Inaug.-Diss.--Leipzig. / Lebenslauf. "Verzeichnis der wichtigsten Literatur": p. [xi]-xv.

No description available.

The solubility parameters for ten fractions of Athabasca vacuum residue were calculated from molecular representations via group additivity methods. Two methods were used; Marrero-Gani and Fedors. The calculated parameters were compared between the fractions for consistency, and also compared with other literature sources. The results from the Marrero-Gani method were satisfactory in that the values were in the expected range and the results were consistent from fraction to fraction. The final stage of the work on group additivities was to estimate the solubility parameter values at the extraction temperature of 473 K, and then compare the solutes to the solvents. The solubility parameters of the solvents were calculated from correlations and from the molecular dynamic simulation; the latter method did not result in fulfilling values. The most reasonable solvent and solute solubility parameters were used to assess the utility of the solubility models to explain the trends. The solubility models were not suitable for these types of materials. Stability of heavy oil fractions undergoing mild thermal reactions were predicted computationally for limited sample cracked molecules.

Inaug.-Diss.--Hochschule, Berlin, 1960. / On spine: Cansteins Beziehungen zu Spener. Bibliography: p. 184-197.

Zugl : Kath. Univ. Lublin, Diss.

Thesis advisor: Dermot Moran / In this dissertation, I critically evaluate the contributions of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) to the relatively neglected topic of the phenomenology of freedom. We can have, I argue, an experience of a “bias” of freedom in favor of the morally good: willing what is morally good renders one freer, and willing against what is morally good renders one less free. Attempts to reconcile freedom and morality have often identified freedom with autonomy, most famously in Immanuel Kant, or even rendered freedom determined by the morally good, as in Socratic intellectualism and in Scheler. These attempts neglect what Hildebrand finds to be the central feature of the will and freedom: the free self-donation (Hingabe) of the person, the will’s fiat (let it be); which is the key to the reconciliation of freedom and morality. The height of freedom, I argue, is embodied particularly in our freedom to sanction and disavow value-responses (Wertantworten) of the heart (esp. affective love), which Hildebrand calls “cooperative freedom” (mitwirkende Freiheit). In order to give ourselves to what has value, what has value must first be given to us. In Chapter One, I show that doing justice to this givenness requires, for Hildebrand, holding the radically realist epistemological claim that consciousness is directly receptive to being. Receptivity is prior to any activity on the part of the person; it comes before freedom. Chapter Two explores how things are given as having “importance” (Bedeutsamkeit) and “value” (Wert). Values issue a call (Fordern, “demand”) to give a proper response (Antwort). Chapter Two also outlines Hildebrand’s conception of phenomenology as involving “reverence” (Ehrfurcht). Reverence is openness to value’s word (Wort) and call to give that response. Reverence is defined as freely allowing oneself to be formed by the “laws” of values, and it is essential to freedom. Chapter Three argues that freedom’s most fundamental aspect is defined as “self-donation” (Hingabe), encapsulated in the fiat of the will. Building on William James and Edmund Husserl, Hildebrand expands the phenomenological account of willing as giving the person’s fiat to being moved by potential motives according to their objective importance, in what amounts to an act of giving oneself (Hingabe) in one’s free response. It is this notion of self-donation that enables Hildebrand to secure the independence of the will from affectivity (in contrast to Scheler) and from the mind (in contrast to James and Husserl). Yet this independence rests upon a dependence on values being given for the will to will. Reversing Kant and aligning more with Emmanuel Levinas, Hildebrand finds reverent “heteronomy,” not just autonomy, to be the foundation of the independence of the will and “invests” it with meaning and purpose. Chapter Four explores Hildebrand’s notion of cooperative freedom to sanction or disavow experiences according to their value. For Hildebrand, the sanction can only be actualized in accord with a “general will to be morally good,” or else it is an arbitrary pseudo-sanction. Unlike our freedom to do actions, cooperative freedom is a freedom that can only be fully actualized as a moral freedom. Hildebrand claims cooperative freedom does not pertain to the will, but to a separate “free personal center” (freies Personzentrum), because he associates the will with action. I will argue, nonetheless, that every fiat of the will includes what I term the “cooperative moment” of freedom, so that only a morally good fiat is fully actualized as a fiat. Chapter Five defines this general will to be morally good. It is a will composed of fundamental moral attitudes, particularly reverence for the hierarchy of values, that are the core of the virtues. In this concept of the general will, Hildebrand unites a Kantian concern for willing what is good-in-itself with Scheler’s concern for willing higher values over lower values. In so doing he comes to a unique synthesis of Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and value-ethics in his conception of good will, which all rest on the concept of self-donation. Chapter Six argues that any ethics that is based on what is good-in-itself necessarily, if it recognizes the unique preciousness of the person, becomes a love ethics, for love is the fullest and most proper response to the value of the person. Without recognizing this connection of ethics to love, one almost inevitably misses the connection between morality and happiness. In that case a morality based on the good-in-itself ends up appearing somewhat depersonalizing and burdensome. Just as it is legitimate to pursue one’s own happiness in love by making the beloved the condition of one’s happiness, so too with morality it is legitimate to pursue the happiness that only being moral can bring. So it is in the person who has a quality of loving goodness (Güte) for all where we experience the height of personal freedom as moral freedom. From a phenomenological analysis of this person, I derive four ways moral value enhances freedom: 1) it recollects the person to his or her deepest subjectivity (Eigenleben, “own life”), 2) it “supports” the will and prevents it from being arbitrary, 3) the happiness being moral can bring “nourishes” freedom by giving it energy and strength, and, finally, 4) the happiness being moral brings “intensifies” good activities, i.e., it makes the person readier to do them in the future. Chapter Seven argues that while one is free to reject value in favor of what Hildebrand calls the merely subjectively satisfying, doing so subverts freedom itself into prideful self-enclosure. It also annuls freedom in that it enslaves one to one’s desires. In contrast to Kant, this identification of freedom with moral freedom is not because freedom is the autonomy of following a law given in pure practical reason, but rather it is the reverent acceptance (fiat) of the “heteronomy” the word and law of values impose on us. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This thesis investigates the relationship between the architectural sculpture of Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović and late nineteenth-century aesthetic theory. Most scholarship on Meštrović emphasizes his Croatian heritage and his ties with the Vienna Secessionists and French sculptor Auguste Rodin. While acknowledging that these were important sources for Meštrović, this thesis also seeks to elucidate his shift in style during the first decade of the twentieth century and his continued commitment to clarity of form in his architectural sculpture. An in-depth look at Meštrović’s Kosovo Pavilion, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on Mount Avala near Belgrade, Serbia, and wood reliefs at the Kaštelet chapel in Split, Croatia in terms of German sculptor Adolf von Hildebrand’s 1893 treatise The Problem of Form in the Fine Arts reveals significant parallels between Meštrović’s work and Hildebrand’s ideas. Despite his widespread recognition and critical acclaim during the first half of the twentieth century, Meštrović has faded from discussions of modern art in much of the United States and Europe. This thesis aims to reintroduce Meštrović, offering new possibilities for thinking about his work as it relates to the aesthetic theory that was so important for artists of his time. / text

Thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universität Berlin, 1982. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 280-294).

This thesis examines the intellectual activity of the German Catholic philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) during the Weimar Republic (1918-1933). It fills a gap both in the Hildebrand scholarship and the history of Weimar Catholicism. It examines Hildebrand as an intellectual (following Stefan Collini's analytical concept), and argues that he can most adequately be described as a neo-conservative Catholic intellectual. Hildebrand was a profoundly religious person whose principal goal was the personal sanctification of educated Catholics through the renewal of the Catholic ethos. To this end he presented the Catholic worldview not in the form of neo-scholasticism as recently initiated by Pope Leo XIII, but in a new form. At the center of his novel presentation stood his Catholic personalism and his phenomenological value ethics. After an introductory chapter that outlines Hildebrand's upbringing, formation, and education with an eye to his conversion to the Catholic faith in 1914, the thesis situates and analyzes Hildebrand in the context of the four main discourses that he participated in during the Weimar Republic: Chapter two examines Hildebrand's contribution to the discourse on Siegkatholizismus, the confidence of Catholics to re- Christianize German and European culture after the First World War; chapter three examines Hildebrand's novel justification of Catholic teaching in the discourse on the crisis of marriage and sexuality during the middle years of the Republic; chapter four engages his social thought and his views on the relation between person and community during the final period of Weimar Germany; and chapter five explores Hildebrand's transnational activity against the background of a growing transformation of Catholic supranational identity through nationalism shortly before the Nazi takeover of power in 1933.

The main objective of this thesis is the description and evaluation of the position of germen speaking architects acting in Prague in the period of First Republic in Czechoslovakia. After defining the terminology and social context the thesis sorts out the broad group of German speaking architects into two circles according to their cultural surrounding. The thesis shows existing reasons for assorting the architects inclining to purely German culture and to the cultural environment influenced by German and Czech at the same time. The position of German speaking architects is constituted by the references in the press and literature, educational institutions, association activities and role of building owners. The thesis contribution is the reflexion of the German speaking architects in their remaining memories and periodicals.