This study aims to add a new dimension to research in Australia on the use of accounting ratios to predict corporate failure. Previous studies have used the statistical technique of discriminant analysis to derive models for predicting whether a firm will or will not fail. This study will use the same statistical technique but with three differences: / (a) The ratios to be used in the discriminant analysis are selected by a method which ensured that no arbitrary limit is placed on their number. / (b) Because the significance of accounting ratios can vary from industry to industry, four industries are separately analysed: manufacturing, retail, property, and finance. / (c) The statistical probabilities yielded by the analysis are used to measure a firm’s current level of insolvency risk. / The extra dimension is added by interpreting the characteristic patterns of insolvency risk which emerge: an analysis of the factors causing the differences in these patterns throws new light on the causes, symptoms, and remedies of financial distress.

In many regions of the world, the solvency regulation of insurers is becoming more principle-based and market oriented. However, the exact forms of the solvency standards that are emerging in individual jurisdictions are not entirely consistent. A common risk and capital framework can level the global playing field and possibly reduce the cost of capital for insurers. In the thesis, a conceptual framework for measuring the insolvency risk of life insurance companies will be proposed. The two main advantages of the proposed solvency framework are that it addresses the issue of incentives in the calibration of the capital requirements and it also provides an associated decomposition of the insurer's insolvency risk by term. The proposed term structure of insolvency risk is an efficient risk summary that should be readily accessible to both regulators and policyholders. Given the inherent complexity of the long-term guarantees and options of typical life insurance policies, the term structure of insolvency risk is able to provide stakeholders with more complete information than that provided by a single number that relates to a specific period. The capital standards for life insurers that are currently existing or have been proposed in Canada, U.S., and in the EU are then reviewed within the risk and capital measurement framework of the proposed standard to identify potential shortcomings.

In many regions of the world, the solvency regulation of insurers is becoming more principle-based and market oriented. However, the exact forms of the solvency standards that are emerging in individual jurisdictions are not entirely consistent. A common risk and capital framework can level the global playing field and possibly reduce the cost of capital for insurers. In the thesis, a conceptual framework for measuring the insolvency risk of life insurance companies will be proposed. The two main advantages of the proposed solvency framework are that it addresses the issue of incentives in the calibration of the capital requirements and it also provides an associated decomposition of the insurer's insolvency risk by term. The proposed term structure of insolvency risk is an efficient risk summary that should be readily accessible to both regulators and policyholders. Given the inherent complexity of the long-term guarantees and options of typical life insurance policies, the term structure of insolvency risk is able to provide stakeholders with more complete information than that provided by a single number that relates to a specific period. The capital standards for life insurers that are currently existing or have been proposed in Canada, U.S., and in the EU are then reviewed within the risk and capital measurement framework of the proposed standard to identify potential shortcomings.

<p>To be able to protect themselves from credit risk, the banks must constantly check the performance of  the companies they have lent money to. There are many mathematical models for predicting financial distress. These models use accounting-based ratios, which often are historical and not representative for the present situation. This study describes how the banks do in practice to find signals of insolvency in time and the variables they are observing for doing that.</p><p>In addition to financial reports which the company sends in to the bank at least once a year, also the relationship between them and information from different information  agencies are of great importance to track  signals of insolvency. Poor profitability is the primary cause of insolvency. It is caused mainly because of bad business and leadership.  Eventually will  poor profitability lead  to consuming of equity capital and place the company in an illiquid situation. Then it may be difficult for the company to pay their bills and signals of insolvency become obvious and  the  banks start then to sharpen  their attention on the companies and intensify the follow-up works.</p><p>Another find-out  of the  study  is  that local factors which  are  contributing to failure are  the  large companies that are active  in the area. When they are in a bad situation, it affects the suppliers. The big difference between service and manufacturing companies  regarding insolvency  is  that service companies are more flexible regarding cutting down costs when bad times come.</p> / <p>För att undvika stora kreditförluster måste bankerna ständigt bevaka de företag som de har lånat pengar till och försöka förutse signaler om obestånd för dem. Det finns många matematiska modeller för  att förutse  konkursrisken. Problemet är dock att dessa modeller använder redovisningsbaserade data vilka oftast utgör  en historisk ögonblicksbild av den finansiella ställningen då de skrivs ner  och inte är representativa for den nuvarande situationen. Denna studie redogör för hur bankerna i praktiken gör för att identifiera  signaler om obestånd i tid och vilka variabler de tittar på för att göra det.</p><p>Förutom finansiella rapporter som företaget sänder in till banken minst en gång om året, har även relationen  parterna  emellan  och  information  från  olika upplysningsbyråer stor betydelse för att spåra signaler  om obestånd  i förväg. Dålig lönsamhet är den främsta orsaken till obestånd. Den  orsakas  främst av dåligt företagande och dålig ledarskap. Så småningom kommer dålig lönsamhet att  leda  till  att det egna kapitalet förbrukas och företaget hamnar i en illikvid situation. Då  kommer  företaget  få det  svårt att  betala  sina räkningar  och signalerna  för obestånd  börjar  dyka upp. Banken börjar då  skärpa uppmärksamheten och intensifiera uppföljningsarbetet.</p><p>Det kom också fram i undersökningen  att lokala faktorer som bidrar till obestånd är stora företag som är verksamma i området. När det börjar gå dåligt för dem påverkar det underleverantörer och inhyrda konsulter.  Den stora skillnaden mellan tjänste-  och tillverkningsföretag, vad gäller obeståndsrisken, ligger i att tjänsteföretag är mer flexibla angående nedskärning av kostnaderna när dåliga tider kommer.</p>

To be able to protect themselves from credit risk, the banks must constantly check the performance of  the companies they have lent money to. There are many mathematical models for predicting financial distress. These models use accounting-based ratios, which often are historical and not representative for the present situation. This study describes how the banks do in practice to find signals of insolvency in time and the variables they are observing for doing that. In addition to financial reports which the company sends in to the bank at least once a year, also the relationship between them and information from different information  agencies are of great importance to track  signals of insolvency. Poor profitability is the primary cause of insolvency. It is caused mainly because of bad business and leadership.  Eventually will  poor profitability lead  to consuming of equity capital and place the company in an illiquid situation. Then it may be difficult for the company to pay their bills and signals of insolvency become obvious and  the  banks start then to sharpen  their attention on the companies and intensify the follow-up works. Another find-out  of the  study  is  that local factors which  are  contributing to failure are  the  large companies that are active  in the area. When they are in a bad situation, it affects the suppliers. The big difference between service and manufacturing companies  regarding insolvency  is  that service companies are more flexible regarding cutting down costs when bad times come. / För att undvika stora kreditförluster måste bankerna ständigt bevaka de företag som de har lånat pengar till och försöka förutse signaler om obestånd för dem. Det finns många matematiska modeller för  att förutse  konkursrisken. Problemet är dock att dessa modeller använder redovisningsbaserade data vilka oftast utgör  en historisk ögonblicksbild av den finansiella ställningen då de skrivs ner  och inte är representativa for den nuvarande situationen. Denna studie redogör för hur bankerna i praktiken gör för att identifiera  signaler om obestånd i tid och vilka variabler de tittar på för att göra det. Förutom finansiella rapporter som företaget sänder in till banken minst en gång om året, har även relationen  parterna  emellan  och  information  från  olika upplysningsbyråer stor betydelse för att spåra signaler  om obestånd  i förväg. Dålig lönsamhet är den främsta orsaken till obestånd. Den  orsakas  främst av dåligt företagande och dålig ledarskap. Så småningom kommer dålig lönsamhet att  leda  till  att det egna kapitalet förbrukas och företaget hamnar i en illikvid situation. Då  kommer  företaget  få det  svårt att  betala  sina räkningar  och signalerna  för obestånd  börjar  dyka upp. Banken börjar då  skärpa uppmärksamheten och intensifiera uppföljningsarbetet. Det kom också fram i undersökningen  att lokala faktorer som bidrar till obestånd är stora företag som är verksamma i området. När det börjar gå dåligt för dem påverkar det underleverantörer och inhyrda konsulter.  Den stora skillnaden mellan tjänste-  och tillverkningsföretag, vad gäller obeståndsrisken, ligger i att tjänsteföretag är mer flexibla angående nedskärning av kostnaderna när dåliga tider kommer.

Corporate governance practices of fintech companies have caused to increase in risk or caused to decrease in the risks. This study is mainly focused to identify the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, especially board structure and ownership structure, on the market-based risk of fintech companies. We have employed several corporate governance mechanisms such as, board size, board independence, board expertise on fintech, CEO duality, risk committee functioning, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership of the fintech companies. Total risk, systematic risk, market risk,and insolvency risk are employed as our dependent variables to examine this phenomenon. We have selected 46 listed fintech companies that are listed in any stock market of the world. Data is collected through 2012-2022 period. We have conducted our analysis using 369 unbalanced panel datasets. Our purpose was to emphasize the importance of better corporate governance mechanisms to risk management in fintech companies. From the management point of view, investors’ point of view, or directors’ point of view, what changes should do to better risk management of the company and also their personal benefit? In the recent past, two bluechip fintech companies have bankrupt due to corporate governance mispractices and risk management issues. Our results show that, corporate governance is one of the key factors in determining risk of the fintech companies. We have identified that the best practices caused to decrease risk while mispractices caused to increase risk.

This dissertation has three chapters studying accounting conservatism in the property-liability (P&L) insurance industry. There are two types of accounting conservatism – ex-ante (unconditional) conservatism and ex-post (conditional) conservatism. The former means that firms over-report liabilities initially, before more detailed information becomes available. The latter means that firms respond to this new information asymmetrically by recognizing expected losses more quickly than expected gains. My analysis throughout the dissertation focuses on the loss reserve accruals since it is the most significant accruals on the balance sheet. One benefit of studying the P&L insurance industry is that we have specific and detailed information regarding the development of loss reserve accruals over time. Chapter 1 is an executive summary of the next two chapters, highlighting the key results, the policy implications, and the contributions of the dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the two types of accounting conservatism and explore three research questions: (1) whether ex-ante and ex-post conservatism prevails in the P&L insurance industry; (2) what the relations are between ex-post conservatism and other managerial incentives including ex-ante conservatism; and (3) how much the opportunity cost is for being conservative. I study all U.S. domiciled P&L insurance companies from 1996 to 2012 and follow the previous literature to measure accounting conservatism in Chapter 2. I find that both types of accounting conservatism prevail in the insurance industry. Besides, the back-of-the-envelope estimates based on the industry average insurer indicate that their opportunity costs are trivial compared to the amounts of net income and total assets. Chapter 2 also shows that the practices of ex-ante and ex-post conservatism exhibit a nonlinear, U-shape relationship. This finding supports the view that the two types of conservatism can be compliments because they can serve for different purposes. Ex-ante conservatism is mainly used to create a cushion against future unexpected losses, whereas ex-post conservatism can reduce informational frictions. In Chapter 3, I develop a new method of assessing conditional conservatism using more detailed data from the insurance industry. I look at how conditional conservatism affects insolvency risk and the financial strength rating of P&L insurance companies. I also investigate how a change to accounting rules affects conditional conservatism. The new method of measuring conditional conservatism is based on the concavity of the loss development curve. I study all U.S. domiciled P&L insurance companies from 1995 to 2015 and find that the greater the degree of conditional conservatism, the lower is insolvency probability, and the better is the financial strength rating, with other things being constant. The result indicates that regulators and rating agencies do reward insurers that voluntarily utilize conditional conservatism accounting strategy. Moreover, I find that the level of conditional conservatism is reduced after the enactment of the Model Audit Rule (MAR). MAR, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404, increased board oversight of internal risk management. The result suggests that complying with additional disclosure requirements provides a “safe harbor” for insurance companies so that they have fewer incentives to be conditionally conservative. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance

財政部所推動保單紅利自由化及費率自由化政策提供壽險商品市場的另一發展方向，促進我保險市場良性競爭，且自民國九十二年自由分紅保單進入台灣壽險市場，已有數十家壽險公司相繼搶這塊大餅，目前市面上的分紅保單大多採用美式三元利差分紅方式，在紅利部分尚不可設定保證給付，亦即沒有保證保戶每年都一定會領到利差分紅。因此，本研究將介紹在歐洲廣為盛行、附最低保證給付的英式分紅保單，作為國內業者在分紅保單設計上的參考指標。 本研究主要以傳統壽險商品為研究範疇，在不考慮有解約權下以隨機模擬的方式對英式分紅保單進行公平定價。研究方法為在大量模擬下找出不同投資策略的Markowiz效率前緣曲線，並選用這些投資策略於給定不分紅保單的預定利率下，在公平精算原則為前提下以蒙地卡羅法(Monte Carlo Methods)的方式，針對不同目標期末紅利率(Terminal Bonus Target；TB)，找出分紅保單應有的合理預定利率及期間紅利率。再去衡量保險公司不同資產配置下，因為未達到期望紅利所造成的風險。此外，本研究更進一步地以靜態及動態投資策略探討保險公司失去清償能力(Insolvency Risk)的問題。 最後在上述架構下，本研究為了符合市場實際情況，分別針對不同保單期間與不同的繳費方式進行敏感度分析。