The aim of this study is to analyze how problems are represented within SOU 2008:27. Further more, the aim is to analyze how the new subject plan for history can bee seen as a product of this document. The method used, and the theoretical frame of the study, is based on Carol Lee Bacchi’s ”what´s the problem represented to be?” approach, which basic principle is that policies are filled with representations of problems and that these representations need to be examined. These problem representations are then themselves subject for scrutiny, the second step being an analysis of the texts presumptions and assumptions concerning view of man and perception of knowledge.   The results show, among other things, that a problem representations can be found in the SOU; the school system is too vague and unclear. This can be broken down to four concrete problems; the schools lack of clarity, the schools uniformity, the schools abundance of choices and the educations lack of preparation for societal partake. The view of man is an idea of the working citizen and perception of knowledge mainly being securing students employability.   The subject plan in history is a product of the SOU in several ways. The proposed solutions for the schools lack of clarity are implemented, which results in a more detailed control of the teachers. The problem with the high schools uniformity is also solved by the fact that a shorter course is given to students attending a “practical program” thus dividing the high school.

This study is based on a proposition about the legislation regarding sexual offences prepared by a commission initiated by the Swedish government in 1972 which was presented in 1976. The purpose of this study has been to ascertain the commissions views on rape based on their representation of the problem, their presuppositions and assumptions regarding it and future consequences in behavior for victims and offenders of the crime. The key results of this study is that the commission regarded the “problem” of the then current legislation to be non-consistently with the time being. In their opinion the legislation needed to be loosened from its moral strings and be adjusted to the “new” sexually liberal era. The study has furthermore shown that the commission had a clear picture of rape as consistent of different victims and different perpetrators regarding the prevailing situation. Depending on factors such as gender, social class and generation the commission pointed out certain women likely be sexually assaulted and certain men likely to be rapists. Consequences of this being that certain women were regarded as jointly responsible in case of being subject to rape. These women were led to the perception that they, in the future, had to avoid a certain behavior if they did not want to risk being raped. Rather than the victims of rape perpetrators benefited by the suggested new legislation since their crimes were looked upon more mildly than before and they were not themselves fully responsible for the offence.

This thesis examines the Swedish political response to the challenges posed by gene technology, seen through the prism of governmental commissions. It discerns and analyses continuities and changes in the Swedish political conception of gene technology, over the course of two decades, 1980–2000. This is done by thematically following ideas of “risks” and “ethics” as they are represented in the inner workings and reception of three governmental commissions. The Gene-Ethics Commission (1981–1984), the Gene Technology Commission (1990–1992) and the Biotechnology Commission (1997–2000) form the empirical focal points of this analysis. The first two provided preparatory policy proposals that preceded the implementation of the Swedish gene technology laws of 1991 and 1994. The last one aimed at presenting a comprehensive Swedish biotechnology policy for the new millennium. The study takes into account the role of governmental commissions as arenas where science and politics intersect in Swedish political life, and illuminates how this type of “boundary organisation”, placed on the border of science and politics, impinges on the understanding of the gene technology issue. The commissions have looked into the limits, dangers, possibilities and future applications of gene technology. They have been appointed to deal with the problematic task of distinguishing between what is routine and untested practices, realistic prediction and “science fiction”, what are unique problems and what are problems substantially similar to older ones, what constitutes a responsible approach as opposed to misconduct and what it means to let things “get out of hand” in contrast to being “in control”. Throughout a period of twenty years, media reports have continued to frame the challenges posed by gene technology as a task of balancing risks and benefits, walking the fine line between “frankenfoods” and “miracle drugs”. One salient problem for the commissions to solve was that science and industry seemed to promote a technology the public opposed and resisted, at least in parts. For both politics and science to gain, or regain, public trust it needed to demonstrate that risks – be it environmental, ethical or health related ones – were under control. Under the surface, it was much more complicated than “science helping politics” to make informed and rational decisions on how to formulate a regulatory policy. Could experts be trusted to participate in policy-making in a neutral way and was it not important, in accordance with democratic norms, to involve the public?