Airbases are often prioritized targets in early stages of conflicts. To avoid this, the Swedish Air Force have a concept to disperse their resources. It requires mobile logistical units to support the flying machines outside the airbases and achieve the effect of this concept. Moshe Kress has principles in his thesis on how to achieve a successful logistical chain. Therefore, this study aims to understand the Swedish use of mobile logistical units from Kress principles.  The findings of this qualitative analysis shows that many of these principles interrelate because many results of the operationalized questions are similar.  The Swedish management philosophy offers a degree of initiative on the tactical level in the completing of tasks.  Even though there are room for initiative, the logistical levels need to maintain good communication and cooperation to maintain the logistical chain. One detail that was recurrent in the results was the importance of continuous planning and be open for readjustments when lessons are learnt. Kress principles can be used as a tool to analyze this kind of concept and better understand the use of these units. Details concerning how the Swedish mobile logistical units operate are classified and specific for their country. Therefore, this study contributes to insights and understandings on the basics of how these units operate from the perspective of Kress principles.

In-between 2000 and 2007 the Swedish armed forces helicopter wing experienced several major aviation accidents. These accidents were remarkable with regards to the facts that aviation accidents had been decreasing in numbers since 1970; that safety technology had developed; and that findings in earlier research suggests that the characteristics of Swedish national culture should lower the risk of accidents. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of these aviation accidents by applying theories of organizational factors in aviation accidents and organizational learning. The chosen method is a single case study conducted with a qualitative approach, focusing on the helicopter wing, its squadrons, structure and its command. The results of this study show that aviation accidents could be the result of many contributory organizational factors. They also show that organizational learning should be an integrated part of risk management. Finally they show that reorganizations considerably reduces an organizations capability to manage risks. The conclusion is that when safety critical organizations such as the military reorganize, they tend to lose critical procedures, objectives, management and structure which leads to higher risks and in some cases to accidents.

This thesis addresses the driving forces behind the Swedish state’s procurement of Helicopters 14 and 16 and the decommissioning of Helicopter 4. These actions have significantly affected the Swedish Armed Forces, especially the Helicopter Wing, in carrying out their operational tasks. On numerous occasions the Helicopter Wing has been unable to perform its tasks. For instance, the Nordic Battle Group 08 had no helicopters to exercise with and, until recently, Sweden had completely lacked the ability to hunt submarines with helicopters for almost ten years. This thesis also aims to compare the decisions in 1999-2000 regarding Helicopter 14 with the decisions in 2010-2011 regarding the acquisition of Helicopter 16, to find if there is a general trend and how much the Armed Forces were able to influence decisions. This is done by using Graham T. Allison’s and Philip Zelikow’s models for explaining and analysing the factors behind a state’s decisions.   The analysis shows that the decisions were primarily compromises between the Armed Forces and Sweden’s government, where the government had the main influence. The decisions can be seen as rational, depending on whose point of view they are observed from, although they were not unanimously agreed between the organisations involved. It also shows that economic restrictions and the government’s involvement have had negative consequences for the Helicopter Wing organisation, that the acquisition of Helicopter 16 was a consequence of the procurement of Helicopter 14, and that further consequences will probably arise from the decision to acquire Helicopter 16.