Diss. Universität Tübingen, 2008. / Business and Economics (German Language) (Springer-11775) (GWV).

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2007.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2008.

Zugl.: Zürich, Universiẗat, Diss., 2005.

abstract: I study the performance of hedge fund managers, using quarterly stock holdings from 1995 to 2010. I use the holdings-based measure built on Ferson and Mo (2012) to decompose a manager's overall performance into stock selection and three components of timing ability: market return, volatility, and liquidity. At the aggregate level, I find that hedge fund managers have stock picking skills but no timing skills, and overall I do not find strong evidence to support their superiority. I show that the lack of abilities is driven by the large fluctuations of timing performance with market conditions. I find that conditioning information, equity capital constraints, and priority in stocks to liquidate can partly explain the weak evidence. At the individual fund level, bootstrap analysis results suggest that even top managers' abilities cannot be separated from luck. Also, I find that hedge fund managers exhibit short-horizon persistence in selectivity skill. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Business Administration 2013

I focus on analyzing the performance of various hedge fund strategies in my diploma thesis.

This thesis examines three important topics in corporate governance: the relationship between activist hedge funds and other institutional investors, the role of perks in the market for CEO talent, and public scrutiny and the changing nature of perks. First, I provide an in depth study of the interaction between activist hedge funds and other institutional investors. Hedge funds are more likely to target firms with high levels of institutional ownership, and demonstrate a preference for short term focused institutional investors. Hedge fund activism generates short run and long run abnormal returns without increasing stock return volatility. Regardless of investment horizon, volatility is inversely related to prior period institutional ownership. The trading behavior of institutional owners with different investment horizons is consistent with hedge fund activism creating value. These findings hold regardless of whether investment horizon is based on portfolio churn rate or type of institution. Overall, the results suggest a mutually beneficial relationship between activist hedge funds and other institutional investors. Second, in a coauthored paper with Drs. Seungijn Han and Jiaping Qiu, I provide the first comprehensive analysis on how CEOs’ wage and perks are jointly determined in a competitive CEO market. The underlying theory shows that in equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more sensitive than wage to changes in firm size. The more perks enhance the CEO’s productivity, the faster perks increase in firm size. Closed form solutions allow the recovery of the cost function of providing perks. I examine the determinants of CEO perquisite compensation using hand-collected information for S&P 500 companies and find consistent empirical evidence. Third, I examine the impact of public scrutiny on CEO compensation using the unique opportunity provided by the 2008 financial crisis, government support, and legislated compensation restrictions. I introduce novel data on executive perks at S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2012. Overall, my results are consistent with increased public scrutiny having lasting impact on perks and temporary impact on wage, and with legislated compensation restrictions having temporary impact on wage. Changes in specific perks items provide evidence on which perks firms perceive as excessive and which provide common value. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) came into worldwide attention in 2018, when over $11.6 billion flowed through them. The CME Group launched Bitcoin futures contracts in December 2017, giving large funds their first regulated exposure to digital assets. As digital assets move towards the mainstream of finance, institutional investors have followed. This study comparatively analyzes Hedge Fund investment in digital assets against that of other institutional investment firm types (Private Equity and Venture Capital) by analyzing their crypto holdings and rebuilding an equally weighted portfolio for each fund. Under these conditions, the study succeeds in finding significant differences between hedge fund results in the sample and those of private equity/venture capital firms. Specifically, this study shows through the composite portfolios built that digital asset investments made by hedge funds generate a much higher return than that of private equity and venture capital firms. Average hedge fund investments have much higher trading volumes and market capitalizations than those made by private equity and venture capital firms, suggesting that PE and VC firms are taking higher risks by investing in new and little-known crypto projects. The results of this study signal that the hedge fund business model is much better suited for the high-risk, high-volatility cryptocurrency market than strategies employed by venture capital and private equity firms.

Techn. Univ., Diss./08--Darmstadt, 2007.

This thesis is a collection of three essays on hedge funds with contributions to the empirical understanding of their fees, and their voluntary disclosure of returns and assets under management, using a large consolidation of widely-employed publicly available hedge fund databases. First, time-series variation in reported fees is analysed using fund launches within hedge fund management companies, and conditioning fees at launch on fund family characteristics. Larger and better performing fund families launch high fee funds. Funds with high management fees at launch do not perform any differently from low fee funds, though funds with high incentive fees marginally outperform. An interval regression technique is proposed to overcome the discrete nature of reported fees. Secondly, the reliability of voluntary disclosures of financial information is analysed with a different measure of time-variation --- tracking changes to statements of historical performance recorded at different points in time. This uncovers evidence that historical returns are routinely revised. These revisions are not merely random or corrections of earlier mistakes; they are partly forecastable by fund characteristics. Moreover, funds that revise their performance histories, significantly and predictably underperform those that have never revised. Finally, the availability, and timing, of the selective disclosure of assets under management by funds is examined. More than a third of funds have asset records falling short of returns published. There is evidence of strategic disclosure by funds --- asset reporting drying up after times of fund stress, such as poor performance or outflows. Furthermore, investors should take heed of the greater propensity for shortfall funds to trigger fraud performance flags. These results suggest that unreliable disclosures: constitute a valuable source of information for current and potential investors; have implications for researchers; and, exhort market regulators to include assets, not just returns, in the debate around mandatory disclosure by financial institutions.