This research explores the external and internal factors and their roles in shaping Turkish foreign policy, which has witnessed many changes in the post-Cold War era. External factors are explained by referring to structural systemic dynamics, while internal factors are conceptualised within the scope of agency. Analysis is conducted on three levels. At the ‘systemic level’, the effects of changes created by the international system are discussed based on the Neorealist view of the international system. To avoid the pitfalls of Neorealism, which ignores domestic and individual factors, the focus of the study is shifted to the main agential factors in the domestic sphere of foreign policy-making at ‘state level’. On the third platform of analysis, the ‘individual level’, ideational factors of key figures are integrated into foreign policy analysis. It is argued that systemic effects were influential on Turkish foreign policy in the first period (1990-2002), while agential factors were weak and incapable of responding enough to pressures generated by changes in the international system. In the second period (2002-2010), however, the role of the system in shaping Turkey's foreign policy lessened, while the stronger and coherent governmental agency started to be a rising factor in shaping foreign policy.

This thesis details the purchase of liberal internationalism on elite and public opinion between 1945 and 1975 by examining two of its bastions, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, better known as Chatham House, and the United Nations Association, the successor organisation to the League of Nations Union. It reveals how liberal internationalism survived the collapse of the League of Nations and the Second World War by exploring the relationships Chatham House and UNA had with the public, media, Whitehall and the main political parties. Chatham House and UNA had a significant impact upon these groups, acting as democratising agents in foreign policy by extending debate over international affairs beyond Whitehall. Nonetheless, although elite and popular liberal internationalism survived past 1945, it struggled to do so and in order to fully appreciate how, it is necessary to simultaneously assess the confines they and their fellow NGOs worked within. Chatham House and UNA’s impact upon the politics of foreign policy must also be understood in connection with the formal and informal political structures that restricted their attempts to democratise foreign policy; structures that promoted the illusory bifurcation of domestic and international affairs.

On the 25th November 1965 Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu staged a bloodless coup to take charge of the political turmoil in recently independent Congo and establish one of the most brutal and corrupt dictatorships in modern African history. This thesis explores the story of the American hand both in Mobutu’s fortuitous rise and its subsequent sustenance of his regime in the name of its geostrategic Cold War agenda. Spanning the administrations of four presidents from Lyndon Johnson to Jimmy Carter, this study considers the effects of the American Mobutu alliance on Congo and how its relationship with the Congolese leader in turn shaped the American approach towards the wider region and, ultimately, defined its Cold War in Africa. The thesis begins with the CIA-organised mercenary suppression of the Simba rebellion from 1964 to 1965, before offering a detailed analysis of the American role in bringing Mobutu to the helm of Congolese politics and ensuring the survival of his initially tenuous grasp on power. Having consolidated his grip on Congo, subsequent chapters investigate the American role in the establishment of the Mobutist ‘State Kleptocracy’, the part played by the Kinshasa despot in defining the American stand in the Angolan Civil War and, despite the by now obvious shortcomings of its Congo alliance, the Carter administration’s continued support for Mobutu when his regime was threatened by violent dissent once more. As such, this thesis aims to give a more comprehensive and detailed picture of the American Cold War alliance with Congo’s profligate dictator from 1964 to 1981.

This thesis comprises an empirical study of the British role in Yugoslavia and its successor states between 1991 and 1995, and demonstrates that the British government led the international 'consensus' during that time, through what may be considered a doctrine of assertive appeasement while, at the same time, misleading parliament on issues crucial to an understanding of the situation. It also demonstrates that British policy was consistent, unlike that of its western allies, in obstructing initiatives aimed at effective international military intervention, which resulted in a prolongation of the war, and advanced the agenda of the Belgrade regime. The motives which may have guided British policy in this instance are discussed briefly in the introductory chapter which offers an outline of the global framework within which British policy was formulated in the wake of the Cold War, with particular reference to Britain's place in the New European order, following the downing of the Berlin Wall, and in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty. A chronological approach has been adopted as the most appropriate in demonstrating some of the intricate manoeuvres which characterised British diplomacy in the region at crucial junctures of the war.

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This study describes how the New Order regime created and used a particular version of the Indonesian past. This official past drew on the work of "the history industry" (archaeological and historical research) and is reflected in approved works of history writing. The New Order past can also be seen in textbooks and in what monuments the regime erected. The New Order chose to emphasize fourteenth century Majapahit empire; this hierarchical, Java-centred, Hindu empire was identified as the true ancestor of the present nation. Although Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim in population, subsequent Muslim advances were not stressed, except as part of the "palace culture" of Central Java, which was seen as an extension of Majapahit. Islam also provided its share of "national heroes" who fought against the Dutch colonialists. Dutch control, was looked upon with some ambiguity; the colonial regime was oppressive but it also provided stability. The Dutch were driven out during the 1945--1949 Revolution. The New Order gave credit for the Indonesian victory in this struggle to the military rather than to civilians such as Sukarno. The Revolution later took on a more radical character that culminated in an attempt on the part of the Indonesian Communist Party to seize power. The suppression of the September 30 Movement in 1965 was seen as a righting of the nation's proper path of development, a course that could in fact be traced back to Gajah Mada's Majapahit. Not all were impressed with this official history. A more Islamic "history in waiting," which differed significantly from that of the regime, was created by historians and archaeologists working within the New Order. This "ummat-oriented" past stressed long connections between Indonesia and the rest of the Muslim world. The New Order's past was used to foster national integration and the legitimacy of the regime itself. The fate of the Suharto Presidency might indicate that the past was utiliz

This study deals with Allied policy for postwar Germany during the Second World War (1941-1945) and the Allied occupation (1945-1949). It is shown that the ideological division and the conflicting objectives of the occupation powers led to a disintegration of cooperation between the occupation powers, and resulted in the division of Germany as an alternative settlement to the "German Problem". The evidence is based on the available government documents, eye-witness accounts, and secondary sources.

This study addresses Government media policy throughout the Falklands War of 1982. It considers the effectiveness, and charts the development of, Falklands-related public relations’ policy by departments including, but not limited to, the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The literature of the 1980s concerning the media during the conflict still dominates the historiography of the subject. This thesis is the first significant reappraisal of the work offered during the decade in which the war occurred. It is informed by recently released archive material and newly conducted interviews, and boasts an extensive analysis of the content of the printed press during the conflict. There are a number of central hypotheses contained in this research (as well as many lesser theories). This thesis argues that media policy observed by the MoD in relation to the Task Force journalists was ill-prepared, reactionary, driven by internal MoD motivation and that ultimately, control of policy was devolved to the men on the ground. This thesis advances that MoD media policy in Britain, while as reactive as that rolled out to the Task Force, became more effective as the war progressed. The MoD failed to adequately cater for the British media until the middle of May 1982, at which time a number of sensible and potentially successful initiatives were introduced – specifically the News Release Group and the Military Briefing Group. It is also the contention of this work that the machinery developed centrally, by the Cabinet Office and No.10 Press Office in the form of the South Atlantic Presentation Unit and Information Group, had the potential to be successful additions to the regular organisation of Government. However, neither had enough authority and were plagued by departmental rivalries. While the media-related initiatives of the MoD ultimately became more successful, those of wider Government became less effective. Finally, this thesis provides a serious analysis of the printed press in order to substantiate the hypothesis that much of what had been argued about the printed press was generalised and oversimplified – its reliance on Argentine source material, its jingoistic nature, the dominance of reports on armed conflict and its aversion to a diplomatic settlement.

This thesis examines the utility of coercion theory in complex contemporary conflicts through a study of the Afghan conflict as it unfolded in the provinces of Faryab and Kunduz from 2005 to 2012. The last two decades have produced ample examples of incidents where the UN, international alliances or states have found it necessary to use force in order to coerce states or armed groups to stop unacceptable activities or change their behaviour. However, the potential of military force to induce behavioural change in such conflicts is understudied and poorly understood. In the Afghan conflict the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) together with the Afghan security forces applied force in order to influence the Taliban and other groups who violently opposed the elected government to change their behaviour. Although neither ISAF nor the participating nations had articulated a coercive strategy, force was used consistent with coercion theory on a number of occasions. Coercion theory consists of a number of assumptions and presuppositions, the existence of which should be present on the ground for theory to have utility. This thesis argues that these were generally not, or only to a limited degree present in the Afghan conflict. It further argues that in the cases where ISAF and its Afghan allies applied force consistent with theory, it did generally not translate to the desired outcomes, in particular when coercion represented the dominant effort. This thesis consequently argues that coercion theory is not well suited to provide explanatory power to or predict outcomes in conflicts that are comparable to the conflict in Afghanistan. In particular, theory’s presumption of unitary actors, the rationality presumption and the notion of the credible threat is insufficient. Theory’s notion of coercive mechanisms also assumes a connection between human behaviour and what may influence it that is overly simplistic. This consequently proposes a revised set of assumptions and presuppositions as well as a revised understanding of mechanisms that acknowledges that coercion alone is rarely sufficient to instil sustainable change.

This thesis unfolds from the observation that, in the years immediately following the defeat of Germany in May 1945, the radio was the best-preserved and most popular medium of mass communication. It explores the implications of the radio's dominance as a medium that both crosses and helps to define the boundaries of nation and region, as well as 'public' and 'private' space during a time when the upheavals of war and occupation were restructuring both the physical space of Germany as well as its political and symbolic spaces. It examines the practices of everyday broadcasting from the Allied-controlled radio stations in the western zones of occupied Germany to show how within the radio programmes, the diverse experiences of radio listeners were able to from part of a larger narrative of 'Germanness' at a time when Germany did not exist. Chapters explore the embedding of the radio within the every mental landscape of Germany, as well as within the private space of the home. It is argued that, in maintaining the relationships between the outside public world and the safe world of the home, the radio not only represented a means of remembering a collective German past, but also one of the primary places for the negotiation of new German identities in the present. Further chapters explore the ambiguities in the visions of these spaces produced by the radio. The production of private space is examined through a discussion of women's programming, showing the way that such programmes structured the debate surrounding women's position in society around their use of the scarce resource of time. A close examination how radio programming addressed the wider space of Germany shows how by imbuing the everyday visions of the broadcast region with the symbols of Heimat, radio programmes created a vision of Germany that at once embraced modernity and gave the impressions of maintaining a link with a usable past.