The current state of the global distribution of income, wealth, and well-being is in many respects the product of historical acts and processes. Of these, some have been just, others not. In philosophical discourse, processes of the latter kind are referred to as historical injustices. Of these historical injustices, the most protracted, extensive, and (presumably) the most devastating, is colonialism. For centuries, innocent people – in fact whole continents – were subjected to plunder, despoilment, land-displacement, exploitation, slavery, oppressive rule, cultural rape, and genocide. The extent and persistence of the consequences of this particular historical injustice are, however, contested territory. With regards to the exact causes of global poverty and destitution, measuring the effects of colonialism vis-à-vis other determining factors is an empirical impossibility. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that during colonial times vast amounts of riches were illicitly transferred from the colonies to their (mainly European) masters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this massive and prolonged one-directional transfer (from South to North) of wealth and resources necessary for nation-building, i.e. self-sustained and successful eco¬nomic development, has contributed, to a morally significant degree, to the unequal economic status of societies – resulting, ultimately, in the present unjust division of countries into developed, industrialized ones on the one hand, and under-developed (in many cases, extremely poor) ones, on the other. If this assumption is correct, then this is a problem of fantastic moral proportions. The aim of this essay is to consider the moral implications of the consequences of colonialism in light of the problem of global poverty and against emergent, compelling theories of global justice. It is argued that the former colonies are justified in making reparative demands on their former colonial powers as a matter of rectificatory justice. The demands discussed here are aimed at property restoration and economic compensation. The salience of these demands is established by way of arguments for collective moral responsibility and historical (trans-generational) obligations. It is further argued that such reparations would constitute a great leap towards eradicating global poverty on the grounds that many presently poor countries were the victims of colonial atrocities. Such a leap would also take us closer to a just world.

This dissertation considers the case of the Mesoamerican People’s Forum (MPF), a Central American ‘cousin’ of the World Social Forum, and manifestation of the Global Justice Movement. It argues that the MPF cannot be adequately understood as a transnational social movement or as an ‘open space.’ Rather, it is best understood as a political playing field on which the leaders of locally rooted social movements contested the future of the Central American left within an uncertain and changing political context. Based on extensive ethnographic field work and grounded analysis, it argues that well-placed actors within forum spaces can best be thought of as ‘mediators’ between state and society. The emergence of de facto federated governance structures in Central America, plus weak democratic institutions, have placed new pressures on mediators. Leaders within the Central American left find that they need to build up and/or maintain power bases to shield their positions within an uncertain political environment. They mobilize people to participate in transnational forum spaces because of the legitimating benefits, but shape networked flows within these spaces to limit the potential for networking to erode established positions. Thus I conclude that openness is neither the condition nor the objective of social forums, but rather a pawn strategically deployed or retracted in the course of networked interactions. The work advances thinking about the nature of collective political subjectivity in an era of transformationalist globalization. It also argues in favor of critical realist perspectives on collectivization in a post-development, globalizing world. Specifically, scholars can best advance an ‘epistemology of the south’ by promoting and protecting cognitive justice, which in turn can be achieved through the use of realist approaches that serve to uncover the practices of power at work within networked spaces.

This dissertation considers the case of the Mesoamerican People’s Forum (MPF), a Central American ‘cousin’ of the World Social Forum, and manifestation of the Global Justice Movement. It argues that the MPF cannot be adequately understood as a transnational social movement or as an ‘open space.’ Rather, it is best understood as a political playing field on which the leaders of locally rooted social movements contested the future of the Central American left within an uncertain and changing political context. Based on extensive ethnographic field work and grounded analysis, it argues that well-placed actors within forum spaces can best be thought of as ‘mediators’ between state and society. The emergence of de facto federated governance structures in Central America, plus weak democratic institutions, have placed new pressures on mediators. Leaders within the Central American left find that they need to build up and/or maintain power bases to shield their positions within an uncertain political environment. They mobilize people to participate in transnational forum spaces because of the legitimating benefits, but shape networked flows within these spaces to limit the potential for networking to erode established positions. Thus I conclude that openness is neither the condition nor the objective of social forums, but rather a pawn strategically deployed or retracted in the course of networked interactions. The work advances thinking about the nature of collective political subjectivity in an era of transformationalist globalization. It also argues in favor of critical realist perspectives on collectivization in a post-development, globalizing world. Specifically, scholars can best advance an ‘epistemology of the south’ by promoting and protecting cognitive justice, which in turn can be achieved through the use of realist approaches that serve to uncover the practices of power at work within networked spaces.

<p>Global poverty is a pressing moral issue that necessitates serious moral reflection. It is inextricably connected with the issue of global justice. In today’s world where there are obvious extreme economic inequalities that impoverishes millions of people in many poor countries, the need for a sound principle of global justice is morally necessary. This thesis proposes Thomas Pogge’s idea of cosmopolitan justice as a feasible and relevant theory which can help and guide in alleviating severe worldwide poverty. Pogge emphasizes the stringent negative duty not to impose, sustain and profit from a global order that deprives the poor of their basic necessities necessary for them to lead a worthwhile human life. Many people are not aware that in participating in an unjust global order, they seriously harm the global poor more than their failure to provide assistance for the poor’s basic needs. So the greater responsibility of restructuring global order in order to meet the demands of global justice lies mainly in the hands of developed nations and their citizens who have profited from the present global arrangement and who have more than adequate means to help those who are deeply affected by extreme global economic inequalities. The stronger obligation not to harm the global poor must be performed by those who make decisions and policies at the global institutional level. They are the ones who decide the fate of the global poor and they are the ones who can easily change the rules underlying the present global order. The first step to poverty eradication and the overseeing that continuous efforts are exerted to realize this aim of helping the global poor are theirs to perform immediately. This task is not optional. It is urgent and a moral necessity.</p>

This thesis is the first step in a research project which aims to develop an accurate and robust theory of global justice. The thesis concerns the content of our duties of global justice, under strict compliance theory. It begins by discussing the basic framework of my theory of global justice, which consists in two aspects: duties of minimal wellbeing, which are universal, and duties of fairness and equality, which are associative and not universal. With that in place, it briefly discusses the nature of duties of fairness and equality. I shall argue that they are associative, because they are derived from the form of cooperation at hand; and that there are three kinds of them in our contemporary world: states, local cooperation and trans-state cooperation. It is from their forms of cooperation that these duties are derived. After that, the thesis focuses exclusively on duties of minimal wellbeing. Against the usual account of these duties - the human-flourishing account - I argue for my human-life account. This account argues that the function of these duties is to secure a human life for individuals; and it begins with a Razian conception of wellbeing, which states that the wellbeing of an individual is fundamentally constituted by: (a) the satisfaction of his biological needs, and (b) his success in whole-heartedly pursuing socially defined and determined goals and activities which are in fact valuable. An account of what constitutes a human life is then derived from this conception of wellbeing – it is a life that consists in having a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs, where this is constituted by the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing; and this in turn consists in: (a) being able to forms ideas of what is worth doing, (b) being able to revise them in light of further reasons, and (c) being able to coordinate one's actions according to them. I then determine the specific objects of duties of minimal wellbeing (means for the satisfaction of biological needs, education, physical security, freedom of belief, association and expression, freedom of non-harmful conduct, and minimal resources), by determining what is involved in securing such a human life for individuals.

In an attempt to illustrate that the developed world has obligations to alleviate severe poverty, Thomas Pogge created a theory driven by human rights to focus on negative rights and duties of the avoidance of harm. His theory of global justice is developed on a minimalist account of what it means to harm. For him, the violation of the negative duty not to harm constitutes an injustice. This injustice is enacted against the citizens of developing nations by the global institutional order. Citizens of the developed world are perpetuating injustice by harming individuals through the imposition of a global order that avoidably causes human rights deficits without due compensation or reform to policies. Many critics take issue with his definition of harm as focused on negative rights, as well as find his theory of causation troublesome. His critics largely object to his assertion that the developed world causally contributes to severe poverty. Critiques of Pogge attempt to demonstrate that it is not the case that the developed world is causally responsible for severe poverty. In doing so, some make reference to domestic factors within developing nations, which they claim Pogge largely neglects. Others argue that the current global institutional order benefits developing nations. Furthermore, some of his critics engage with the normative demands that follow from his argument. They claim he has a minimal definition of harm and injustice that leads to unmanageable maximal obligations. Conversely, there are claims his argument leads to normative demands that are insufficient in redressing injustices. I argue that Pogge’s theory of global justice has developed the foundation necessary to motivate affluent nations to establish a minimally just global institutional order that avoids the perpetuation of avoidable human rights violations. This foundation elucidates and establishes, through the global institutional order, an overarching causal relationship between the world’s affluent nations and the severely poor. This relationship, despite critiques, is essential in order to illustrate that developed world citizens do indeed contribute to severe poverty and so must take action to establish a minimally just institutional order. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2009-02-02 16:07:34.355

We live in a severely unequal world. Pressing questions are, then, what changes the global advantaged should bring about to improve the situation of the global disadvantaged, and why they should do so in the first place. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 answer the latter question whereas chapters 4 and 5 answer the former. Chapter 1 considers Peter Singer’s ‘non-relationist’ and Thomas Pogge’s ‘relationist’ approaches to global justice. The chapter argues that Pogge’s argument is more compelling than Singer’s, but that it is incomplete. To make a relationist argument more plausible, the chapter draws on two critical social theorists: Alf Hornborg and David Harvey. Based on their analyses, and employing the perspectives of ‘human time’ and ‘ecological space’, the chapter concludes that the advantaged are in violation of a stringent negative duty by being complicit in the harmful global system. The chapter also introduces two kinds of debt – ‘temporal debt’ and ‘ecological debt’ – that the advantaged may owe the disadvantaged. Chapter 2 argues that the global system is not only harmful but severely harmful: it is likely to reproduce ‘absolute harm’ (a harm that infringes upon minimum human well-being). Chapter 3 discusses what positive action the advantaged ought to take because of the negative-duty violation and the problem-solving ability they have. Focusing on two kinds of action – reparation and remedy – the chapter argues that achieving reparation may face practical problems, but that the advantaged should act immediately to provide remedy – in particular, institutional remedy – for the disadvantaged. In doing so, the chapter commends the ‘advantaged remedy’ principle. Chapters 4 and 5 consider remedial institutions which the advantaged should strive to create and uphold. Chapter 4 focuses on one which we already have: the UN Global Compact. The chapter argues that this institution is necessary in the light of present global circumstances and also advances a set of principles appropriate to protect minimum human well-being. But it concludes that this reformist institution may turn out to be insufficient. Based on this conclusion, chapter 5 supports a more radical proposal: a market-socialist proposal offered by Leslie Sklair. Sklair’s account, however, does not explain why it is market socialism, rather than a non-market alternative, that should be pursued. Neither does it show how market-socialist institutions would remedy the global-systemic problems that are likely to afflict the disadvantaged. The chapter offers answers to these questions by drawing on David Miller (for the first question) and David Schweickart (for the second question). The chapter then argues that market socialism, if accompanied by an appropriate ethos, would serve to remedy the situation of the global disadvantaged. Meanwhile, the shift to market socialism would, and should, take time. So, this project concludes by considering a supplementary institution that may need to be implemented in the meantime: an ecological space tax.

In this I will explore the ethical challenge of global climate change by analysing three accounts of how responsibility for climate change should be distributed. I explore why it is valuable to view climate change as part of a bigger ethical problem of resources, distribution and global justice. Furthermore, I will argue that a road towards change by a cosmo political theory of justice is the most reasonable option. The theme of my argumentation is that the challenge of global climate change should be understood as a problem between human beings, not between states, or via schemes for distribution or rigid systematic solutions. Many theories of justice fail to do so with challenging and potentially dangerous consequences. / I den här uppsatsen så kommer jag utforska klimatförändringar som etisk utmaning. Jag undersöker varför det är värdefullt att se klimatförändringar som en del av ett större problem som handlar om resurser, distribuering och global rättvisa. Jag kommer undersöka tre möjliga vägar till en lösning på klimatförändringar som etiskt problem och hävda att en kosmopolitisk rättviseteori är det rimligaste alternativet. Klimatförändringens utmaning måste förstås som ett problem människor emellan och inte stater emellan genom planer för distribuering av resurser eller någon annan mer eller mindre regid systematisk lösning. Många rättviseteorier lyckas mindre väl med detta med utmanande och potentiellt farliga konsekvenser som resultat.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media are constantly drawing attention to human rights violations caused by multinational corporations abroad (MNC). Due to the lack of an adequate framework to hold corporations accountable for their corporate misconduct across borders, there is a liability gap. Extensive research has been undertaken by political philosophers as well as lawyers attempting to fill the gap, leaving the question why it still exists. Currently, there is a debate in the Swiss parliament about the implementation of a constitutional law which could fill this gap. By conducting an argumentation analysis on the parliamentary debate about the Swiss Business Initiative (SBI), this thesis seeks to analyze how politicians are framing the debate, as well as what normative concerns of the academy have been discussed or left out. Finally, the paper concludes with seven findings that could be focused on more in praxis.

This dissertation is the first step in a larger research project aimed at bridging the gap between Western philosophy and Indigenous thought. Here, I identify a methodological approach to the social contract by analyzing the tradition under an historical lens. I highlight that, along with the justificatory capacities of the social contract, comes a great deal of modelling involved in different versions of the social contract. This modelling comes in the form of four pre-contractual elements that different authors model in different ways. I show how different authors choose different structural problems or injustices that such theories want to address, as well as normative commitments that their theories are committed to, a standard of considerability of interests that identifies whose interests matter for those deliberating the terms of the contract, and a contractual device. I then go on to develop a framework for the development of a theory of global justice. I focus on the first three pre-contractual elements. For the sake of a global theory of justice, I identify four circumstances that need to be the focus of our concerns about global justice: Serious existential uncertainty due to climate change and massive animal extinction; the existence of a shared global institutional framework that forces us to think in terms beyond the state; the disproportionate distribution of the planet’s scarce resources; and the pervasive racial, gender and disabled-bodied-targeted inequalities that are characteristic of today’s world. I then move on to identify the “dignity of being” as a non-anthropocentric, core normative commitment that can be used as the basis for a theory of global justice. I conclude by developing a standard of considerability of interests that can adequately incorporate the interests of diverse beings into the social contract deliberations. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation is the first step in a larger research project aimed at bridging the gap between Western philosophy and Indigenous thought. Here, I identify a useful methodological approach to the social contract by analyzing the tradition under an historical lens. I highlight that, along with the justificatory capacities of the social contract, comes a great deal of modelling involved in different versions of the social contract. This modelling comes in the form of four pre-contractual elements that different authors model in different ways. I show how different authors choose different structural problems or injustices that such theories want to address, as well as normative commitments that their theories are committed to, a standard of considerability of interests that identifies whose interests matter for those deliberating the terms of the contract, and a contractual device. Once that has been established, I am able to provide some foundational elements for establishing a framework for the development of a theory of global justice. I focus on the first three pre-contractual elements.