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Creativity is a nebulous concept, lacking both clear articulations and common understandings of meaning. Due to a lack of clear alternatives the concept of creativity is increasingly becoming infused with economically driven vocabulary, associations, interests and ideologies. There is an immediate need to provide alternatives to the „creative economy‟ view of creativity, because of its insidious effect on educational institutions and practices and because it promotes a generally impoverished view of the meaning of creativity and of human potential. Reductionist thought; the tendency to understand concepts as separate and distinct from one another prevents us from easily conceptualising an experience such as creativity which involves the simultaneous experience of seemingly paradoxical elements such as individuality and unity, intellect and intuition and freedom and discipline. Democracy is a metaphor which can help to articulate and understand the paradoxical experience of creativity. Democracy stands for the potential to make meaning from the integrated exploration of individuality and of unity, which I argue is a fundamental dynamic of the creative experience. I further suggest that the essence of the creative experience is a democratic attunement to existence, in which subject and object, self and environment, intellect and intuition and freedom and discipline are experienced as in a democratic relationship with one another. This way of understanding creativity provides an alternative to the creative economy view. It implies some significant changes to traditional educational emphases, including a movement away from primarily individualistically oriented curricula and toward curricula and educational values which situate the individual within an integrated eco-system.

Creativity is a nebulous concept, lacking both clear articulations and common understandings of meaning. Due to a lack of clear alternatives the concept of creativity is increasingly becoming infused with economically driven vocabulary, associations, interests and ideologies. There is an immediate need to provide alternatives to the „creative economy‟ view of creativity, because of its insidious effect on educational institutions and practices and because it promotes a generally impoverished view of the meaning of creativity and of human potential. Reductionist thought; the tendency to understand concepts as separate and distinct from one another prevents us from easily conceptualising an experience such as creativity which involves the simultaneous experience of seemingly paradoxical elements such as individuality and unity, intellect and intuition and freedom and discipline. Democracy is a metaphor which can help to articulate and understand the paradoxical experience of creativity. Democracy stands for the potential to make meaning from the integrated exploration of individuality and of unity, which I argue is a fundamental dynamic of the creative experience. I further suggest that the essence of the creative experience is a democratic attunement to existence, in which subject and object, self and environment, intellect and intuition and freedom and discipline are experienced as in a democratic relationship with one another. This way of understanding creativity provides an alternative to the creative economy view. It implies some significant changes to traditional educational emphases, including a movement away from primarily individualistically oriented curricula and toward curricula and educational values which situate the individual within an integrated eco-system.

Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2017-07-17T18:11:51Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Dissertação - Raphael Tenorio.pdf: 2177320 bytes, checksum: 0c49be0a42bf364787c207916fe7b241 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-17T18:11:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Dissertação - Raphael Tenorio.pdf: 2177320 bytes, checksum: 0c49be0a42bf364787c207916fe7b241 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-22 / A pesquisa se empenha em analisar a fenomenologia da morte em Emmanuel Lévinas. Em Martin Heidegger, principal autor com o qual dialoga Lévinas, a morte é vista não como um fenômeno da vida, mas como um modo de ser do Dasein e que pode ser antecipada (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), possibilitando o destrancamento do impessoal (das Man) e uma possível resignificação da existência inautêntica face a angústia da nadificação. Lévinas, no seu esforço de desontologizar a filosofia, vê a morte como um evento que afronta o presente do sujeito inter-essado (intéressement). Ao contrário da atracção existencial na qual a finitude está posta na Analítica Existencial, a morte, em Lévinas, é posta no exterior da existência, realizando-se como um anti-projeto. A morte é um enigma, uma experiência inexperienciável, uma alteridade estranha que dissipa os poderes compreensivos do sujeito, torna-o passivo, delineia os limites da razão e restringe a capacidade de antecipação à possibilidade mais radical da existência. Deste modo, acredita Lévinas, a morte do outro a “morte primeira”, uma experiência moral concreta, mais impactante do que os poderes da morte própria. O filósofo francês tem a morte como afecção do outro no Mesmo. Assim, é possível afirmar que morremos na morte de outrem. Angustiamo-nos por não possuirmos respostas (a não-resposta, o sem-resposta), por estarmos diante de um enigma absoluto que só temos a possibilidade de “sofrê-lo”, porque outros morrem junto e nem se pode “morrer por eles”, nem morrer a própria morte e nem ser dono de qualquer poder de decisão, a não ser que ela se aproxime, se avizinhe (voisinage). A essência da morte é o seu caráter de eterno futuro. Constitui-se, desta maneira, uma grandiosa metonímia na existência. Não a minha morte, mas a morte do outro é a morte primeira, pois é esse evento que me inicia e continua re-lembrando que sou mortal, pois não me apercebo desse fato todo o tempo. O acesso a mortalidade, a minha mortalidade, faz-se, desde Lévinas, via experiência da morte de outro. A angústia que me toma não é fundamental, prima, é um “sentimento” a posteriori que nesta etapa posterior irá me angustiar profundamente e de forma singular. / The present research analyses the phenomenology of death in Emmanuel Lévinas. According to Martin Heidegger, the main philosopher with whom Lévinas develops a dialogue, death is not seen as a phenomenon of life but as a way of being of Dasein which can be anticipated (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) in order to operate the dissolution of the they-self (das Man) and a possible reframing of inauthentic existence in view of the angst of nihilation. In his effort of de-ontologizing philosophy, Levinás understands death as an event that takes down the present of the interestedness (intéressement) subject. Unlike the existential attraction in which finitude is posited in the Existential Analytic, Levinás claims that death is posited in the exterior of existence and that it is actualized as an anti-project. Death is a riddle. It is an inexplicable experience, an strange otherness that consumes the comprehensive powers of the subject; it makes it passive, draws the boundaries of reason and restricts the capacity to anticipate the most radical possibility of existence. Thus, Levinás believes that the death of the other is a “first death”, a concrete moral experience even more startling than the powers of death proper. The French philosopher conceives death as affection of the other in the Same. Therefore, it is possible to say that we die in the death of the other. We agonize in not having answers (a non-answer, the without-answer). We agonize in facing an absolute riddle and because others die along and one can neither “die for them” nor die one’s own death; neither one can be the owner of any power of decision, unless she approaches and take a voisinage (neighborliness). The essence of death lies in its feature as an eternal future. This way death configures a great metonymy of existence. It is not my death but the death of the other that is the first death. Such event introduces and reminds me to the fact that I am mortal. I am not constantly aware of mortality. The access to it – to my mortality, is given by the experience of death of the other. The angst that overcomes me is not fundamental. Instead, it is an a posteriori “feeling” which will constitute me as a singularity in this ulterior moment.

This thesis argues that Heidegger’s thought offers crucial insights into the structural challenges that modernity poses to being an ethical and religious person. I argue that these difficulties come down to an instrumentalist conception of truth, a denial or repression of finitude as the condition of meaningfulness, and a philosophical anthropology that is both too subjectivistic and too objectivistic. Yet while Heidegger was good on the diagnosis, he was reluctant to give more than digressive and opaque prescriptions to these problems. My thesis seeks to respond to this lacuna by putting Heidegger’s critical observations in the service of articulating a positive religious ethics. To that end, it seeks to locate—as well as redefine from an ontological perspective—the human dispositions and practices that expose truth in a non-instrumental light, that show finitude as a positive condition of meaningfulness, and that reveal the essence of the human being in non-subjectivist and non- objectivist terms. I argue that these include listening and gratitude—dispositions and practices I claim should form the backbone of any religious ethics, and yet which I also claim should not be limited to those who believe in a personal, theistic God. My thesis contributes to the fields of modern theology and Heidegger Studies in four ways. First, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Levinas and Adorno) are wrong to oppose ontology to ethics. Second, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Marion and Jonas) are wrong to oppose ontology to theology. Third, it shows that Heidegger’s own ambivalence about the ethical and theological relevance of his thought allows for the development of a deeply ethical and theological posture. And fourth, it offers a unique, post-Heideggerian interpretation of gratitude, one in which it is understood as a structure of Dasein that is both “always already” and “not yet” operative.

This roundtable discussion will examine the ways in which we talk about and examine media. Over the past year, the participants have used Facebook as the venue for a conversation about media that has engaged the very techniques that they seek to understand. While their positions vary, the participants in this roundtable welcome others to share in a common purpose: to find better ways to relate to, from, and about media.

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.