This paper examines the distributional effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a welfare state redistributing income. The redistribution scheme is financed by a progressive income tax and gives the same absolute transfer to all individuals. Ceteris paribus, international trade leads to an increase in income per capita but also to higher income inequality on two fronts. Inter-group inequality between managers and workers increases, and intra-group inequality within the group of managers goes up as well. We show that for constant tax rates, there is an endogenous increase in the size of the welfare state that works against the increase in inequality, yet cannot offset it. The paper also sheds light on the conditions under which trade can actually lead to a Pareto improvement.

This paper investigates the effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms where a welfare state redistributes income. We look at a very stylised progressive non-distortionary redistribution scheme. We show that for a given tax rate international trade increases income per capita, but also leads to higher income inequality. Two aspects of income inequality are examined. First, inter-group inequality between managers and workers is considered. Second, intra-group inequality within the group of managers is investigated. For a given tax rate the size of the welfare state and therefore the transfer per capita increases when going from autarky to trade. This second-round effect counteracts the primary increase in inequality, yet cannot outweigh it. Since the redistribution scheme is non-distortionary, it is possible to decrease trade-induced inequality by increasing the tax rate without jeopardising the gains from trade.

This paper examines the effects of a unilateral reform of the redistribution policy in an economy open to international trade. We set up a general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous agents allowing for country asymmetries. We show that under international trade compared to autarky, a unilateral tax increase leads to a less pronounced decline in aggregate real income in the reforming country, while income inequality is reduced to a larger extent for sufficiently small initial tax rates. We highlight as a key mechanism a tax-induced reduction in the market size of the reforming country relative to its trading partner, resulting in a firm selection effect towards exporting. From the perspective of a non-reforming trading partner, the unilateral redistribution policy reform resembles a unilateral increase in trade costs leading to a deterioration of terms-of-trade and a decline in both aggregate real income and inequality.

We set up a trade model with heterogeneous firms and a worker population that is heterogeneous in two dimensions: workers are either skilled or unskilled, and within each skill category there is a continuum of abilities. Workers with high abilities, both skilled and unskilled, are matched to firms with high productivities, and this leads to wage differentials within each skill category across firms. Self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting generates an exporter wage premium, and our framework with skilled and unskilled workers allows us to decompose this premium into its skill-specific components. We employ linked employer-employee data from Germany to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. Using these parameter estimates, we compute an average exporter wage premium of 5 percent. The decomposition by skill turns out to be quantitatively highly relevant, with exporting firms paying no wage premium at all to their unskilled workers, while the premium for skilled workers is 12 percent.

This paper investigates the effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms where a welfare state redistributes income. We look at a very stylised progressive non-distortionary redistribution scheme. We show that for a given tax rate international trade increases income per capita, but also leads to higher income inequality. Two aspects of income inequality are examined. First, inter-group inequality between managers and workers is considered. Second, intra-group inequality within the group of managers is investigated. For a given tax rate the size of the welfare state and therefore the transfer per capita increases when going from autarky to trade. This second-round effect counteracts the primary increase in inequality, yet cannot outweigh it. Since the redistribution scheme is non-distortionary, it is possible to decrease trade-induced inequality by increasing the tax rate without jeopardising the gains from trade.

This paper examines the distributional effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a welfare state redistributing income. The redistribution scheme is financed by a progressive income tax and gives the same absolute transfer to all individuals. Ceteris paribus, international trade leads to an increase in income per capita but also to higher income inequality on two fronts. Inter-group inequality between managers and workers increases, and intra-group inequality within the group of managers goes up as well. We show that for constant tax rates, there is an endogenous increase in the size of the welfare state that works against the increase in inequality, yet cannot offset it. The paper also sheds light on the conditions under which trade can actually lead to a Pareto improvement.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen, die die Rolle unterschiedlichester Arten von finanziellen Friktionen sowohl auf Firmenseite, als auch auf Bankenseite, für die Übertragung von finanziellen Schocks und Geldpolitik analysieren. Im ersten Aufsatz, "Firm Heterogeneity and the Capital Market", studiere ich welche Art von Finanzbeschränkungen der Firmen für die Übertragung von Kapitalmarktfinanzierungsschocks, als auch geldpolitischen Schocks, ausschlaggebend sind. Hierbei gehöre ich zu den Ersten in der Literatur, die Kapitalmarktfinanzierungsschocks direkt aus Firmendaten schätzen. Ich zeige in meiner Studie, dass es für ein tieferes Verständnis von Firmeninvestitionen entscheidend ist, zwischen verschiedenen potentiellen Maßzahlen für Finanzbeschränkungen der Firmen zu unterscheiden. Konkret zeige ich, dass finanzbeschränkte Firmen mit hohen erwarteten zukünftigen Gewinnen nach einem Kapitalmarktfinanzierungsschock ihre Investitionen stärker als andere Firmen erhöhen. Im Unterschied dazu, spielt für die Übertragung von Geldpolitik auf Firmeninvestitionen die Liquidität und die Verschuldungsquote eine stärkere Rolle. Diese Resultate implizieren, dass für Politikmaßnahmen die eine Erhöhung von gesamtwirtschaftlichen Investitionen zum Ziel haben, sowohl Geldpolitik als auch der Zugang zum Kapitalmarkt im Blick behalten werden muss. Der zweite Aufsatz, "The Macroeconomic Effects of a European Deposit (Re-)Insurance Scheme", wurde gemeinsam mit Marius Clemens und Stefan Gebauer geschrieben. Hier analysieren wir die Wohlfahrts- und Stabilisierungseffekte einer europäischen Einlagenrückversicherung. Unser Regime-Switching-Zwei-Länder-DSGE-Modell impliziert, dass eine europäischer Einlagenrückversicherungsfond Konjunkturschwankungen in beiden Ländern gut ausgleichen kann und die Risikoteilung zwischen beiden Ländern verbessert. Allerdings kann das Wirtschaftswachstum langfristig leiden, wenn die Einzahlungen der Banken in den jeweiligen Ländern in die europäische Einlagenversicherung schlecht gelöst sind. Im dritten Aufsatz, "The Financial Accelerator, Wages and Optimal Monetary Policy", analysiere ich in einem makroökonomischen Modell, welche Rolle Geldpolitik einnehmen sollte, wenn Friktionen auf der Bankenseite und Lohnrigiditäten existieren. Ich zeige, dass Zentralbanken im Fall von Finanzmarktschocks einen großen Fokus auf die Stabilisierung von Lohninflation legen sollten. Dies erklärt sich über die geringere Sensitivität von Kapitalnachfrage auf Änderungen in Reallöhnen im Falle von Friktionen auf dem Bankenmarkt. Höhere Reallöhne führen zudem zu Inflation und einem niedrigeren Risikoaufschlag auf Firmenkredite. / This thesis consists of three essays that focus on the role of heterogeneity in both the type and the degree of financial frictions for the pass-through of financial shocks and of monetary policy. In the first essay, "Firm Heterogeneity and the Capital Market", I investigate the importance of firms' financial constraints for the transmission of both equity shocks and monetary policy shocks. I am the first in the literature to obtain an instrument to equity financing shocks directly from firm-level data. I show in my study, that it is necessary to strictly distinguish between different forms of financial constraints if researchers want to investigate the role of firm heterogeneity on firm investment rates. In particular, financially constrained firms with high expected future profits increase their investment rate relatively more when capital market funding conditions are improved. In contrast, firm liquidity and high debt burden of firms explain the heterogeneity in firms' investment response to monetary policy. Therefore, policy makers have to consider both monetary policy conditions and access of firms to capital markets in order to relax the firms' financial constraints and to stimulate investment. The second essay, "The Macroeconomic Effects of a European Deposit (Re-) Insurance Scheme", is joint work with Marius Clemens and Stefan Gebauer. We analyze the stabilization effects of a common European deposit re-insurance scheme. To this end we build a two-country regime-switching general equilibrium model. The findings suggest that a common European deposit insurance scheme reduces business cycle fluctuations in both countries and improve risk sharing within the union. Long term macroeconomic performance however can deteriorate when contributions to the deposit insurance are non-deductible and designed poorly. In the third essay, "The Financial Accelerator, Wages and Optimal Monetary Policy", I investigate optimal monetary policy under the existence of both banking frictions and wage rigidities. In my macroeconomic model, I document that after the economy is hit by adverse financial shocks, monetary policy should stabilize wage inflation to improve welfare. This result can be explained as follows: The presence of financial frictions makes capital demand less elastic to changes in real wages. The wage-inflation stabilization regime that results in relatively higher real wages reduces the capital demand by less in comparison to the non-financial-friction economy. Higher real wages increase inflation and lowers the credit spread.

Subsidising investment in lagging regions is an important regional policy instrument in many countries. Some argue that this instrument is not specific enough to concentrate the aid towards the regions that are lagging behind most, because investment subsidies benefit capital owners who might reside elsewhere, possibly in very rich places. Checking under which conditions this is true is thus highly policy relevant. The present paper studies regional investment subsidies in a multiregional neoclassical dynamic framework. We set up a model with trade in heterogeneous goods, with a perfectly integrated financial capital market and sluggish adjustment of regional capital stocks. Consumers and investors act under perfect foresight. We derive the equilibrium system, show how to solve it, and simulate actual European regional subsidies in computational applications. We find that the size of the welfare gains depends on the portfolio distribution held by the households. If households own diversified asset portfolios, we find that the supported regions gain roughly the amounts that are allocated to them in the form of investment subsidies. If they only own local capital stocks, a part of the money is lost through the drop in share prices. From the point of view of total welfare, the subsidy is not efficient. It can lead to a welfare loss for the EU as a whole and definitely leads to welfare losses in the rest of the world, from where investment ows to the supported EU regions.

We set up a trade model with heterogeneous firms and a worker population that is heterogeneous in two dimensions: workers are either skilled or unskilled, and within each skill category there is a continuum of abilities. Workers with high abilities, both skilled and unskilled, are matched to firms with high productivities, and this leads to wage differentials within each skill category across firms. Self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting generates an exporter wage premium, and our framework with skilled and unskilled workers allows us to decompose this premium into its skill-specific components. We employ linked employer-employee data from Germany to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. Using these parameter estimates, we compute an average exporter wage premium of 5 percent. The decomposition by skill turns out to be quantitatively highly relevant, with exporting firms paying no wage premium at all to their unskilled workers, while the premium for skilled workers is 12 percent.

Subsidising investment in lagging regions is an important regional policy instrument in many countries. Some argue that this instrument is not specific enough to concentrate the aid towards the regions that are lagging behind most, because investment subsidies benefit capital owners who might reside elsewhere, possibly in very rich places. Checking under which conditions this is true is thus highly policy relevant. The present paper studies regional investment subsidies in a multiregional neoclassical dynamic framework. We set up a model with trade in heterogeneous goods, with a perfectly integrated financial capital market and sluggish adjustment of regional capital stocks. Consumers and investors act under perfect foresight. We derive the equilibrium system, show how to solve it, and simulate actual European regional subsidies in computational applications. We find that the size of the welfare gains depends on the portfolio distribution held by the households. If households own diversified asset portfolios, we find that the supported regions gain roughly the amounts that are allocated to them in the form of investment subsidies. If they only own local capital stocks, a part of the money is lost through the drop in share prices. From the point of view of total welfare, the subsidy is not efficient. It can lead to a welfare loss for the EU as a whole and definitely leads to welfare losses in the rest of the world, from where investment ows to the supported EU regions.