A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management by Research and Dissertation / This study focuses on the gap-filling role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). The use of development banks as a policy instrument to spur economic growth has been a practice followed internationally since World War II. Development banks are intended to extend financing to undertakings in the market economy deemed by the private sector as posing too much financial risk. Usually, these are development-orientated, low-profit green-fields projects initiated by clients in the public sector. By financing such development projects traditionally excluded by the market, the development bank fills a gap in the market. The DBSA was established in 1983 to bridge the gap between the industrialised central government and the underdeveloped Bantustan states and independent territories. At the time, the Bank could finance any development project so long as it fell within the Southern African region. However, post 1994, the DBSA mandate changed, shifting its focus to the public sector – low-income municipalities – and to particularly, specialise in financing infrastructure projects. Now altered, its development finance functions extended far beyond the Bantustan territories and independent states. Interest in the DBSA’s gap-filling role was generated by the observation that it had not been providing development finance according to the traditional tenets of understanding development finance. The problem was two-fold. The Bank’s target client was not necessarily the most deserving. Additionally, projects financed by the DBSA did not automatically fall within the infrastructure development mandate. This thesis has explored how, in light of its financier role prior and post 1994, the DBSA interpreted and acted in relation to its mandate as set out in its policy documents and strategies. This study also delved into the nature of projects financed and if they were in line with the traditional understanding of gap-filling. As well, this report investigated factors contributing to the DBSA’s deviation from its gap-filling role. To carry out this research, case study methodology was used in tandem with the qualitative approach. To answer research questions in-depth-unstructured interviews and document analysis were used. The study was both an exploration of the DBSA’s gap-filling role as well as examination of development finance in action in the South African context. The study drew on literature in New Institutional Economics (NIE) as an umbrella theory best suited to explore the DBSA’s gap-filling role. It was found that prior to 1994 the DBSA did act in line with its gap-filling role. However, post 1994 the Bank most certainly deviated from its gap-filling role. Contributing factors to this divergence were found to be an increasingly competitive private sector, confusion over its development mandate, a challenging municipal client base and a self-sustainability funding model. Prior to 1994, the DBSA enjoyed a monopoly over its target client base, the Bantustan states and independent territories. It had a broad development mandate coupled with capital backing from the Republic of South Africa (RSA) central government. Post 1994, the DBSA mandate was infrastructure development targeted towards the public sector. The Bank was required to adopt a self-sustainability funding model. This, coupled with entry into a competitive private sector moving into the development space, placed a great deal of pressure on the Bank. Therefore, it became necessary to finance profit generating projects rather than those initiated by its mandated low-income high risk client base – poor municipalities. This study contributed to DFI literature by illustrating what functions DFIs are mandated to perform compared to what they do in reality. Also, this analysis has shown traditional market-failure studies assume DFIs perform a gap-filling role. This has to be re-examined taking into account the changing institutional environment. And, particularly in South Africa, more studies need to be conducted to further understand limitations and opportunities the DFI model offers for overall development.

Ho Wing-Kee. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-66). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Content --- p.v / List of Table --- p.vi / List of Appendices --- p.vii / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Theoretical Framework --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Regime 1 ( Social Planner Model) --- p.10 / Chapter 3.2 --- Regime 2 ( Provision of Indivisible Public Capital by the Government Model ) --- p.14 / Chapter 3.3 --- Regime 3 ( Provision of Indivisible Public Capital by the Public Monopoly Model) --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Quantitative Comparison --- p.27 / Chapter 4.1 --- Calibration --- p.27 / Chapter 4.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.29 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.31 / Appendices --- p.42 / References --- p.60

Since the enactment of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Act of 2009, there has not been a single successful PPP transaction entered into between the Government of Zambia and any private sector entity under the PPP Act of 2009 (Zambia Development Agency, 2014: 7). According to the Zambia Development Agency (2014:7), 75% of the PPPs that were entered into by the government of Zambia prior to the promulgation of the PPP Act of 2009 were canceled. These include: the Kasumbalesa Border Post, Mpulungu Harbour and Railways Systems of Zambia with an exception of the 65 year concession of the Luburma Market (popularly known as Kamwala Market). These cancellations of PPP concessions coupled with revelations in the Zambian Parliament that concession documentation for the Luburma market which is the only surviving PPP had since gone missing, this led to the research problem statement with an assertion that risks associated with infrastructure project finance are endemic in Zambia. In seeking to explore the validity of this assertion, three research objectives guided the study, namely: assessing Zambia’s general infrastructure project finance and PPP framework in comparison to theoretical normative criteria and selected country experiences; identifying and rating risks through a questionnaire; and proposing an ideal project finance risk management model which can be used as a reference by sponsors in Zambia as they design and structure infrastructure project finance deals. On a scale of 1-5 which was guided by the overal risk score outlined in the study, the average mean score ranking for all the 40 risks under investigation was found to be 3.25 .This indicates that the sentiments among respondents is that risks associated with infrastructure project finance in Zambia are average and not endemic as was affirmed in the problem statement. Despite this ‘comforting’ statistical result, the little progress in terms of earmarked infrastructure PPP deals coupled with deal cancellations as outlined above may be an indication that even the average risks appear to impede on the development of project finance and PPPs in Zambia. There is therefore an urgent need for Government and other relevant stakeholders to begin paying attention to some of the risks discussed in this study especially those with a mean score ranking in excess of 3.50 (high risk). The study in chapter 9 provides recommendations which are grouped under four key headings: addressing the environment for PPPs; providing capacity to procuring entities; paying attention to critical success factors for project development; as well as exploring a variety of possible credit enhancement mechanisms such as guarantees as a way of wooing project investors and improving the bankability of planned infrastructure deals. The Government of Zambia is further advised to avoid using ‘political feasibility “as the core investment criteria in the infrastructure agenda for the country. The study encourages that conventional benchmarks which are a mix of technical soundness, economic viability, environmental and social sustainability, financial/commercial viability as well as market readiness remain the core guiding principle in the project identification process. This will be the only way to avoid developing “white elephants” that may perpetually be a burden to the treasury and tax payers.

Public asset management is a critical component of the financial integrity of government. However, in practice, problems exist in the field of public asset management at different levels of government in the United States. This research explores the management of public fixed assets owned, controlled and used by state governments in America. It attempts to answer two major questions: (1) What are the characteristics of a modern public asset management system based on the available literature? and (2) How do public asset management practices at the U.S. state government compare to the system standard described in the first question? Based on systems theory and current research on public asset management and public procurement systems, this research develops an intellectual framework of a public fixed asset management system. This system is composed of six interdependent cornerstones, including legal and regulatory requirements, organization structure, management process throughout th e life cycle of assets, human capital strategies, information and technology resources, and monitoring, integrity, and transparency. Each cornerstone consists of a number of components that reveal the underlying working principles of the relevant cornerstone and together determine the standards of fixed asset management in the relevant area. Survey results demonstrate that state governments fundamentally satisfy the standards identified in the fixed asset management system. However, certain problems obviously exist in the area of each cornerstone. In addition, survey results reveal that the six cornerstones of fixed asset management system are interrelated with one another. In most states, when a management element in the area of one cornerstone is widely implemented, the relevant management elements in areas of other cornerstones are employed and vice versa. / A major contribution of this research is the development of a fixed asset management system. State and federal governments may compare their fixed asset management to the standards identified in this system. Local governments may find appropriate management components to adapt to their characteristics from this system. / by Yaotai Lu. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

This study explores the connections of public procurement official perceptions of public-private partnerships and their contracting decisions for public infrastructure projects. Detailed discussion of previous scholarship and its focus on policymaking and project evaluation of public-private partnerships leaves a gap in the public policy process – implementation. Procurement officials are presented in the role of policy implementers rather than agents in a principalagent approach. This attempts to address a shortcoming of the description that these officials do nothing more than purchase. Arguments are put forth that these officials are given additional levels of discretion when faced with contracting decisions. Specifically, procurement officials observe that public-private partnerships provide sets of project consequences. A survey instrument is designed to explore the differences in perceptions that procurement officials have with respect to public-private partnerships and traditional contracting out. Survey failures result in findings only being able to attempt a more general view of public-private partnerships. Results allow perceptions to be placed in a decision-making model based on a project phase approach that develops on the assumption that tasks contracted to private vendors produce project consequences. Furthermore, analysis of significant consequence perceptions indicate that those perceptions do not provide a rationale for a procurement official’s decision-making on whether to contract using a public-private partnership for public infrastructure projects. Independent sample t-tests, controlled correlations, multiple ANOVA and linear regression analyses show that perceptions of consequences, the perceptions of differences of those consequences across project phases, relationships of consequences to perceptions of efficiency and effectiveness proxies and a bounded rationalitybased model of decision-making for procurement officials are all inconclusive. Discussion focuses on the development of consequences and phases as defining and clarifying public-private partnerships. Further discussions are presented for procurement officials with respect to their decision-making and possible role as policy implementers. Conclusions fail to uncover any inferential results. The research finds its primary contribution in the conceptual discourse of public procurement official roles and public-private partnership definitions. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

by Leung Ada Nga Ting, Tsang Hin Kwok. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-104). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.vi / LIST OF APPENDICES --- p.viii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.ix / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- NEW WORLD DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD --- p.3 / Introduction --- p.3 / Thesis --- p.3 / Company Background --- p.5 / Entrance into the Power/Infrastructure Business --- p.8 / The Spin-off of New World Infrastructure Ltd. (NWIL) --- p.9 / The Group's Strategy On Its Infrastructure Investments --- p.13 / Major Dates / Events --- p.14 / Analysis --- p.17 / New World's Project-Financing Structure --- p.17 / "Possible Reasons Underlying The ""Suboptimal"" Project-Financing Structure" --- p.19 / Strong Financial Affordability --- p.20 / Lack Of Access To External Project Debt Financing --- p.20 / Policy Not Welcome Use Of External Debt --- p.22 / The Structure Is Really Not So Suboptimal After All --- p.23 / Infrastructure Development As Only A Chinese Investment Vehicle --- p.24 / A Very Unique Set Of Arrangements At The Project Level --- p.34 / Extension Of Joint Venture Terms --- p.35 / PRC Joint Venture Partner Directly Bears The Losses Suffered By The Group --- p.35 / Renegotiation Of Revenue Terms To Ensure Repayment Schedule --- p.36 / Priority & Guaranteed Repayment Schedule On New World's Principal And Interest Payments --- p.36 / Limited Or No Responsibilities For Cost Overruns Or Delays --- p.39 / Guaranteed Minimum Revenues --- p.40 / Market Interpretations Of New World's Infrastructure Venture --- p.41 / Conclusions --- p.43 / A Final Assessment --- p.44 / Concluding Words --- p.45 / Chapter III. --- HUANENG POWER INTERNATIONAL INC --- p.47 / Introduction --- p.47 / Thesis --- p.47 / Company Background --- p.48 / HIPDC --- p.48 / The Formation of HPI --- p.48 / The Reorganization of HPI --- p.50 / Asset Transfer --- p.51 / Debt Transfer --- p.51 / Combined Offering (IPO) --- p.52 / Post-Offering Ownership --- p.53 / Major Events --- p.55 / Analysis --- p.57 / The New Tariff Setting Regulatory Policy And Its Advantages --- p.57 / Old Tariff Structure --- p.57 / New Tariff Structure --- p.58 / Tariff Rate Tied Into The Net Fixed Assets --- p.59 / The Result Of The NFA-Tied Rate Calculation --- p.61 / Other Features Of The Pricing Policy Include The Following: --- p.62 / A Capital Structure That Reduces Risk --- p.62 / Reviewing The Performance of HPI --- p.65 / An Analysis of The Performance of HPI's Stock Price --- p.65 / No Dividends Policy --- p.65 / Lack Of Confidence In The Chinese Government --- p.65 / Environmental Factors --- p.66 / Financing Good News --- p.66 / Downward Revisions In Earnings Forecasts --- p.67 / Conclusions --- p.68 / Concluding Words --- p.69 / Chapter IV. --- "SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS" --- p.70 / APPENDICES --- p.73 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.95

Thesis (MDF (Development Finance))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Infrastructure and related services are crucial for facilitating economic activities, creating employment opportunities and generating economic growth. The African continent has a huge infrastructure gap estimated by the World Bank at US$75 billion per annum. However, the current levels of public sector resources and foreign capital inflows in Africa are insufficient to fund this infrastructure gap. Africa, therefore, needs to explore new sources of funding to finance its infrastructure backlog. It is then natural that Africa should encourage the private sector to invest in the infrastructure sector. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the worldwide funded pensions market is about US$24.6 trillion of which US$16.2 trillion is held by pension funds (Inderst, 2009). Infrastructure investments provide important benefits including long-term and inflation-hedged cash revenues which are compatible with pension fund interests. Pension funds around the world have been already investing in infrastructure assets, for example in Latin America, Australia, Canada and the United States of America (US) amongst others. However, such experiences of pension fund participation in infrastructure financing in Africa are very rare. Anecdotal evidence suggests that African pension funds currently manage assets of about US$300 billion. If a small portion of the pension fund assets could be invested in infrastructure projects in Africa, the continent’s infrastructure gap could be partly addressed. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a programme of the African Union, seeks to address the infrastructure gap and mobilise the necessary resources domestically and from outside the continent. NEPAD, together with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the regional economic communities, has developed an Infrastructure Plan for Africa. This study explores the possibility of utilising some of the Africa pension fund assets for infrastructure investments especially in the NEPAD infrastructure projects. The global trends in pension fund investments in infrastructure are reviewed to propose a model for infrastructure investments by African pension funds and some recommendations are put forward on how to increase such investments. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Infrastruktuur en verwante dienste is krities vir die fasilitering van ekonomiese aktiwiteite, die skep van werksgeleenthede en om ekonomiese groei te genereer. Die Afrika-kontinent het ’n groot infrastruktuur-gaping wat deur die Wêreldbank op US$75 biljoen per jaar beraam word. Die huidige vlakke van openbare-sektor hulpbronne en buitelandse kapitaalinvloei is egter onvoldoende om hierdie infrastruktuur-gaping te befonds. Afrika moet daarom nuwe bronne vir befondsing ondersoek om sy infrastruktuur agterstand te befonds. Dit is dan natuurlik dat Afrika die privaatsektor sal aanmoedig om in die infrastruktuur-sektor te belê. Volgens die Organisasie vir Ekonomiese Samewerking en Ontwikkeling (OECD), is die wêreldwye pensioenmark omtrent US$24.6 triljoen waarvan US$16.2 triljoen deur pensioenfondse gehou word (Inderst, 2009). Infrastruktuur-beleggings bied belangrike voordele insluitend langtermyn- en inflasie-verskanste kontantinkomstes wat versoenbaar is met pensioenfonds belange. Pensioenfondse regoor die wêreld het alreeds begin om in infrastruktuurbates te belê, byvoorbeeld in Latyns-Amerika, Australië, Kanada en in die Verenigde State van Amerika. Sulke gevalle van pensioenfonds deelname aan infrastruktuur-finansiering in Afrika is egter seldsaam. Daar word gespekuleer dat Afrika se pensioenfondse tans bates bestuur van ongeveer US$300 biljoen. As ’n klein gedeelte van die pensioenfondsbates in infrastruktuur-projekte in Afrika belê kon word, sou die kontinent se infrastruktuur-gaping gedeeltelik aangespreek word. Die nuwe vennootskap vir Afrika se ontwikkeling (New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD), ‘n program van die Afrika Unie, streef daarna om die infrastruktuur gaping aan te spreek en die nodige hulpbronne binnelands en van buite die kontinent te mobiliseer. NEPAD, tesame met die Afrika Ontwikkelingsbank (AfDB) en die streek se ekonomiese gemeenskappe, het ’n infrastruktuur-plan vir Afrika ontwikkel. Hierdie studie ondersoek die moontlikheid om ’n gedeelte van Afrika se pensioenfondsbates vir infrastruktuur-beleggings aan te wend, veral in die NEPAD infrastruktuur-projekte. Die wêreldwye neigings in pensioenfondsbeleggings in infrastruktuur word ondersoek om ’n model voor te stel vir infrastruktuur-beleggings deur Afrika pensioenfondse en ’n paar aanbevelings word gemaak om sodanige beleggings te verhoog.