<p>Background: All companies and organizations use some kind of management control. A reward system is an example of a management control system, which is used to accomplish congruence between the goals of the employees and the goals of the organization. It is also used in order to motivate the employees and to encourage them to stay within the organization. Today it is difficult for companies and organizations to create and maintain well-functioning reward systems. At many universities individual pay is used as a means of a control system in order to motivate the employees. The public sector has specific characteristics that complicate its pay systems. This affects universities since they are a part of the public sector. </p><p>Purpose: The purpose is to investigate if the individual pay used at universities results in expected effects, that is, if it motivates professors in their work. The purpose is also to explain why professors are motivated/not motivated by individual pay. </p><p>Research method: The material has been gathered by interviews with eight professors at the University of Linköping. </p><p>Conclusion: It is difficult to use individual pay in order to motivate university professors in their work. Professors rather seem to be motivated by non-material rewards than by material such. In addition, individual pay systems can have defects that lessen the possibility of motivating professors. However, if professors have the tendency to be motivated</p>

Background: All companies and organizations use some kind of management control. A reward system is an example of a management control system, which is used to accomplish congruence between the goals of the employees and the goals of the organization. It is also used in order to motivate the employees and to encourage them to stay within the organization. Today it is difficult for companies and organizations to create and maintain well-functioning reward systems. At many universities individual pay is used as a means of a control system in order to motivate the employees. The public sector has specific characteristics that complicate its pay systems. This affects universities since they are a part of the public sector. Purpose: The purpose is to investigate if the individual pay used at universities results in expected effects, that is, if it motivates professors in their work. The purpose is also to explain why professors are motivated/not motivated by individual pay. Research method: The material has been gathered by interviews with eight professors at the University of Linköping. Conclusion: It is difficult to use individual pay in order to motivate university professors in their work. Professors rather seem to be motivated by non-material rewards than by material such. In addition, individual pay systems can have defects that lessen the possibility of motivating professors. However, if professors have the tendency to be motivated

Inom den offentliga sektorn har individuell lönesättning blivit ett vanligare tillvägagångsätt för att öka anställdas prestationsnivå. Även tro på den egna förmågan har en betydande roll för hur arbetsgivare bör hantera sin anställda vid lönesättning. Personer med hög self-efficacy söker sig till arbetsplatser med individuell lönesättning i högre grad än anställda med låg self-efficacy. Studiens syfte var att undersöka anställda inom den offentliga sektorns attityd till individuell lönesättning utifrån grad av self-efficacy och självskattad prestationsnivå. 174 anställda i åldrarna 19-68 tillfrågades om att delta i studien. Enkäten bestod av påståenden om attityd till individuell lönesättning, arbetsrelaterad self-efficacy och självskattad prestationsnivå. Resultatet visa på ett signifikant samband mellan attityd till individuell lönesättning och self-efficacy samt en tendens till ett positivt samband mellan attityd till individuell lönesättning och prestation. Slutsatsen blev att anställda med högre self-efficacy har en mer positiv attityd till individuell lönesättning men att det krävs mer forskning inom ämnet.

Sammanfattning Titel Lönesättande samtal i praktiken - En kvalitativ studie om hur chefer på Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap upplever management med fokus på lönesättande samtal. Nivå                        Datum Magister                  Augusti 2018 Författare               Handledare Victor Skoglund        Jonas Axelsson Syfte Syftet med denna studie är att få kunskap och djupare förståelse av lönesättande chefers upplevelser av management med särskilt fokus på arbetet med lönesättande samtal. Metod Studien är baserad på kvalitativ metod och det empiriska materialet har tagits fram med hjälp av semistrukturerad intervjuform. Sammanlagt har 7 intervjuer genomförts och urvalet består av lönesättande chefer som arbetar på Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. Resultat och slutsatser Undersökningen kommer fram till olika slutsatser angående lönesättande chefs arbete kring lönesättande samtal. Resultatet visar att det generella chefskapet innehåller vad bland annat Mintzberg (1973), Tengblad (2012), Kanter (1977) och Sayles (1964) kallar för managementarbete, eftersom chefskapet upplevs innehålla många och olika arbetsuppgifter, hektisk arbetsmiljö, förväntningar från berörda intressenter, långa arbetstider, anpassningsförmåga och beslut som ska främja verksamhetens intressen. Vidare visar studien att ekonomiska resurser, höga ingångslöner, omplacering till ny tjänst och allmänt formulerade lönekriterier försvårar lönesättande chefs arbete med lönesättande samtal. Studien skiljer sig något från Lysgaards (1985) teori om arbetarkollektivet då cheferna inte upplever något ”starkare” kollektiv bland medarbetarna. Däremot kan lönesättningen spegla efter hur kollektivavtalen är reglerade med fackförbundet ST, Seko och Saco. Slutligen visar studien att det råder maktfördelning till fördel cheferna enligt Korpis (1978) teori om makt och konflikt eftersom chefen, arbetsgivaren, är den beslutsfattande parten att påverka medarbetarens nya lön. Nyckelord Lönesättande samtal, Individuell lönesättning, Teknisk/ekonomiska system, Mänskligt system, Kollektivets system, Management, Arbetarkollektiv, Makt och konflikt. / Abstract Title Pay setting conversations in practice - A qualitative study on how managers at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency experience management regarding pay setting conversations. Level                     Date Magister-level         August 2018 Author                   Supervisor Victor Skoglund       Jonas Axelsson Aim The aim of this study is to gain knowledge and a deeper understanding of pay setting managers ́ experiences of management with a particular focus on the work of pay setting conversations. Method The study is based on qualitative methodology and the empirical material has been developed using semistructured interviews. A total of 7 interviews have been conducted and the selection consists of pay setting managers who work at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Results and conclusions The study reveals different conclusions regarding the pay setting managers ́ work with pay setting conversations. The result shows that the general leadership includes what Mintzberg (1973), Tengblad (2012), Kanter (1977) and Sayles (1964) calling for management work, because the leadership is perceived to contain many and different tasks, hectic working environment, stakeholder expectations, long working hours, adaptability and decisions to promote the company’s interests. Furthermore, the study results that financial resources, high entrance salary, redeployement of position and generally formulated salary criteria complicating pay setting managers ́ work with pay setting conversations. The study differs somewhat from Lysgaard's (1985) theory of the labor collective, since the managers do not experience any ”stronger” collective among the employees. On the other hand, the pay setting can reflect how collective agreements are regulated with the trade union ST, Seko and Saco. Finally, the study results that there is power distribution to the advantage of the leaders according to Korpi's (1978) theory of power and conflict because the manager, the employer, is the decision-making part to influence the employees ́ new salary. Keywords Pay setting conversations, Individual pay setting, Technical/economic system, Human system, Collective system, Management, Labor collective, Power and conflict.