Apples and pears may be related fruits, but that does not mean they are the same! If I were to host a dinner party and intended to bake and serve an apple tart, but was delivered pears, I would end up with a pear frangipane and some very disappointed house guests. The context in which words are communicated is very important - apples and pears could relate to fruits or indeed stairs. Recognising intention as being important even in social contracts highlights the importance of intention in commercial transactions. The utility of contract law is to facilitate the agreement of parties and the rights and obligations assumed by them -this is the true essence of contract. Reverting to the analogy above, indemnity clauses although in some cases achieving similar ends as exclusion clauses, are not intended to result in exclusions of liability but are a more specific method of contractual risk management. One could infer that parties who specifically make use of indemnity clauses do not intend these to function as limitation of liability clauses, neither would they have intended such clauses be construed an exclusion of liability. Exclusion clauses could be construed as defences to accrued rights, however a central theme in this thesis is that an exclusion clause is clear in its function- it negates the accrual of a primary duty, implied by law. An indemnity on the other hand undeniably relates to secondary obligations to compensate or make good loss upon breach of primary obligations to perform. An indemnity clause, transfers secondary obligations to compensate to another who has assumed such obligation(s). In most cases the transferred obligation is financial; an indemnity is similar to a contractual insurance in this sense. An indemnity clause is not an exclusion clause. The difference is not only academic but also relevant to commerce. As the indemnity becomes a more common feature in high risk and high value contracting, certainty of its meaning is all too important. Where an indemnity is misconstrued as an exclusion of liability, the latter a duty defining clause, this could have an effect on the insurance arrangements between the parties ultimately making the venture uneconomical for one or both of the parties. The certainty of a contractual term enhances its effectiveness and consequently reduces the economic transaction costs of its inclusion. Thus, parties can focus on the first stage of Posner's transaction cost theory – 'negotiations and drafting' enhancing the utility of contract law.

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O presente trabalho tem como escopo central a análise da regra do prejuízo relacionada às nulidades no processo penal. Corolário da teoria da instrumentalidade das formas, a regra do prejuízo dispõe que somente será reconhecida a nulidade se do ato viciado resultar algum prejuízo para a acusação ou para a defesa. A despeito de sua importância para a construção de um modelo finalístico, referida categoria do prejuízo vem sendo aplicada de forma caótica pela jurisprudência pátria. Na realidade, o entendimento daquilo que de fato configura o prejuízo para efeitos do artigo 563 do Código de Processo Penal se perdeu em meio a decisões controversas e confusas acerca do tema. A regra, inicialmente adotada no processo civil, foi transportada ao processo penal sem as devidas cautelas e desprovida dos necessários ajustes. Inexiste uma sistematização mínima para aferição do prejuízo, sendo certo que hodiernamente se confere uma discricionariedade absoluta ao magistrado para determinar se no caso concreto há alguma lesão às partes. Nesse cenário, a precípua função da forma, que é assegurar uma proteção ao acusado contra eventuais arbitrariedades do Estado, muitas vezes é deixada de lado. Toda essa problemática tem gerado um ambiente instável para correta aplicação das nulidades, o que acaba por acarretar uma notável insegurança jurídica. O presente estudo tem a pretensão de propor um modelo racional de aferição do prejuízo, com base no qual o magistrado encontrará critérios mais claros para a aplicação das nulidades no processo penal. / This research aims to analyze the harmless error rule, strictly related to the subject of nullities in the criminal procedure. As a deployment of the theory of instrumentality of the procedural forms, the harmless error rule provides that a mistake will only cause the nullity of the procedure if there is evidence to support that the prosecution or the defense were actually harmed by that error. Although extremely important for the incorporation of teleological model of nullity, the mentioned harmless error rule has been wrongfully applied by Brazilian courts. In reality, the understanding of the actual meaning of the word harm, as per article 563 of the Criminal Procedure, has been lost throughout so many different confusing and controversial court decisions. The harmless error rule, initially used in civil cases, was brought to criminal procedure without the needed adjustments. There is no minimum systematization in order to identify a harmful error and, therefore, nowadays the judge has total discretion to determine in each case the severity of the error. Given this reality, the most important function of a procedural form, which is to protect the defendant against eventual arbitrary measures committed by the State, is normally forgotten. All these issues have caused an unstable background regarding the correct application of the nullities, leading to a noticeable legal uncertainty in this subject. This research has the intention to come up with a rational model of application of the harmless error rule, based on which the judges will find the necessary criteria to recognize nullities in criminal procedures.

O presente trabalho tem como escopo central a análise da regra do prejuízo relacionada às nulidades no processo penal. Corolário da teoria da instrumentalidade das formas, a regra do prejuízo dispõe que somente será reconhecida a nulidade se do ato viciado resultar algum prejuízo para a acusação ou para a defesa. A despeito de sua importância para a construção de um modelo finalístico, referida categoria do prejuízo vem sendo aplicada de forma caótica pela jurisprudência pátria. Na realidade, o entendimento daquilo que de fato configura o prejuízo para efeitos do artigo 563 do Código de Processo Penal se perdeu em meio a decisões controversas e confusas acerca do tema. A regra, inicialmente adotada no processo civil, foi transportada ao processo penal sem as devidas cautelas e desprovida dos necessários ajustes. Inexiste uma sistematização mínima para aferição do prejuízo, sendo certo que hodiernamente se confere uma discricionariedade absoluta ao magistrado para determinar se no caso concreto há alguma lesão às partes. Nesse cenário, a precípua função da forma, que é assegurar uma proteção ao acusado contra eventuais arbitrariedades do Estado, muitas vezes é deixada de lado. Toda essa problemática tem gerado um ambiente instável para correta aplicação das nulidades, o que acaba por acarretar uma notável insegurança jurídica. O presente estudo tem a pretensão de propor um modelo racional de aferição do prejuízo, com base no qual o magistrado encontrará critérios mais claros para a aplicação das nulidades no processo penal. / This research aims to analyze the harmless error rule, strictly related to the subject of nullities in the criminal procedure. As a deployment of the theory of instrumentality of the procedural forms, the harmless error rule provides that a mistake will only cause the nullity of the procedure if there is evidence to support that the prosecution or the defense were actually harmed by that error. Although extremely important for the incorporation of teleological model of nullity, the mentioned harmless error rule has been wrongfully applied by Brazilian courts. In reality, the understanding of the actual meaning of the word harm, as per article 563 of the Criminal Procedure, has been lost throughout so many different confusing and controversial court decisions. The harmless error rule, initially used in civil cases, was brought to criminal procedure without the needed adjustments. There is no minimum systematization in order to identify a harmful error and, therefore, nowadays the judge has total discretion to determine in each case the severity of the error. Given this reality, the most important function of a procedural form, which is to protect the defendant against eventual arbitrary measures committed by the State, is normally forgotten. All these issues have caused an unstable background regarding the correct application of the nullities, leading to a noticeable legal uncertainty in this subject. This research has the intention to come up with a rational model of application of the harmless error rule, based on which the judges will find the necessary criteria to recognize nullities in criminal procedures.

The United States Constitution had been in existence for almost two hundred years before the Supreme Court decided that some violations of constitutional rights may be too insignificant to warrant remedial action. Known as "harmless error," this statutory doctrine allows a court to affirm a conviction when a mere technicality or minor defect did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The doctrine aims to promote judicial efficiency and judgment finality. The Court first applied harmless error to constitutional violations by shifting the statutory test away from the error's effect on substantial rights to its impact on the jury's verdict. Over time, the test evolved even further, now allowing a court to disregard the constitutional error when a majority of justices believe that the untainted record evidence shows that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. This sacrifice of individual and institutional constitutional protections at the altar of judicial efficiency and judgment finality subverts the harmless error doctrine's purposes and strikes at the core of America's founding ideals. In particular, it allows appellate courts to invade the jury's role as the finder of fact and guilt, to sidestep their constitutional role to review and correct errors and protect the Constitution, and to incentivize government actors to commit constitutional violations with little-to-no ramifications. After conducting a comprehensive review of the harmless error doctrine and its development, this thesis traces through many substantive, theoretical, and practical problems with the doctrine's current application. It then proposes that the Constitution and the values that it protects should once again be elevated above the harmless error doctrine's pragmatic concerns of judicial efficiency and judgment finality.