Nowadays BE deals with many other issues besides loss aversion and the preference for fairness mentioned above. There are many works which examine such phenomena like the endowment effect, or the framing effect, the inequality aversion and the judgment choice discrepancy, the money illusion, or the mental accounting. This thesis will examine two of these topics: the discrepancy between choice and judgment and the inequality aversion. It will also try to prove that besides material payoffs there exist nonmaterial payoffs, which influence people's choices through their judgments and can be crucial in some situations, leading sometimes even to reversals in preferences.

In standard contract-theoretic models, the underlying assumption is that an agent is purely selfish, and his objective is to maximize his own payoff. A large amount of empirical evidence has pointed out that many individuals are also motivated by other psychological considerations, such as fairness concerns and reciprocity. Theorists have been engaged in finding more realistic assumptions that are consistent with the ways in which economic agents behave in real life. Among the existing theories, the theory of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt [35] has attracted enormous attention. It soon became a useful tool in behavioral contract theory, which capitalizes on the power of social preferences theories to enhance understanding of real-world contracting phenomena. The present thesis aims at contributing to the behavioral contract literature by investigating how inequality aversion preferences impact on the optimal contract design in a financial contracting environment and the agent's incentive in a career concerns experiment. Chapter 2 reviews some of the recent theoretical contributions to the development of the theories of reciprocity and fairness. Emphasis is placed on sketching the theories, demonstrating their abilities to explain experimental regularities and pointing out some potential problems that are inherent in the existing theories. In addition, we present a survey of the recent theoretical contributions linking inequality aversion and the theory of incentives, where the traditional selfish agent assumption is replaced by the more realistic assumption that the individual agent is also inequality-averse. Incorporating more realism into economic modelling, such as assuming some individuals are inequality-averse, appears to be a promising avenue for research in the theory of incentives, as it generates more refutable predictions that models based on the selfish agent assumption cannot offer. Chapter 3 analyzes a tractable two-period staged financing model in which a single principal interacts with an agent who is risk-neutral and inequality-averse, offering him an equity contract. We fully characterize the menu of the optimal sharing contracts. Our results show that inequality-aversion changes the structure of the optimal contract. More importantly, we show that it is more likely we will observe an equal sharing contract when the agent is inequality-averse. Our findings for efficiency comparison indicate that inequality-aversion exacerbates the distortions caused by moral hazard, which leads to a further downward distortion in terms of total social welfare in this staged financing context. Incorporating inequality-aversion into a dynamic staged financing game thus allows us to interpret real-world contractual arrangements in the venture capital industry where equal split contracts dominate. In Chapter 4, we revisit the innovative Holmström's-type career concerns experiment by Irlenbusch and Silwka [47]. In particular, we introduce inequality-aversion, a theoretical short cut for reciprocity, into the analysis and investigate if it is the missing link that potentially drives the results in the experiment. Two related but conceptually different models are considered. The complete information model confirms that inequality-aversion induces positive effort in the second period, but does not predict any differences in the effort choices across both periods in the revealed-ability setting. The incomplete information model's predictions conform more closely to the observations in the revealed-ability setting, and its predictions for the hidden-ability setting can partly explain the lower effort choices observed in the hidden-ability setting. Our analysis suggests that inequality-aversion is part of the missing link, but not all. Incorporating fairness intentions into the analysis should open more opportunities for explaining the experimental results in Irlenbusch and Silwka. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1339820 / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, Business School, 2008

This paper investigates the influence of two representative other-regarding preferences on specified issues. The first chapter studies the preferred tax rate and labor supplies of voters in the presence of income inequality aversion in a two-stage redistribution game. The two-stage redistribution game consists of a first stage in which voters vote for a flat tax rate on income with the revenues redistributed evenly and a second stage in which workers, who are also voters, provide the labor supplies with the tax rate given. I specify inequality aversion preferences into two ways: The payoff inequality aversion represents people's preference to divide their material payoff evenly, and the income inequality aversion represents people's preference to divide their income evenly without considering their efforts to earn that income. In conclusion, payoff inequality-averse workers provide the same labor supplied as a worker who does not have any inequality aversions (a standard worker) but prefers a higher tax rate to a standard worker. The income inequality-averse workers, first, provide their labor supply considering their positions in a skill distribution and, therefore, adjust their labor supply such that the income curve becomes flatter. High-skilled workers tend to earn less income, while low-skilled workers tend to earn more income. Second, the income share of the richest decreases with the degree of inequality aversion up to a point. Third, inequality-averse workers do not necessarily prefer a higher tax rate to a standard worker, mainly because some level of income inequality is already self-adjusted in the second stage. The second chapter looks at how reciprocal preferences influence coalition size in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal preferences represent how a decision maker gains an additional positive utility when it responds to a kind action with a kind action or to an unkind action with an unkind action. I incorporate reciprocal preferences in a two-stage game that predicts the decision of each government to participate in an agreement that decreases pollutant emissions. The main result shows that bigger coalition forms than the standard preference does not include reciprocal preferences. Reciprocal governments that participate in the treaty (signatories) suffer from unkindness based on pollution by non-signatories so that the threat to retaliate by polluting becomes credible. Then, free-rider governments (non-signatories) on the margin surrender to the implicit threat and participate in the treaty. Furthermore, including reciprocity reverses the usual result that there is an inverse relationship between the marginal benefit and coalition size. In other words, the size of coalition increases with the marginal benefit of abatement in an equilibrium when the reciprocal sensitivity is sufficiently high. Signatories are more likely to retaliate against non-signatories because the benefit to non-signatories of refraining from decreasing emissions aggravates the unkindness to signatories.

A new IAM is used to calculate the optimal tradeoff between, on the one hand,locking up fossil fuel and curbing global warming, and, on the other hand,sacrificing consumption now and in the near future. This IAM uses the Oxford carbon cycle, which differs from DICE, FUND and PAGE in that cumulative emissions are the key driving force of changes in temperature. We highlight how time impatience, intergenerational inequality aversion and expected trend growth affect the time paths of the optimal global carbon tax and the optimal amount of fossil fuel reserves to leave untapped. We also compare these with the adverse and deleterious global warming trajectories that occur if no policy actions are taken. (authors' abstract) / Series: Ecological Economic Papers

This diploma thesis deals with income inequality measurements and concentrates mostly on the subjective parameters that are used in inequality computations. The core of the thesis is an evaluation of data from a survey, in which a questionnaire was completed by 150 people, mostly students and recent graduates. The most surprising finding is that approximately one third of respondents support the absolute invariance principle; eventually, this means a denial of many types of measurements in welfare economics, including the Gini Index. In the questionnaire, the respondents were also supposed to estimate actual Czech income distribution. All groups of respondents, not excluding economists, substantially overestimated the lowest income class size.

Governments, international agencies, and researchers routinely assess health and income inequalities and inequities so as to better communicate the evidence of their levels and trends to both policy-makers and the general public. Measuring the extent to which differences in health or income are unequal or unfair is, however, complex. This thesis contains three chapters centrally concerned with inequalities, though the focus differs across chapters. Chapter 2 helps address the gap between the requirements of indices often used for measuring income-related health inequality and current research practice by providing a non-technical review and critical assessment of the recent literature. This chapter should function as a guide for policy researchers and analysts to help them be more critical consumers of studies that use these indices while also helping applied researchers in choosing inequality measures that have the normative properties they seek. Most measures of inequality make assumptions about the extent to which society is averse to inequality. Moreover, analysts often assume that attitudes toward inequalities in health or income are the same. Chapter 3 is the first study using a mixed-methods approach to assess public attitudes toward inequalities in income, health, and income-related health inequality to determine preferences and how attitudes toward inequalities in these domains differ. Chapter 2 and 3 contribute to a greater understanding of the measurement and interpretation of inequalities. While chapters 2 and 3 focus on inequalities among individuals within a society, chapter 4 focuses on inequalities globally among societies. Chapter 4 examines global health inequalities that result from medical care use using the example of long-standing drug technologies for treating hypertension. The study links availability and affordability of blood-pressure-lowering medicines with individual use and health outcomes. Chapter 4, therefore, provides an empirical illustration on how country-specific policies can play an important role in either countering or exacerbating health differences. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis concerns itself with different aspects of inequality related to health and income, though the focus differs across chapters. The second and third chapters of this thesis contribute to a greater understanding of the measurement and interpretation of inequalities. Whereas the fourth chapter provides empirical evidence on how country-specific policies can counteract or exacerbate health differences. Chapter 2 comprehensively reviews and critically assesses the literature on the technical and normative properties of indices commonly used for measuring income-related health inequality thereby addressing the gap between the requirements of these indices and current research practice. Chapter 3 investigates public attitudes toward inequalities in income, health, and income-related health inequality to determine preferences and where attitudes toward these inequalities differ. Chapter 4 examines global health inequalities that result from medical care use using the example of long-standing drug technologies for treating hypertension and links availability and affordability of medicines with individual use and health outcomes.

<p>This thesis addresses the issue of weighted cost-benefit analysis (WCBA). WCBA is a welfare evaluation model where income distribution effects are valued by distributional weighting. The method was developed already in the 1970s. The interest in and applications of this method have increased in the past decade, e.g. when evaluating of global environmental problems. There are, however, still unsolved problems regarding the application of this method. One such issue is the choice of the approach to the means of estimating of the distributional weights. The literature on WCBA suggests a couple of approaches, but gives no clues as to which one is the most appropriate one to use, either from a theoretical or from an empirical point of view. Accordingly, the choice of distributional weights may be an arbitrary one. In the first paper in this thesis, the consequences of the choice of distributional weights on project decisions have been studied. Different sets of distributional weights have been compared across a variety of strategically chosen income distribution effects. The distributional weights examined are those that correspond to the WCBA approaches commonly suggested in literature on the topic. The results indicate that the choice of distributional weights is of importance for the rank of projects only when the income distribution effects concern target populations with low incomes. The results also show that not only the mean income but also the span of incomes, of the target population of the income distribution effect, affects the result of the distributional weighting when applying very progressive non-linear distributional weights. This may cause the distributional weighting to indicate an income distribution effect even though the project effect is evenly distributed across the population.</p><p>One rational for distributional weighting, commonly referred to when applying WCBA, is that marginal utility of income is decreasing with income. In the second paper, this hypothesis is tested. My study contributes to this literature by employing stated preference data on compensated variation (CV) in a model flexible as to the functional form of the marginal utility. The results indicate that the marginal utility of income decreases linearly with income.</p><p>Under certain conditions, a decreasing marginal utility of income corresponds to risk aversion. Thus the hypothesis that marginal utility of income is decreasing with income can be tested by analyses of individuals’ behaviour in gambling situations. The third paper examines of the role of risk aversion, defined by the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, for people’s concern about the problem of ‘sick’ buildings. The analysis is based on data on the willingness to pay (WTP) for having the indoor air quality (IAQ) at home examined and diagnosed by experts and the WTP for acquiring an IAQ at home that is guaranteed to be good. The results indicate that some of the households are willing to pay for an elimination of the uncertainty of the IAQ at home, even though they are not willing to pay for an elimination of the risks for building related ill health. The probability to pay, for an elimination of the uncertainty of the indoor air quality at home, only because of risk aversion is estimated to 0.3-0.4. Risk aversion seems to be a more common motive, for the decision to pay for a diagnosis of the IAQ at home, among young people.</p><p>Another rationale for distributional weighting, commonly referred to, is the existence of unselfish motives for economic behaviour, such as social inequality aversion or altruism. In the fourth paper the hypothesis that people have altruistic preferences, i.e. that they care about other people’s well being, is tested. The WTP for a public project, that ensures good indoor air quality in all buildings, have been measured in three different ways for three randomly drawn sub-samples, capturing different motives for economic behaviour (pure altruism, paternalism and selfishness). The significance of different questions, and different motives, is analysed using an independent samples test of the mean WTPs of the sub-samples, a chi-square test of the association between the WTP and the sample group membership and an econometric analysis of the decision to pay to the public project. No evidence for altruism, either pure altruism or paternalism, is found in this study.</p>

This thesis addresses the issue of weighted cost-benefit analysis (WCBA). WCBA is a welfare evaluation model where income distribution effects are valued by distributional weighting. The method was developed already in the 1970s. The interest in and applications of this method have increased in the past decade, e.g. when evaluating of global environmental problems. There are, however, still unsolved problems regarding the application of this method. One such issue is the choice of the approach to the means of estimating of the distributional weights. The literature on WCBA suggests a couple of approaches, but gives no clues as to which one is the most appropriate one to use, either from a theoretical or from an empirical point of view. Accordingly, the choice of distributional weights may be an arbitrary one. In the first paper in this thesis, the consequences of the choice of distributional weights on project decisions have been studied. Different sets of distributional weights have been compared across a variety of strategically chosen income distribution effects. The distributional weights examined are those that correspond to the WCBA approaches commonly suggested in literature on the topic. The results indicate that the choice of distributional weights is of importance for the rank of projects only when the income distribution effects concern target populations with low incomes. The results also show that not only the mean income but also the span of incomes, of the target population of the income distribution effect, affects the result of the distributional weighting when applying very progressive non-linear distributional weights. This may cause the distributional weighting to indicate an income distribution effect even though the project effect is evenly distributed across the population. One rational for distributional weighting, commonly referred to when applying WCBA, is that marginal utility of income is decreasing with income. In the second paper, this hypothesis is tested. My study contributes to this literature by employing stated preference data on compensated variation (CV) in a model flexible as to the functional form of the marginal utility. The results indicate that the marginal utility of income decreases linearly with income. Under certain conditions, a decreasing marginal utility of income corresponds to risk aversion. Thus the hypothesis that marginal utility of income is decreasing with income can be tested by analyses of individuals’ behaviour in gambling situations. The third paper examines of the role of risk aversion, defined by the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, for people’s concern about the problem of ‘sick’ buildings. The analysis is based on data on the willingness to pay (WTP) for having the indoor air quality (IAQ) at home examined and diagnosed by experts and the WTP for acquiring an IAQ at home that is guaranteed to be good. The results indicate that some of the households are willing to pay for an elimination of the uncertainty of the IAQ at home, even though they are not willing to pay for an elimination of the risks for building related ill health. The probability to pay, for an elimination of the uncertainty of the indoor air quality at home, only because of risk aversion is estimated to 0.3-0.4. Risk aversion seems to be a more common motive, for the decision to pay for a diagnosis of the IAQ at home, among young people. Another rationale for distributional weighting, commonly referred to, is the existence of unselfish motives for economic behaviour, such as social inequality aversion or altruism. In the fourth paper the hypothesis that people have altruistic preferences, i.e. that they care about other people’s well being, is tested. The WTP for a public project, that ensures good indoor air quality in all buildings, have been measured in three different ways for three randomly drawn sub-samples, capturing different motives for economic behaviour (pure altruism, paternalism and selfishness). The significance of different questions, and different motives, is analysed using an independent samples test of the mean WTPs of the sub-samples, a chi-square test of the association between the WTP and the sample group membership and an econometric analysis of the decision to pay to the public project. No evidence for altruism, either pure altruism or paternalism, is found in this study.

Cette thèse a pour objet de fournir une méthode d'évaluation simple de l'inégalité et de la mobilité des revenus. Nous utilisons une méthode de décomposition récemment introduite dans la littérature et aujourd'hui connue sous le nom de emph{décomposition faible}, pour analyser la répartition des écarts de revenus entre les individus appartenant à un même sous-groupe et ceux situés dans des sous-groupes distincts. Nous nous intéressons en particulier aux contextes dans lesquels il peut être pertinent de faire appel à un tel outil de décomposition. Nous approfondissons nos recherches en précisant les propriétés normatives des indicateurs compatibles avec le schéma de décomposition faible en sous-groupes. Nous énonçons notamment des principes de transferts intra- et intergroupes afin de fournir des moyens d'actions représentatifs des préférences d'un décideur politique. Les fondements axiomatiques de cette propriété de décomposition en sous-groupes sont également abordés. Des fonctions de pondération plus générale mais néanmoins conformes aux schémas de décomposition en sous-groupes usuels sont introduites. Cette généralisation nous permet de caractériser axiomatiquement des mesures d'inégalité à 2 paramètres que nous qualifions de (alpha,delta)-Gini. Ces 2 paramètres alpha et delta permettent de capter l'ensemble des points de vue politique des décideurs publics (d'extrême gauche à extrême droite). Nous montrons de plus que l'application de la décomposition faible en sous-groupes se généralise aisément à l'étude de la mobilité des revenus. Nous proposons ainsi une adaptation de la propriété de décomposition en sous-groupes dans un cadre bidimensionnel et caractérisons 2 classes de mesures d'inégalité de croissance ajustée et de mouvements de revenus cohérentes avec cette condition. Diverses études empiriques sont également menées afin d'illustrer les différentes notions développées dans cette thèse. / This Ph.D. Dissertation aims at providing accurate and simple tool to evaluate income inequality and mobility. Our work relies on a subgroup decomposition property recently introduced in the literature as the $``$emph{weak decomposition}$"$ to break down total disparities into within-group and between-group disparities. A particular interest is given to the context in which subgroup decomposition can be applied. We introduce within-group and between-group transfer principles that can be modulated according to a decision maker's preferences. The axiomatic basis of the subgroup decomposition property are also dealt with. Some general weighing functions are introduced to caracterize a two-parameters class of inequality measures denoted denoted (alpha,delta)-Gini. The parameters alpha and delta allow capturing the set of decision's maker point of view (from extrem leftist to extreme rightist). Furthermore, we demonstrate the the application of the weak decomposition can easily be extended to income mobility. We propose an adaptation of the subgroup decomposition property to a bimensional framework and we characterize 2 classes of inequality adjusted growth and income movements measures consistent with such a property. Various empirical studies are also carried out to illustrate the various developed concepts.

Les disparités socio-spatiales sont à la fois une cause et une conséquence des inégalités sociales. Cette thèse interroge le rôle des inégalités sociales dans la formation et la correction des disparités socio-spatiales. Elle est composée de trois essais, qui éclairent différentes facettes de ce questionnement, faisant intervenir les migrations résidentielles et les politiques publiques. Le premier essai analyse la pertinence des orientations stratégiques nationales de la politique de développement rural à l'aune du débat philosophique sur la justice sociale. Il met en évidence le rôle que joue et que devrait jouer l'objectif de réduction des inégalités sociales dans la définition d'une politique agissant sur les disparités socio-spatiales. Les deux essais suivants montrent comment les inégalités sociales génèrent des disparités socio-spatiales par le biais des mobilités résidentielles de longues et de courtes distances. Le second essai étudie les effets du sentiment d'aversion à l'inégalité locale et de la politique de redistribution du revenu sur les mobilités et les disparités interrégionales, dans le cadre théorique de la Nouvelle Economie Géographique. Le dernier essai examine comment les inégalités sociales conditionnent les choix résidentiels et induisent une ségrégation socio-spatiale au sein des aires urbaines françaises, à l'aide de modèles économétriques de choix discrets / Socio-spatial disparities are both a cause and a consequence of social inequalities. This thesis questions the role of social inequalities in the formation and correction of socio-spatial disparities. It is composed of three essays shedding light on different sides of this issue, involving residential migrations and public policies. The first essay analyses the relevance of the national strategic orientations of the rural development policy by the yardstick of the philosophical debate on social justice. It puts in evidence the role that play and should play the objective of reducing social inequalities in the definition of a policy acting on socio-spatial disparities. The two following essays show how social inequalities generate socio-spatial disparities through long and short distance residential moves. The second essay studies the effect of the feeling of aversion toward local inequality and of the income redistribution policy on interregional migrations and disparities, in the theoretical framework of the New Economic Geography. The last essay examines how social inequalities determine residential choices and produce socio-spatial segregation in the French urban areas, using econometric discrete choice models