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Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics, Justice and the Human beyond Being. Levinas finds the early twentieth century to be marked by a rejection of the concept of humanity, at the moment of its awakening to its own brutality. While accepting the anti-humanist position, insofar as it questions the primacy of free will, and an unquestionable security in its attachment to a pregiven, universal Reason, Levinas' work questions the value of rethinking the human in terms of being. This thesis traces Levinas' attempt to rehabilitate humanity from its devotion to ontology as first philosophy. It argues that Levinas offers a reinterpretation of the relation of being and the human, tracing the movement in Levinas' work from a critical attempt to rethink the human and being, to the notion of the human beyond being. The thesis begins with a critical engagement with Heideggerian ontology suggesting that Levinas' renewal of the question of being in his prewar essays reflects a concern for the meaning of subjective existence and its relation to the social and political totality. These concerns lie behind his reinterpretation of the relation of existence and the existent in his essays of the 1940's in which Levinas undertakes a critique of a Platonic social totality and introduces a notion of the alterity of eros which does not have its value determined in terms of a teleology of social production. From this basis, Levinas is shown to address the question of justice by articulating the essentially ambiguous relation between the subject and another in terms of the ambivalence of the face, and contrasting this with the alterity of love. The development of these ideas is traced across Levinas' major works. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas argues that the response to the singular other is conceived of as the event of the production of a universal which affirms the tertiality of the social totality, that is, attests to the whole of humanity. In Otherwise than Being, the relation of ethics and justice is discussed in different terms, those of the relation of the ethical Saying and the realm of the Said or being's justice. Levinas juxtaposes the ontological tertiality of the third, with the notion of an ethical tertiality, which he calls illeity. Illeity is found to not be reducible to the ontological tertiality of the third party, but to name the exceeding of subjectivity in terms of an absolute susceptibility to the Other, and is an excessive concept of a singular universal: the human beyond being.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 1999. / Title from title screen (viewed Apr. 16, 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of General Philosophy, Faculty of Arts. Includes bibliography. Also available in print form.

When a Black person sees a display on stage of a fellow Black person getting killed by a White person, why do they not intervene to stop that killing from happening? One would answer, ‘Because it is just a performance. That Black person is not literally getting killed. It is all an act'. Fair enough. Then why does that spectating Black person get a heavy heart when he sees that killing being portrayed on stage? Is it because it is an experience he is familiar to? He has seen his fellow Blacks getting killed in front of his eyes. What does he do about what he sees on stage? What does the play do to his psyche? Richard Schechner, using Goffman's words, argues that the events on stage must be experienced as, what he deems, ‘actual realization': meaning that “the reality of performance is in the performing” (Bennet, 1997:11). Because the violence taking place on stage is only a performance, the spectator does not intervene as he might in an actual violence he would see taking place outside the theatre hall. However, that does not, as Schechner puts it, make the violence ‘less real' but ‘different real' (Bennet, 1997:11). The imaginary world of theatre is not an entirely ‘unreal' world, it is a world based on real occurrences. These real occurrences are taken to the imaginary world with hopes that when they are returned to the real world they will impact it in different ways, in ways set to transform it.

The following study seeks to investigate the impeccability of Christ from a historical/theological position. Two camps emerge on either side of the debate: Those who hold to the posse non peccare view which is to say, ability not to sin, otherwise known as the peccability view and those who hold to the non posse peccare view which is to say inability to sin, otherwise known as the impeccability view. While both camps affirm the sinless perfection of Christ they oppose each other in whether as fully human He could have sinned if He wanted to. It boils down to a case of ‘could have but did not’ or ‘did not because He could not have’. It is the view of this thesis that the non posse peccare view squares with both historical and biblical theology. We argue in chapter two by surveying Church councils up to the present time pertinent to this theme to prove that the history of this issue matters in that it establishes the relationship between Christology and history and by inference a major impact upon many outcomes in Church history. Our aim was to prove that this historical error goes a long way in distorting the gospel message. In chapter three we survey and evaluate the position from a peccability viewpoint while, at the same time, entering and notarising our points of departure. We have there highlighted the arguments peccability theologians utilise to defend their view and have criticised such from our Dispensational theology. In chapter four we then assess and acknowledge the argument for impeccability by proving the necessity of it for the exoneration of His Person and gospel. In the summit of chapter five we have surveyed the field of Scripture to have the final say on this issue and concluded in favour of impeccability. / MA (Dogmatics), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

The following study seeks to investigate the impeccability of Christ from a historical/theological position. Two camps emerge on either side of the debate: Those who hold to the posse non peccare view which is to say, ability not to sin, otherwise known as the peccability view and those who hold to the non posse peccare view which is to say inability to sin, otherwise known as the impeccability view. While both camps affirm the sinless perfection of Christ they oppose each other in whether as fully human He could have sinned if He wanted to. It boils down to a case of ‘could have but did not’ or ‘did not because He could not have’. It is the view of this thesis that the non posse peccare view squares with both historical and biblical theology. We argue in chapter two by surveying Church councils up to the present time pertinent to this theme to prove that the history of this issue matters in that it establishes the relationship between Christology and history and by inference a major impact upon many outcomes in Church history. Our aim was to prove that this historical error goes a long way in distorting the gospel message. In chapter three we survey and evaluate the position from a peccability viewpoint while, at the same time, entering and notarising our points of departure. We have there highlighted the arguments peccability theologians utilise to defend their view and have criticised such from our Dispensational theology. In chapter four we then assess and acknowledge the argument for impeccability by proving the necessity of it for the exoneration of His Person and gospel. In the summit of chapter five we have surveyed the field of Scripture to have the final say on this issue and concluded in favour of impeccability. / MA (Dogmatics), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

This thesis explores how metaphors of identity shape the practice of preaching and can encourage or limit attempts to witness to Jesus’ life, death and resurrection. It asks the question: Is there an identity that will encourage a faithful homiletic practice by embracing the full range of human capacities and gifts without asking the preacher to rely on him- or herself? It suggests that the homiletic identity of THE PREACHER AS ARTIST can lead preachers to understand their task in relation to the life and ongoing ministry of Jesus Christ and so give space to divine and human action in the event of preaching the word of God. The argument begins with an account of the present cultural moment and the suggestion that preachers should consider an identity that takes the imagination seriously in light of shifting cultural assumptions and expectations. It then describes the significance of metaphor for identity before looking at two established homiletic identities, THE PREACHER AS TEACHER and THE PREACHER AS HERALD. Accounts of these two identities highlight the tension between divine and human agency in the task of preaching. The thesis then examines the metaphor of THE PREACHER AS ARTIST. This attempt to re-describe the identity of preachers draws on a theology of communion and the doctrine of the vicarious humanity of Christ to relocate the identity and practice of the preacher in the creative and ongoing ministry of Jesus. The metaphorical association of the preacher and artist understood within the artistic ministry of Jesus Christ frees the full range of human capacities, including the imagination. It connects preachers to the person and work of Jesus Christ, who took the raw materials of the human condition and offered them back to the Father in a redemptive and imaginative fashion through the Holy Spirit.

Thesis advisor: O. Ernesto Valiente / Thesis advisor: Richard Lennan / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / The genetic enhancement the human genome would be humanity’s most extreme attempt in the quest for hyperagency, and will have negative implications for our sense of humanity. Hyperagency is an extreme over-expression of our own human agency; everything is transparent, subject to our control and manipulation, and in accordance with our own interests. Modern era philosophical theories in subjectivity and agency have developed, evolved, and responded to advancements in science and technology over the past few centuries, and have all contributed to the current shift in understanding of our own humanity, influencing the rise of hyperagency in the postmodern world. The act of manipulating an organism’s genetic material for the purposes of changing and modifying its characteristics is referred to as genetic modification. The term genetic enhancement is more specifically indicative of the process of modifying nonpathological, or non-disease related genes. Genetic enhancement, in the form of germline engineering especially, exhibits a dangerous attitude of hyperagency that will have negative consequences for humanity as a whole. Hyperagency not only disrupts our sense of reverence before mystery and depth but also threatens our sense of morality in relating to the world. If continued, practices in hyperagency such as genetic enhancement will lead us to lose our sense of humanity altogether. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis (B.A.) --Butler University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-53).