positive duty to do well. Furthermore Poggeargues for an institutional view of negative duties flown from the fact that we all shape,uphold and impose institutions.With the help of three philosophers; Polly Vizard, Tim Hayward and Mathias Risse, Idebate a number of their raised objections to Thomas Pogge’s theory of institutional globaljustice which all focus on the controversial causal claim that the present global order causesglobal poverty. The objections discussed are (a) Vizard’s scrutinizing of Pogge’s notion ofresponsibility (b) Hayward’s call for a full causal account of how the global order is harmingthe poor and (c) Risse’s alternative baseline for harm. I argue that although Pogge has somepotential problems, he nevertheless is not contradicted by these objections to the extent thatthey themselves claim. I hold that the debated criticism appeals for further investigation andthat in light of the arguments in this thesis we have a negative duty not to harm and a positiveobligation to reform global unjust institutions in responding to global poverty.

No description available.

In recent decades the European Union has moved from a multilateral treaty to a distinctive social, political, and economic order among European states. During the same period political philosophers have increasingly turned their attention to questions of justice beyond the state. But their discussions have largely focused on global justice, and have paid relatively little attention to the distinctive moral and political questions raised by the emergence of a new type of order among European states. This thesis fills this lacuna, by developing a conception of ‘social democratic’ or ‘egalitarian’ social justice for the specific institutional arrangements of the EU. In Chapters one through three, I delineate a general conception of ‘pluralist egalitarianism’, the view that we have a variety of grounds for endorsing equality-inclined economic institutions domestically. Direct egalitarian arguments stress the internal requirements of institutional fairness to which basic economic institutions are subject. Indirect egalitarian arguments favour egalitarian economic outcomes based on concerns of social equality. I further differentiate between a transnationalist and an internationalist position. Direct transnationalist arguments stress the EU’s similarity to domestic institutions and derive egalitarian economic requirements for the EU as a whole. Indirect transnationalists argue that EU citizens stand in a distinctive kind of relationship such that the value of social equality has purchase amongst them, and social equality requires a limitation on economic inequalities at the EU level. By contrast, internationalists insist on the continuing importance of national self-determination. However, they endorse more substantive economic institutions at the EU level to protect existing social democratic welfare state arrangements. In chapter four to seven, I assess the extent to which each of these arguments can support a more egalitarian organisation of basic economic institutions at the EU level. Finally, I offer one practical proposal that would help the EU to realise the social democratic vision I have defended. This is the idea of an EU social minimum. I explain how such a social minimum would be conceived and implemented, and I demonstrate why transnationalists and internationalists should endorse such a policy.

Existing moral reflection on immigration law and policy is caught in an impasse between (1) proponents of an individual right to free international migration and (2) proponents of a state’s right to control its borders. In Chapter 1, I examine arguments supporting an individual right to free international migration. I show that the case for this putative right cannot be settled solely by considering the strength of individuals’ interest in being able to cross international borders according to their choice. Rather, at a crucial point, the argument for an individual right to free migration turns on the truth of a particular conception of global justice. In Chapter 2, I examine arguments supporting a state’s right to control its borders. I contend that these arguments do not seek to defend the substantive justice of restrictive immigration policies, but rather the legitimacy of processes of political decision-making by which states unilaterally determine their own immigration policies. Abandoning this right-versus-right paradigm, I recast the debate by focusing on two distinct questions: (1) the question of justice in immigration, which substantively evaluates immigrant admission policy; and (2) the question of the legitimacy of immigration law enacted by procedures responsive only to states’ internal political decisions. I further propose that in articulating principles of justice in immigration, we should first develop a conception of global justice which will provide the background for our evaluation of immigration policy. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend a conception of global justice I call cooperation-based internationalism. I argue that co-citizens are joint participants in a scheme of cooperation which provides them with the social goods they need to lead autonomous lives. They therefore owe each other special duties of social justice. In addition, I argue for a duty of assistance which applies among all human persons globally. This duty requires developed states to assist developing states in establishing minimally just institutions. In Chapter 4, I develop a conception of justice in immigration against the background of cooperation-based internationalism. I argue that there is no requirement for states to allow open immigration. Nevertheless, I argue that co-citizens owe each other duties which impose significant moral constraints on immigration policy: states must (1) allow for family unification; (2) eschew policies that select immigrants based on criteria that unjustly call into question the fitness for citizenship of certain current members; (3) regulate labour immigration so that all current citizens benefit equally unless unequal gains benefit worse-off citizens. The duty of assistance is also imposes constraints on immigration policy. Developed states should (4) avoid immigration policies which cause brain drain harmful to international development and (5) admit and resettle refugees. In Chapter 5, I turn to the distinct question of the legitimacy of unilaterally-enacted immigration law. I argue that the application and enforcement of immigration law counts as a coercive exercise of political power which stands in need of justification. I examine the consent and natural duty of justice theories of political legitimacy, concluding that these influential theories cannot establish the legitimacy of immigration law. I conclude by considering the implications of the illegitimacy of immigration law for the evaluation of irregular migration.

This dissertation aims to defend an egalitarian conception of global distributive justice. Many hold that the scope of egalitarian justice should be defined by membership of a single political community but my dissertation will challenge this view. I begin by considering three distinctive arguments against the ideal of global equality. They maintain that egalitarian obligations of justice apply only to those people who are subject to the same sovereign authority which coerces them to abide by its rules; or to those who contribute to the preservation of each other’s autonomy through collectively sustaining a state; or to those who belong to the same nation. The first three chapters deal with these arguments respectively. Central to these arguments is the assumption that the domestic and the global contexts are different in some morally relevant way so egalitarian principles of justice apply to the former but not the latter. After rebutting these anti-egalitarian arguments I turn to the more constructive task of developing a form of global egalitarianism that is grounded in the value of equality as a normative ideal of how human relations should be conducted. I argue in Chapter 4 that relational equality—that is, standing in relations of equality to one another (rather than relations characterized by domination or exploitation)—is a demand of justice in the global context. This ideal of relational equality has distributive implications. In Chapter 5 I try to spell out these implications by defending a set of principles of global distributive justice that would follow from our commitment to global relational equality. In the sixth and final chapter, I discuss what responsibilities we have in relation to global injustice, how to distribute the burdens associated with these responsibilities, and whether they are excessively demanding on complying agents.